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Abstract 
How is the forecast behaviour of professional individuals? Are they accurate and efficient, 
and how are their performances compared to the consensus’ performance? Do their forecasts 
differ in the special episodes of the Volcker disinflation and in the recent financial crisis? 
And are individuals employed in certain industries outperforming individuals employed in 
other industries? This thesis examines these issues, using survey data of the one-year ahead 
inflation rate in the United States, derived from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
Several aspects of the forecasting behaviour of individuals are highlighted. The consensus 
mean and median forecasts and most individuals are unbiased. They also pass some 
efficiency tests, even though they are not strong-form rational. The performance of consensus 
forecasts is better than the performance of the majority of individuals, though several 
individuals make accurate forecasts. Even though individual differences exist, there are few 
differences between the forecasters employed in different industry categories. The forecasters 
performed were worse during the Volcker disinflation, though not as bad as we might expect. 
And during the recent financial crisis, the performances of forecasters have not worsened. 
Additionally, the forecasts seem to have improved over time.  
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Preface1 
Inflation is very important for the economy. For central banks conducting monetary policy, it 
is decisive to control the inflation and therefore to have knowledge of individuals’ inflation 
expectations. Inflation expectations have been debated and studied a lot in modern 
macroeconomics. Different results are found, thus no final conclusions are drawn. With this 
paper I want to contribute to the existing literature by looking at professional survey 
respondents forecasts in a detailed manner. The dataset I have been using contains individual 
data, and enables me to look at the forecasts on an individual level. However, the numbers of 
individuals have been limited, and there are several problems with the dataset that needs 
consideration. In addition several findings are explained by intuition, reasoning and 
comparison with previous results. Hence, the findings should not be viewed as hard evidence. 
Bergen, June 18th, 2012 
 
Karen Oftedal Eikill  
                                                        
1 This paper was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration program 
- Major in Financial Economics. Neither the institution, nor the advisor is responsible for the theories and 
methods used, or the results and conclusions drawn, through the approval of this thesis.  
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1. Introduction 
Inflation expectations are debated and studied a lot in modern macroeconomics. Many 
economic agents base their real decisions on inflation expectations. Hence, their expectations 
are important for the economy. Among those are policymakers conducting fiscal policy, 
firms setting prices and management and labour negotiating on wages. For central banks, the 
control of inflation is decisive in their goal of pursuing good monetary policy. Because 
inflation expectations influence the actual inflation they also influence the conduction of 
monetary policy performed by the central bank (Bernanke, 2007). Macroeconomic models 
also emphasize inflation expectations and argue that they are crucial. Forecasts can provide 
important information about inflation expectations, and have in a comprehensive study by 
Ang et al. (2007) been found to forecast the inflation better than other possible methods. 
Almost all central banks with inflation targeting study and evaluate surveys with inflation 
expectations (Kershoff & Smit, 2002). Hence, such surveys are considered valuable and is 
naturally often studied and examined. 
Many macroeconomic models assume that the rational expectations hypothesis holds 
(Mankiw, et al., 2003). The hypothesis has been an object of a lot of studies, and different 
conclusions have been drawn. Because the monetary policy implications of rational 
expectations are very different from the implications of other, more backward-looking 
models, studies of the hypothesis continue. In this thesis we examine the forecast behaviour 
of professional forecasters, investigating if they are accurate and rational. Using the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF), we study the one-year ahead inflation expectations of 
individual respondents. Even though examining the rationality of the forecasts in the SPF 
have been performed by previous studies, relatively few have examined rationality on an 
individual level. To truly understand the nature of forecasters it is important to look at how 
individuals perform and whether there are differences between them. Because most previous 
literature and economic models do not account for individual differences, we find analysing 
the subject both interesting and valuable. Together with the fact that our data sample is new, 
containing forecasts of the recent financial crisis, our detailed discussion of the rationality 
and accuracy of individuals is a contribution to the existing literature.  
We also add to the literature an analysis of the industry variable containing in the survey. We 
compare the industries to find if differences exist. In addition we examine the effects of the 
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Volcker disinflation and whether the forecast performance of individuals has altered in the 
recent financial crisis. Our paper also documents problems with the SPF. No previous papers 
have, to our knowledge, examined all these problems. 
The questions we want to answer in this paper are thus; how rational are individual 
forecasters? How do they perform compared to consensus forecasts and do we observe any 
patterns among them? Do the employment of individuals matter for their forecast 
performance? And have the rationality of individuals been affected by the Volcker 
disinflation and the financial crisis? 
When analysing the whole sample, we find that the accuracy and the rationality of individuals 
vary a lot. Both the consensus and the majority of individuals are unbiased. With the majority 
of individuals passing less tests of efficiency than the consensus, the performance of 
individuals can be claimed worse than the consensus. But even though the majority are “less” 
rational than the consensus, there are many individuals whose performances are relatively 
good. Examining the rationality of individuals employed in different industries leaves us with 
no particular distinctions. A strategic incentive of for example media attention, is, however, 
more likely to exist among the individuals employed in the nonfinancial sector.  
Results regarding the Volcker disinflation indicate quite accurate forecasts, even in this 
decreasing inflation period. Even though the majority of individuals are biased, there are 
many individuals for whom we cannot claim biasedness. A quite surprising result also 
emerges when we analyse the rationality of forecasters during the recent financial crisis. Both 
consensus forecasts and individuals performed better during the financial crisis than in the 
whole sample. Even when we compare with a more recent sample starting in the second 
quarter of 1990, this result holds.  
Hence, the individuals are quite accurate, but not strong-form rational. This holds for almost 
all tests performed with our data. The forecasts also seem to improve over the surveyed years. 
Several results point in this direction; the best respondents are located in the end of the 
survey period, the sample that starts in the second quarter of 1990 performs a bit better than 
the whole sample and the forecasts made during the recent financial crisis are relatively good. 
Both these results are in accordance with previous literature (Croushore, 2006; Gerberding, 
2006).  
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In the following, we start in section two with a presentation of what the inflation is and the 
importance of it, together with some theory about expectations. A presentation of both the 
survey data and the actual data follows in section three. Section four contains theory about 
how to examine and test accuracy and rationality of forecasts, and section five presents our 
dataset together with some problems that we had to deal with (and the chosen solution for 
those). Section six presents our analysis part. When analysing, we start examining the whole 
sample, before analysing the industry variables, the Volcker disinflation and the financial 
crisis.  
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2. Inflation expectations 
The annual inflation is the yearly increase in the price level in an economy. The inflation 
makes money less worth, thus decreasing the purchasing power. If the inflation is negative 
the price level decreases and deflation is present.  
The inflation is very important for the economy. Decreasing the value of money, it makes the 
value of wages and the value of loans smaller. The inflation is important for both the rulers of 
a country and its inhabitants. Keeping the price level stable, thus having a low inflation rate 
over time, will promote growth, efficiency and stability. This will, all else equal, support a 
maximum sustainable employment. For central banks conducting monetary policy, 
controlling the inflation is decisive (Bernanke, 2007). Several countries have inflation 
targeting as their monetary regime (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997). The main goal of the 
monetary policy of the central banks in these countries is to keep the inflation stable.  
We begin presenting inflation expectations and a presentation of expectations theory in 
section 2.1. In 2.2 we present and discuss briefly some previous literature that are discussing 
inflation expectations. 
2.1 Theory and importance of inflation expectations 
The aim of this section is to present inflation expectations. Theory about expectations in 
general is presented in 2.1.1. We continue debating the importance of inflation expectations 
in section 2.1.2, before discussing how to measure them in 2.1.3.   
2.1.1 Expectations theory 
How expectations are formed is very important. The most popular theory about the formation 
of expectations is probably the rationality expectations hypothesis, with a popular alternative 
being adaptive expectations (Mankiw, et al., 2003). If expectations about the inflation are 
formed adaptively, one expects the next year inflation to be equal to the inflation over the 
past year (Mankiw, et al., 2003).  If true, the expected inflation would contain no new 
information. Making an effort to gather those would then be a waste of time. However, 
according to several previous studies, for example the mentioned by Ang et al. (2007), 
expectations can provide valuable new information (others who claim this are Thomas (1999) 
and Gerberding (2006)). Thus, the backward-looking hypothesis of adaptive expectations 
fails, and finding a way to measure and trace the expectations is desirable.  
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The rational expectations hypothesis assumes that a sufficiently large number of people know 
“how the world works”, making rational predictions based on the information they have 
available at any time (Zarnowitz, 1992). As defined by Muth (1996 cited in Gerberding, 
2006, p.316); “Expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are 
essentially the same as the predictions of relevant economic theory.” Hence, Muth assumes 
that the subjective expectations of economic agents match the predictions of the relevant 
economic theory, and therefore do not make systematic mistakes (Gerberding, 2006). 
If expectations are rational they should be both unbiased and efficient. If unbiased, forecast 
errors are zero on average, and if efficient individuals use all relevant information when they 
form their expectations. To exploit this information, individuals have to do a lot of research 
and they have to keep updated on previous values of the economic variable that they are 
going to forecast (Gerberding, 2006).  
Efficiency could be both weak-form and strong-form (Thomas, 1999). Weak-form efficiency 
requires that individuals adequately consider information they have in past values of the 
variables they are forecasting. This criterion is based on the notion that while historical 
information about the variable itself can be viewed as costless, other information is costly. 
Therefore, individuals cannot be required to account for all other information.  
If individuals are strong-form efficient they exploit all information available where the 
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost of gathering, learning and utilizing this 
information when they predict the inflation (Thomas, 1999). Because different individuals 
have different marginal costs and benefits, defining the exact level of available information 
that individuals should utilize to be defined as strong-form efficient is difficult.2  
Because the implications for the conduction of monetary policy are different if expectations 
are formed rational compared to adaptive, it is of importance for politicians and central banks 
to study how expectations are formed (Bullard & Mitra, 2002). Studies find that observed 
inflation expectations are not consistent with either adaptive or rational expectations 
                                                        2 It could also be questioned if the criterion of strong-form rationality, if expressed as individuals exploring all 
available information, is too strict (Gerberding, 2006). This because the amount of knowledge required is large 
and it is time-consuming to keep updated. However, if one considers the marginal cost of utilizing the 
information smaller than the marginal benefit, one should demand individuals to update themselves on this type 
of information. 
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(Roberts, 1998; Mankiw, et al., 2003). To know how individuals form their expectations is 
difficult, and further research on this topic is thus important.  
2.1.2 The importance of inflation expectations  
Inflation expectations are important for those who make decisions about the future. 
Policymakers conducting fiscal policy, firms setting prices and making decisions about 
investments, investors who are hedging the risk of nominal assets, management and labour 
negotiating on wages and central banks and politicians who are conducting monetary policy, 
all base their decision on their expectations about future inflation (Ang, et al., 2007). Because 
they affect real agents’ decisions, the inflation expectations have a true effect on the real 
economy. Many macroeconomic models involving the inflation emphasize inflation 
expectations and argue that they are crucial (Mankiw, et al., 2003). Thus inflation 
expectations are important also for economic research. Several OECD countries base their 
monetary policy on inflation targeting. For those the inflation expectations are especially 
important (Diebold, et al., 1997; Thomas, 1999). 3  Naturally, the important inflation 
expectations have been an object of many studies (Gerberding, 2006).  
Changing inflation expectations, and the factors that create these changes are also important. 
If an increase in the inflation is expected, decision makers will change their behaviour. 
Workers will demand higher wages, and central banks will change their monetary policy by 
setting a higher rate to try to lower the inflation, given that the new expected inflation is 
higher than their “targeted value.” New information often changes the inflation expectations 
of economic agents. Hence, newly published values for macroeconomic variables will be 
important, because agents will adjust their forecasts if the new values differ from the 
expected ones.  
2.1.3 Measuring inflation expectations 
Expectations are variables that cannot be observed. Different approaches of finding a proxy 
for these variables exist. It is possible to build economic models, derive measures from 
financial asset prices or to use time series models (Ang, et al., 2007). Another alternative is to 
conduct surveys. Surveys question market participants directly about their expectations of the                                                         
3 In the United States, one of the duties of the Federal Reserve is to conduct the country’s monetary policy. This 
is done in a pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. In a press 
release from January 25, 2012, the FOMC states that they judge an inflation rate of two percent to be most 
consistent over the longer run. Hence, they communicate an inflation goal to anchor inflation expectations, 
meaning that also the United States has some degree of inflation targeting (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System). 
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desired variable over a certain time horizon (Gerberding, 2006). An advantage of surveys is 
that they do not depend on other assumptions, for example how the level and structure of ex 
ante interest rates are. If depending on other assumptions, the forecasted variable can never 
be better than the theory and assumptions they rely on. A comprehensive study by Ang et al. 
(2007) finds that surveys forecast inflation better than the other measure they consider.  
Many economists have used survey data to test hypothesis about the formation of inflation 
expectations (Keane & Runkle, 1990). Survey participants form their expectations and report 
those in the survey questionnaires. Almost all central banks that have inflation targeting, 
study inflation expectations surveys (Kershoff & Smit, 2002). They use the surveys to 
forecast the inflation and to evaluate the credibility of policies that involves inflation. 
2.2 Previous literature 
This section briefly presents some of the previous literature that tests survey data against 
actual data. Some of these studies will be mentioned in more detail in the analysis section, 
when we compare our results with previous results. 
Victor Zarnowitz has done some extensive work in terms of examining the Survey of 
Professional Forecasts, which is the survey data we will be using (a presentation of this 
survey is presented in 3.1.2).4 In a study of rational expectations, Zarnowitz found that the 
null hypothesis of unbiasedness is rejected for inflation forecasts when using OLS regression 
estimates. However, the error terms were serially correlated, which could lead to falsely 
rejecting the null (Zarnowitz, 1985). He also found that the “consensus,”5 was on average 
more accurate than most of the individual respondents’ predictions over time (Zarnowitz, 
1992). Together with Braun, Zarnowitz made a very comprehensive study of the survey in 
1993, analysing a lot of the surveys’ variables. Some of the results they found were, again, 
that the consensus forecasts are better than most individual forecasts in terms of average 
errors, and that the survey performs well when comparing it with other econometric and time 
series models (Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993).   
                                                        4 Zarnowitz was also involved in tabulating, analysing and evaluating the results when it was conducted by the 
ASA/NBER, and he has done a lot of research studying the survey (Croushore, 1993). 
5 Finding the consensus is done by averaging all predictions in a survey for a given variable and time period, 
resulting in a time series of group mean forecasts. This could also be done with the median (Zarnowitz and 
Braun, 1993). From now on we will refer to these as mean and median consensus forecasts. 
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Other studies also examine some of the issues Zarnowitz´ looked at. Among those is the 
mentioned paper by Ang et al. (2007). Croushore have also written several articles examining 
survey forecasts (Croushore, 1993; Croushore, 2006). While many studies use consensus 
data, Keane and Runkle (1990) tested whether or not the individual forecasters in the SPF 
were rational or not. They concluded that the forecasts were consistent with rational 
expectations.6  
Studies examining the rationality of survey forecasts in the United States often use the SPF, 
the Livingston Survey of professional economists and the Michigan survey of households 
(Thomas, 1999; Mankiw, et al., 2003; Ang, et al., 2007). When examining and comparing 
accuracy measures Ang et al. (2007) find that surveys outperform other prediction models, 
with the SPF and the Livingston survey performing very well, and better than the Michigan 
survey. 
A recent study examining some of the rationality issues are Mankiw et al. (2003). They argue 
that individuals are different, creating disagreement between the forecasters when predicting 
the inflation. This disagreement is something most economic models and research do not 
account for. Instead rationality of survey forecasts is often assumed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
6 The mentioned study by Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) also discuss the forecast performance of individuals. 
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3. Choosing data 
To answer the fundamental questions in this thesis, we have to analyse data. This section 
presents the data that we will be using. We need values for inflation expectations, actual 
values of the inflation, and we need data about variables that we will be using in the analysis 
part. We start finding forecasted values suitable for our analysis in section 3.1, before turning 
to the actual values of the inflation in section 3.2. In 3.2 we also present actual data of the 
economic variables that we are going to use in our analysis.  
3.1 Forecasted values - The Survey of Professional Forecasters 
Because inflation expectations are found to forecast the inflation better than many other 
methods of measuring, we choose to evaluate inflation expectations by using survey 
measures (Ang, et al., 2007). Important for our choice is the fact that surveys do not rely on 
other assumptions, as many other alternative measures do (Gerberding, 2006).  
We will be using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). This survey has 
been conducted since the fourth quarter of 1968. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
has been providing the survey from the second quarter of 1990. Before this the responsibility 
of the survey was shared between the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
2008). 
There are a lot of economic variables included in this survey. Examples are employment and 
unemployment forecasts, inflation forecasts and production forecasts. Our focus will be on 
the inflation measure. The forecasted inflation is calculated using forecasted levels of pgdp, 
which is the level of the GDP price index (how this is done is presented in section 5.1). Even 
though we have survey responses from the fourth quarter of 1968, the survey has only been 
collecting the levels of the GDP price index since 1996. From 1968 to 1991, the forecasts 
were of the GNP deflator and between 1992 and 1995 the GDP implicit deflator.7 Because 
these behave quite similar, and there does not seem to be any breaks in the inflation series 
                                                        
7 The GDP price index is the change in the relative price on a fixed basket of goods produced (Statistics Norway, 
2012). The GDP deflator is not based on a fixed basked of goods and services; it is the nominal GDP divided by 
the real GDP times 100, and vice versa for the GNP deflator (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011a). While the 
GDP contains the goods produced domestically from year to year, the GNP focuses on the produced goods that 
are owned by the respective country. 
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generated from the three different measures in the years where the measure was changed, we 
will not problematize this further (Diebold, et al., 1997; Croushore, 2006). 
The survey contains individual pgdp data, which makes it possible to analyse the questions 
on an individual level in addition to an aggregate level. The survey also contains both point 
forecasts as well as probability distribution forecasts of this variable. In a probability 
forecasts, the respondents answers to the probability of the inflation falling into different 
categories the next periods. Due to the time limit of this paper, we have chosen to focus on 
the point forecasts, but doing the same analysis and checking whether or not the probability 
distributions gives conclusions consistent with the point forecasts could be an interesting 
topic for a further research.8 
Even though survey measures are considered to be good forecasts, there are several issues to 
keep in mind when examining surveys. We will first discuss the use of individual or 
consensus forecasts, section 3.1.1, and why we have chosen a professional survey in section 
3.1.2. A more elaborate explanation of the data, how to transform the survey data into a 
comparable measure as well as a discussion of some problems with the dataset that we had to 
handle follow in section 5. 
3.1.1 Analysing on an individual or a consensus level 
Because the SPF contains individual data it is possible to analyse and perform tests on both 
an individual and an aggregated level. Studies vary regarding their approach to this issue, and 
they have different arguments regarding the level they choose to focus on. Our main focus is 
to study forecasts on an individual level, a focus relatively few papers have had before. 
Because we also compare these with the consensus forecasts, the consensus is also analysed.  
Several studies argue that it is better to use consensus forecasts of the individual data. The 
reasoning is that individual forecasts can be biased because of behavioural biases (Batchelor 
& Dua, 1995).9 These biases can be eliminated, or offset when aggregating forecasts from 
several forecasters, for example by using the mean or the median. As mentioned, Zarnowitz 
                                                        
8 There are already several papers studying the probability forecasts in the SPF, examples are Clements (2008b; 
c) and Diebold et al. (2008).  
9 A behavioural bias is when someone behaves irrationally, for example using behavioural heuristics to make 
choices that leads to sub-optimal investment choices (Goetzmann & Massa, 2003). In forecasting a thought 
example could be if one forecaster is more optimistic than others, hence his heuristics will lead to more 
optimistic forecasts then the others. 
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(1984) found that on average mean forecasts will perform better and be more accurate than 
those of individual forecasters.  
Individual data can also contain important information. One example is that some individuals 
may be much better than others in terms of forecasting behaviour. To use only consensus 
forecasts can also involve some problems (Keane & Runkle, 1990). One example is that the 
different information sets that individuals have are not accounted for. This can cause 
consensus forecasts to have a serious specification bias. The reasoning is that when we test 
the rationality of forecasters, their forecasts may differ just because they have different 
information sets.10 Hence, some might seem to be rational and others not. Not knowing the 
information set of the individuals it is impossible for us to state who that are truly rational. 
Another problem is that we will not be able to see individual deviations from rationality when 
only using consensus values. Individual deviations might be of great importance, for example 
if one wants to test if a group is rational and rationality results appear just because negative 
biases hide positive biases. We consider individual data to contain a lot of important 
information, and hope that studying the individuals on a more detailed level can give us new 
and valuable information. 
3.1.2 The forecasters 
The forecasters in the survey are, as the name suggests, professionals. They are largely from 
the business world; from banks, economic consulting firms, university research centres, other 
economic firms and from Wall Street (Croushore, 1993). 
The forecasters in the SPF are professionals who are close to important economic decision 
makers (Giordani & Söderlind, 2002). This is believed to be a strength of the survey, because 
it makes it more likely that the survey reflects the beliefs that are affecting important 
investment and pricing decisions. In addition the survey has a careful screening of candidates, 
which is supposed to secure the survey against “nonsense” answers. Being professionals the 
forecasters use different tools to determine their forecasts. Examples are other people’s 
forecasts, leading indicators and other surveys.  
Respondents should have an incentive to report their expectations correctly. Therefore, some 
argue that the respondents should be those who also sell their forecasts on the market. At the                                                         10 When finding the mean or median of many individual rational forecasts, each conditional on a private 
information set, it is not said that the forecast itself will be a rational forecast on any particular information set.   
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same time, respondents should not have any strategic incentives to not report their true beliefs 
(Gerberding, 2006), and when respondents also sell their forecasts on the marked, strategic 
motives might be present. Examples are that they could be afraid to respond their true beliefs, 
because of a fear of being the only one making a mistake. A strategic motive could also be to 
make forecasts that do stand out from others’ to get media attention and publicity (Laster, et 
al., 1999). Making the respondents anonymous could solve this problem.  At the same time 
they will not be punished for mistakes nor awarded for good forecasts if they are anonymous. 
All the individual forecasters that we will be working with have one confidential 
identification number each, and are therefore anonymous. Due to the lack of strategic 
incentives of anonymous forecasts this is often seen as strength to the survey (Giordani & 
Söderlind, 2002). However, the forecasters of the survey are often the same as those reporting 
forecasts for the public, implying that strategic incentives could be present. On the positive 
side, this makes the forecasts to some degree secured.  
3.2 The actual values 
The main issue of this paper involves comparing forecasts with actual values. We need 
reliable actual data that corresponds with the forecasted data. In this section we start 
considering which measure we should use and from which source we should acquire it from, 
in section 3.2.1. We also present other actual values that we need in our analysis, section 
3.2.3.  
 
3.2.1 Source and measure 
It is important to use actual data for the same, or a very similar, variable as the one the survey 
asked for.  In our analysis the actual value that we use is the implicit price deflator, the IPD, 
of the GDP in the United States. The IPD of GDP is the ratio of the current-dollar value of 
the GDP to its corresponding chained-dollar value, multiplied by 100 (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2011a). The IPD is at present not the exact same value as the one the SPF 
participants predicts (which is the level of the gross domestic product (GDP)). It is, however, 
the measure the survey asked for between 1992 and 1995. At the same time the series of the 
IPD is very similar to the level of the GDP price index (as discussed in 3.1). Therefore we 
consider it a good measure to compare the survey data with and we calculate the actual 
inflation from this IPD of the GDP.  
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We use the IPD collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).11 The BEA is an 
agency of the Department of Commerce in the United States, and is a part of the 
Department’s Economics and Statistics Administration (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2011b). They are one of the world’s leading statistical agencies, producing a lot of economic 
accounts statistics that helps to promote a better understanding of the United States economy 
for different agents and decision makers, such as the government and the public. Their vision 
is to be the world’s most respected producer of economic accounts, and they should therefore 
be a very reliable source. Some of their produced statistics are of the most closely watched 
economic statistics, such as the national income and product accounts (NIPAs). “Our” 
measure, estimates of the GDP is a very important NIPA variable.  
When comparing survey data and actual data it is important to choose between revised or 
vintage actual data.  The fully revised data is the newest value of the variable in question. If 
choosing vintage data, there are different sets to choose from, being the first one published or 
others published sometime after the first publications. Previous literature has discussed 
whether to use revised or vintage data with different conclusions (Keane & Runkle, 1990; 
Croushore & Stark, 1999; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993). The most common choice in 
forecasting literature is to analyse based on the latest variables, thus revised, data (Croushore, 
2006). The reasoning behind is that it is the final actual data that the forecasters are trying to 
predict, not some preliminary data. We emphasize this thought and choose to follow the 
“mainstream,” using revised data as actuals for comparison. However, it is important to 
consider which values the individuals should have knowledge about when predicting the 
inflation. A more elaborate discussion about the choice of revised or vintage data as well as 
what previous literature have discussed and found out about this issue is presented in 
appendix 2.1. 
3.2.2 Economic variables needed for analysis 
In our analyses we also need actual data of other variables. These are actual economic 
variables that we expect the professional forecasts to have accounted for when making their 
forecasts. Examples of such are the unemployment rate and the short-term interest rate. 
According to economic theory, there is a relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
inflation; with a high unemployment rate indicating a low inflation and vice versa. This is 
expressed by the Philips curve (Gärtner, 2006). The interest rate has a close relationship with                                                         
11 All actual values are extracted from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
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the inflation rate as well, especially in countries where the conduction of monetary policy is 
based on an inflation target. One example is that a high interest rate today indicates 
contractionary monetary policy (by the central bank), which can signal a lower inflation in 
the next period (Mankiw, et al., 2003).  We choose to use both the unemployment level and 
the short-term interest rate in our analysis.  
The unemployment rate in the United States is the number of unemployed individuals as a 
percentage of the labour force. If categorized as an unemployed one have to be in the age of 
16-65 and available for work. Additionally, one should not have been working during the 
survey week, and at the same time have made an effort to find a job within the previous four 
weeks (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  We use data from “The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics” (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labour. This is a Federal government agency 
responsible for measuring the labour market activity, working conditions and price changes 
in the economy, and is thus a reliable source (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). The 
unemployment rate is generally subject to only small revisions, which makes it preferable for 
testing (Mankiw, Reis, & Wolfers, 2003).  
For the short-term interest rate we use the federal funds rate of the United States. The tools 
that the Federal Reserve controls; the discount rate, the reserve requirements and the open 
market operations, alter this short-term interest rate. By using these three tools the Federal 
Reserve influences the demand for, and supply of, balances that depository institutions hold 
at Federal Reserve Banks. This is what influences and alters the federal funds rate, the 
interest rate which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve overnight to 
other depository institutions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012). It is 
thus a key benchmark for the interest rates in the short-term money market in the United 
States. The source of the data is Reuters Ecowin. Ecowin gets its data directly from the 
primary sources, with the most major economic indicators reflected only minutes after they 
have been released (Thomson Reuters, 2012). The federal funds rate and the unemployment 
rate in the United States are presented in figure 6.14, section 6.3.1. 
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4. Evaluating and testing forecasts  
It is important to examine differences between survey forecasts and real values. This section 
presents accuracy measures and tests we can use to investigate such differences. One can 
examine how accurate the forecasts are by comparing actuals and forecasts using different 
accuracy measures presented in section 4.1. To find out whether forecasts and actuals differ 
significantly, hence if forecasts are rational, we can perform tests presented in section 4.2. In 
the presentation of these measures and tests we talk about actuals and forecasts in general, 
but in some examples we refer to the inflation forecasts and the SPF specifically. 
4.1 Evaluating forecast accuracy 
To investigate how accurate and useful a survey is, we examine the forecast accuracy.12 
There are several measures of forecast accuracy that we can use. All the accuracy measures 
that we present involve a comparison of the mean forecasted errors and the actual values. The 
forecast error is given by subtracting the forecasted inflation of a period (𝑡), 𝐹𝑡, from the 
actual inflation in that same period, 𝐴𝑡: 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 
We will focus on four different measures presented in different sections; the mean error in 
section 4.1.1, the mean absolute error in 4.1.2, the root-mean-squared error in 4.1.3 and the 
mean normalized squared error in section 4.1.4. 
4.1.1 The Mean Error (ME) 
The first measure is the mean error; the average difference between the actual value and its 
forecasted values: 
𝑀𝐸 = ∑𝑡=0𝑁 (𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡)
𝑁
 
𝐴𝑡 is the actual values and 𝐹𝑡 is the forecasts, N is the number of observations and time is 
denoted by t. For a forecast to be unbiased, the ME should be close to zero over time. 
Because the sign of the error is taken into account, a positive error can offset a negative one. 
A positive value for the bias indicates that on average the actual values has been                                                         
12 See Batchelor (2000), Mankiw et al. (2003), 
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underestimated and vice versa (Batchelor, 2000). Being the average forecast bias, the ME can 
be used analysing the unbiasedness of forecasts as well as the forecast accuracy. 
4.1.2 Mean absolute error (MAE) 
The mean absolute error (MAE) is calculated as: 
𝑀𝐴𝐸 = ∑𝑡=0𝑁 |(𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡)|
𝑁
 
MAE is the average of all forecast errors; the differences between actual values and mean 
forecasts (Batchelor, 2000). The sign of the error is disregarded, so a negative error does not 
offset a positive error. MAE is more accurate the closer it gets to zero. 
4.1.3 Root-mean-squared error (RMSE) 
This statistic is calculated by squaring all the errors, thus disregarding their signs, and then 
averaging them by dividing on the number of observations, finding the mean squared error 
(MSE) (Batchelor, 2000). The RMSE is the square root of this MSE: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = �Σ𝑡=0𝑁 (𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡)2
𝑁
 
This RMSE penalizes forecasters who make a large errors heavily compared to forecasters 
who make many small errors, thus assuming that the seriousness of an error increases sharply 
with square of the size of the error.13 The closer the RMSE gets to zero, the better is the 
forecast accuracy. 
4.1.4 Mean normalized squared error (MNSE)  
We want to use an accuracy measure that accounts for the variation in the actual value. If the 
variation in a variable (the actual value) is large, forecasting can be more difficult than if the 
dispersion is small. We thus calculate the mean normalized squared error (MNSE): 
𝑀𝑁𝑆𝐸 = �∑𝑡=0𝑁 (𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡)2𝜎𝑝2
𝑁
                                                         
13 An error of for example ±2 % is treated as four times as important as an error of ±1 % in the RMSE. MAE 
assumes that the seriousness of the errors depends of the size of the errors directly. This means that an error of 
±2 % is twice as “serious” as one of ±1 %. 
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By dividing the squared error by the standard deviation of the actual values in a period p, 𝜎𝑝2, 
we adjust the prediction error for volatility that can be present in the actual values. Also in 
terms of MNSE the forecasts accuracy is better the closer it gets to zero. 
4.2 Rationality tests 
When testing the rationality hypothesis, we examine whether the made forecasts exhibit 
systematic mistakes or not. It is common to divide the tests in two requirements necessary for 
rationality; unbiasedness, presented in section 4.2.1 and efficiency, presented in section 4.2.2. 
Bonham and Dacy (1991) present a hierarchy of rationality tests. “Weak” rationality implies 
that forecasts are unbiased and meet tests of week-form efficiency. “Strong” rationality 
demands the forecasts to be weekly rational, in addition to the forecast error being 
uncorrelated with any variable in the respondents information set available at the time of the 
predictions (Bonham & Dacy, 1991; Stekler, 2002).  
 
4.2.1 Test of bias  
When testing for bias, we find whether the survey respondents’ forecasted values are correct 
on average. This implies testing if the average forecast error is zero. To test this we regress 
the actual values of a variable at a time, 𝐴𝑡 , on a constant, 𝛼, and the corresponding forecasts 
for the same time period, 𝐹𝑡 (Stekler, 2002): 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
The test involves testing the joint null hypothesis that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1. If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, we cannot claim the forecasts biased. Even though it is not completely 
correct statistically to claim them unbiased if we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we will 
sometimes use the word “unbiased” if this is true.14  
Holden and Peal (1990) states that even if the null of unbiasedness is rejected using this 
regression, there is still the possibility that the forecasts are unbiased. Thus, rejecting the null 
is not sufficient for stating that the forecasts are biased. We can use a test that is both 
                                                        
14 This goes for the efficiency tests as well. When not rejecting the null of efficiency, we will sometimes say 
they are efficient even though the most correct thing statistically is to say that we cannot claim theme not 
efficient. This issue is also highlighted in the analysis section. 
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necessary and sufficient for unbiasedess. This involves regressing the forecast errors on a 
constant (Stekler, 2002)15: 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡, 
and test if the constant can be restricted to zero with the null hypothesis 𝛼 = 0. We will use 
this last form of the test, being the one both necessary and sufficient for unbiasedness to hold.  
4.2.2 Tests of efficiency 
For a forecasters to be rational, his or hers forecast errors must be uncorrelated with the entire 
information set this forecaster has available when making the predictions. It is hard to define 
the exact information that these sets should contain. We can, however, test whether or not the 
forecast errors are correlated with important information that the forecasters should have and 
utilize when making their forecasts (Stekler, 2002). We use different tests regarding such 
information. The tests we use are: to add lagged values of the actual value, section 4.2.2.1, to 
add forecasts, 4.2.2.2, to add lagged forecast errors, 4.2.2.3, and to add the full information 
set, section 4.2.2.3.16 Tests presented in 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3 are weak-form efficiency 
tests, while the test in section 4.2.2.4 is a strong- form efficiency test. For the forecasts to be 
truly rational, they have to pass the test of unbiasedness discussed in 4.2.1 and these 
efficiency tests. 
 
4.2.2.1 Efficiency test 1: Adding lagged actual values 
One test implying weak-form efficiency if not rejected is to add lagged values of the actual 
variable as independent variables. If efficient, the coefficients of these should be zero 
(Lovell, 1986). The thought is that if the forecasts are rational, the prediction errors should be 
uncorrelated with historical values of the forecasted value. We add the lagged inflation, 
running the regression: 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑡−4 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
                                                        
15 The actual values will in our paper be the calculated actual inflation in period t, while the forecasted value is 
the calculated one-year ahead inflation forecast made one year before t.  
16 In all tests we will use the Holden and Peel (1990) version of the tests, by regressing the forecast errors on the 
abovementioned variables. 
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Where 𝛼 and 𝛽1 should not differ significantly from zero if the forecast is rational. The joint 
null hypothesis is thus 𝛼=𝛽1=0. If the joint null is not rejected the forecast is weakly rational 
based on this test. 
It is common to include the most present realized value of the actuals that is known to the 
forecasters. But, when looking at quarterly levels, it could be that the realized quarterly 
values contain some seasonally noise. If the forecasting period of the forecaster is the next 
year, thus the next four quarters, the actual value that we should include should be the one 
calculated for the last four quarters, being 𝐴𝑡−4. The first report for the quarterly NIPA values 
is released in the end of the first month in the next quarter. With the first release of the actual 
inflation, 𝐴𝑡−4, being about three quarters ago, the forecasters of the SPF should have 
knowledge about this actual value (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). 
4.2.2.2 Efficiency test 2: Adding forecasts 
Another weak-form efficiency test is to include forecasts on the right-hand side of the 
equation to examine if there is information in the forecasts themselves that can predict 
forecast errors (Mankiw, et al., 2003). We test this by running the regression: 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
and test the joint null hypothesis, 𝛼=𝛽1=0. If the joint null is not rejected, the forecasters are 
efficient and weakly rational.  
4.2.2.3 Efficiency test 3: Adding forecast errors 
We can also test if forecast errors are persistent or not. We regress the forecast error on the 
previous years forecast error, to see if information in these previous values have any 
predictive power for the forecast error. If they do, then the forecast errors are persistent, and 
the forecasts can improve if knowing the last years’ forecast error.17 We regress the forecast 
error on the previous year’s forecast error: 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝐴𝑡−4 − 𝐹𝑡−4) + 𝜀𝑡 
 
                                                        17 Testing this on an individual level requires that previous forecasts of the same individual are available, and 
therefore consecutive periods of information for different individuals. 
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When testing if the error made a year ago is still persistent, we test if autocorrelation exists. If 
the joint null hypothesis, 𝛼=𝛽1=0, cannot be rejected, we cannot claim the forecasts not 
efficient, hence the forecasters are efficient. The coefficient, 𝛽1, tells us to which degree the 
errors made a year ago are still present in today’s forecasts. 
4.2.2.4 Efficiency test 4: Adding an information set- relevant available information 
To test strong-form efficiency we need the information set available to individuals when they 
make the forecasts. To know exactly which variables to include is difficult, and we have to 
make some assumptions. The rule is that the information set should include all variables that 
would be contained in a sophisticated economic model of the variable being analysed. 
Adding those variables, we test if these are significantly correlated with the forecast errors. If 
they are, then the agents have not taken sufficiently account of this information in their 
forecasting (Thomas, 1999). Hence, they are not strong-form rational.  
Regarding which variables to include, we assume that they have to be publicly available. One 
example is to run the regression: 
𝐴𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑡−4 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Performing the tests for the inflation forecasts, we include the forecast itself, 𝐹𝑡 , the last 
actual inflation known at the time and not seasonally affected, 𝐴𝑡−4, as well as the current 
unemployment rate, 𝑈𝑡, and the current interest rate, 𝑖𝑡. To be sure to expect the forecasters to 
have knowledge about these values, it is important that the data we use are not subject to 
great revisions. We test if the individuals take sufficiently account of the information about 
these known variables when they respond to the survey. Hence, we test if 𝛼 and the 𝛽 values 
can be restricted to zero. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis of rationality strong-form 
rationality can be stated. 
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5. Working with the survey data 
The survey of professional forecasters (SPF) is a large database, and there are several 
potential problems that we should look into. In this section we present the data thoroughly 
and discuss different problems we need to consider when working with the dataset. Even 
though there have been a lot of studies working with the SPF, there have, to our knowledge, 
not been a lot of focus on examining the problems with the data set in previous literature. We 
find examining and documenting these issues interesting, and we will therefore present and 
document those in a thoroughly manner. 
In the following we start explaining how to transform the data into comparable measures, 
section 5.1, before we take a preliminary look at the data in section 5.2. In 5.4 we discuss the 
industry variable included in the dataset and in section 5.5 we deal with problems that the 
data set contains.  
5.1 Transforming survey data into a comparable measure 
There are both quarterly and annual point forecasts of the pgdp levels in the survey, but the 
survey did not ask for annual levels before the third quarter of 1981. We want a measure of 
the forecasted annual inflation for the whole time period. By using the quarterly forecasted 
pgdp levels in the current quarter (pgdp2) and the forecasted level a year from now (pgdp6), 
we find a measure of the expected one-year ahead inflation: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃1𝑌𝑅𝑡 = [�𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃6𝑡𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝑡� − 1] 
This calculated inflation is the measure we use for the forecasted one-year ahead inflation. 
When analysing and comparing with the actual data, we calculate actual values the same 
way, only using the IPD of the GDP instead of the pgdp levels. 
5.2 A preliminary look at the data 
In this sub-section we take a first look at the dataset. We look at the forecasted pgdp levels, 
the forecasted inflation of the individuals and the mean and median inflation forecasts of 
those each quarter. 
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We start by presenting the numbers of forecasted levels of pgdp2 and pgdp6 for each 
respondent, in figure 5.1 and 5.2. The pattern is almost the same for the other forecasted pgdp 
levels, presented in appendix 2.2. There are large differences between the individuals in 
terms of these forecasted levels. Some respondents did not forecast either levels any quarters, 
and for those we will not be able to calculate the forecasted inflation. 
The calculated mean and median one-year ahead inflation forecast of the data before doing 
anything with the sample is shown in figure 5.3. We see that for some quarters we were not 
able to calculate either the mean or the median forecast, because of the abovementioned 
problem of no individuals responding to either pgdp2 or pgdp6 these quarters. 
The figures 5.4 and 5.5 show us that there are large irregularities in terms of number of 
individuals responding to the survey. The number of participants has varied a lot over the 
years. In 1968 the number was around 60. During the 1970s and 1980s this number 
decreased, being as low as 14 in 1990. When the survey was taken over by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia the number increased again, and stabilized at around 30 
(Giordani & Söderlind, 2002). The number of respondents will, naturally, matter for the 
strength of the analysis.  
Figure 5.1: The number of forecasted pgdp2 
levels for each individual 
Figure 5.2: The number of forecasted pgdp6 
levels for each individual 
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The fact that some quarters have missing one-year ahead inflation forecasts, is also visible 
through figure 5.5. 18  The number of responses each quarter is presented in figure 5.4, while 
figure 5.5 displays the number of inflation forecasts each quarter. In figure 5.5 a response 
involves only that the respondent has received the questionnaire. Therefore, the number of 
responses is different from the number of responded forecasted pgdp levels (and off course 
also different from the number of inflation forecasts). Because we will analyse the inflation 
forecasts, it is number of inflation forecasts that are of most relevance to us. 
To show the dispersion in the data, we present the highest and lowest inflation forecast each 
quarter, presented in figure 5.6. The dispersion is also visible by plotting the standard  
                                                        
18 In the rest of the paper we will often talk about the inflation forecast, meaning the one-year ahead inflation 
forecasts, without this being specified.  
Figure 5.4: The number of responses to the survey 
each quarter. A response involves that a survey 
questionaire have been sent to the individual. 
Figure 5.5: The number of inflation forecasts each 
quarter. An inflation forecast demands that both 
the pgdp2 and the pgdp6 level have been 
forecasted. 
Figure 5.3: The mean and median inflation forecast each quarter. A forecasted value of zero 
indicates that there are no forecasted inflation forecasts for any individual that quarter. The 
forecasted value each quarter presents the one-year ahead inflation forecast given in that 
quarter. 
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deviation of the calculated inflation forecasts each quarter, figure 5.7. Looking at the two 
figures we see that there are large timely differences in the variation of the forecasted values. 
Both the standard deviations and the differences between the highest and the lowest forecast 
are larger in the beginning of the survey than in the end. 
5.3 The industry variable 
In addition to the anonymous individual number, the individual data includes an industry 
classification of the individual respondents (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). 
These were released in May 2008 for the responses after the Philadelphia Fed took over the 
survey, that is, from the second quarter of 1990. For surveys before 1990 it is not possible to 
provide industry classification because of lacking hard- copy historical records.  
Each forecaster is divided in one out of three industry categories. An industry variable with a 
value of one means that the respondent is employed in a firm characterized as a financial 
service provider and a value of two means that the respondent is employed in a nonfinancial 
service provider firm.19 If the forecaster is classified with an industry variable of three, they 
have not been able to classify the industry of the firm where the respondent is employed. The 
industry classification is conservative, meaning that an industry variable is only assigned to a 
respondent if they are certain of the respondent’s employment and the classification of the 
firm where he or she is employed. Some might think that including such 
                                                        19 Being a financial service provider is a firm involved in insurance, investment banking, commercial banking, 
payment services, hedge and mutual funds, asset management or in association of financial service providers. If 
employed in a nonfinancial service provider, one is employed in a university, a manufacturing firm, forecasting 
firm, investment advisor firm, a research firm or a consultant firm (Chew & Price, 2008). A more elaborate 
discussion of the industry variables is discussed in the analysis, section 6.4.  
Figure  5.7: The standard deviation of the inflation 
forecasts given each quarter. 
Figure 5.6: The highest and lowest inflation 
forecast given each quarter. The forecasted value 
each quarter presents the one-year ahead 
inflation forecast given in that quarter. 
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an industry variable may affect the important of the forecasters. However, when using a 
broad two-sector classification as described above this should not be a big problem. 
A respondent’s industry variable can change if he or she quits his or hers job and starts 
working in another firm. The number of participants in each category may also change 
because of changing composition of the panel. This leaves us with an unpredictable pattern of 
individuals included in each industry category over the time span. The number of individual 
forecasters included in every industry variable, as well as the total number of individuals is 
presented in figure 5.8. 
The motivation behind including the industry variables is that different forecasters can have 
different goals, objectives and constraints, which can be related to the place of employment. 
One would think that the forecaster’s primary objective is to make the most accurate and best 
forecasts. However, other incentives, for example strategic, can be present. Hence, the 
industry affiliation of the forecasters can be important when understanding the individual’s 
forecasts (Stark, 1997).  
5.4 Problems with the data set 
This section documents the problems with the dataset. It has been said that the most 
important shortcoming of the survey is the high turnover of participants and large frequency 
gaps in the responses of those participants (Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993). These are issues that 
we will focus on when examining the dataset. 
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We start by investigating the forecasters who have only responded to the survey a few times, 
in section 5.4.1. Then we continue with the respondents who have some missing values in 
their forecasts in section 5.4.2, before discussing the problem of reallocation of id numbers in 
5.4.3. We also discuss the issue of overlapping observations in 5.4.4. A discussion of 
changing base years are presented in appendix 2.4 and a discussion and some tests regarding 
the consistency of the inflation forecasts are presented in appendix 2.5. 
5.4.1 Respondents with few responses 
The respondents have not responded to the survey all years. Some responded in the 
beginning, others responded later. Some also have gaps in their quarterly responses, 
answering to the survey some quarters before stopping and responding later again. The 
analyses of the forecast behaviour of those who only responded to the survey a few times will 
be weak. To account for this we will restrict the sample. 
Almost all previous studies restrict the sample to include only regular forecasts- those who 
have responded to the survey more than a certain number of times. The number of required 
surveys answered varies, some choosing 12 responses as their limit, others using 10 or 20 
(Keane & Runkle, 1990; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993; Clements, 2004; 
Clements, 2008a). We follow the same example as most of the previous studies, deleting 
those respondents who have 12 or fewer responses in total.20  
In some quarters there are individuals who did not forecast any of the pgdp levels. For some 
respondents this goes for all quarters, leaving them with no responses at all to the survey.21 
For others these quarters will be “blank” responses in the middle of forecasted values. We 
consider these “responses” of both individuals who have not responded to any surveys, as 
well as for the individuals that have some of these “blank responses” in the middle of their 
forecasts as not really having responded to the survey this quarter. Hence we exclude these 
individuals from the data. This means that from now on all of the quarters where an 
individual have responded to the survey should contain at least one forecasted pgdp level.                                                          
20 It is, however, important to be aware of the fact that even though we have registered a response from an 
individual, that does not guarantee that the individual have given enough information to make us able to 
calculate his or hers inflation forecast, hence, it is not certain that we will have this exact number of inflation 
forecasts per individual. 
21 Looking at the figures 5.1 and 5.2 we can see for whom this is a problem, noting that the pattern of the pgdp2 
and pgdp6 responded levels are quite similar as the other pgdp level (as presented in appendix 2.2). This 
involves that a lot of respondents with an identification number between 200 and 400 not really having 
answered to the survey at all. 
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We want to know how restricting the sample to respondents with 12 or more responses 
affects the dataset. We begin examining the effect this restriction has on the number of 
surveys and forecasts per respondent, as well as respondents per quarter, in section 5.4.1.1. In 
5.4.1.2 we show how restricting the sample affects the value of the forecasts. 
5.4.1.1 The effect of restricting the sample on number of surveys and forecasts 
When dropping individuals with less than 12 responses, the number of respondents per 
survey, as well as survey responses per individual, will change. These changes are presented 
in table 5.1. The number of surveys per respondent is presented in panel A (where the 
number of surveys per respondents is the number of quarters the respondents have answered 
to one or more pgdp levels). The average number of surveys increases as the irregular 
forecasters are removed, giving us a dataset more eligible for analysis. Naturally, the standard 
deviation of surveys per respondent also decreases when individuals with few responses are 
dropped. The highest number of surveys that an individual responded to is 123. This does, 
however, not mean that this was 123 consecutive responses or 123 forecasts. 
Panel B in table 5.1 shows the number of respondents per survey. When eliminating irregular 
forecasters the total number of unique forecasters decreases along with the average number of 
forecasters per survey. This means that we include data from fewer respondents than we 
would have if we included the whole dataset. Because the changes are not very severe, it does 
not seem like removing irregular forecasters alter the database to a great extent.  
The numbers of inflation forecasts is presented in panel C in table 5.1. The average number 
of forecasts increases from 38.28 to 41.86, and the standard deviation (“std” in table 5.1) is 
decreasing. The minimum forecasts per individual have increased from zero to seven, 
meaning that (at least) one of the respondents who have received the survey 12 or more 
times, have not responded to both the pgdp2 and pgdp6 in more than seven of the survey 
questionnaires that he or she received.  
In figure 5.9 we plot the number of dropped individuals against the time variable, quarter. 
The dropped respondents span the whole time period. The maximum respondents dropped in 
one quarter are 16 in 1970q4. Even though there are respondents dropped over the whole 
time span, there are not more than seven dropped in one quarter from year 2000. This 
indicates that the problem with few responses per individual respondent has gone to some 
degree down. 
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All <12
Deleted observations - 651
Panel A:
Total nmb of surveys 169 169
Mean 40.74 44.53
Std 26.49 25.25
Min 1 12
Max 123 123
Panel B:
Total nmb of respondents 312 174
Mean 42.24 37.51
Std 13.52 11.24
Min 9 9
Max 83 68
Panel C:
Total nmb of forecasts 6408 5761
Mean 38.28 41.86
Std 24.91 23.71
Min 0 7
Max 113 113
Nmb of surveys per respondent
Nmb of respondents per survey
Nmb of forecasts per respondent
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the number of surveys, respondents and forecasts 
before and after restricting the sample to those with 12 or more responses. A response 
means that they have responded to at least one pgdp level in the given quarter. 
Figure 5.9: Number of dropped respondents, being those with 12 or 
less observations each quarter.  
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5.4.1.2 The effect of restricting the sample on the descriptive statistics of the responses 
The descriptive statistics of the forecasted levels of pgdp and of the forecasted inflation 
changes when we drop respondents. These statistics before and after restricting the sample is 
presented in table 5.2. The average forecast level of both pgdp2 and pgdp6 are increasing. 
Thus, the one-year ahead forecasts also increases, from 3.74 % to 3.77 %. The standard 
deviations are a bit increasing, while the minimum and maximum values are the exact same. 
Hence, none of the forecasters with the highest and lowest forecasts were dropped. The 
dispersion in the data will therefore be very similar to the one presented in the preliminary 
look at the data. 
Figure 5.10 show the changes in the forecasted values between the full dataset and the dataset 
with only those with 12 or more responses. We plot the differences, subtracting the “new” 
median forecast in the restricted sample from the ”old” median forecast. This is done for 
forecasts of pgdp2, pgdp6 and the forecasted one-year ahead inflation. With the change in the 
inflation forecast being close to zero, the changes are not very severe.22 
Figure 5.11 presents the same, but for the inflation forecasts only. The largest differences 
between the median inflation forecast from the full sample and the restricted sample are in 
the beginning, and they decrease over time.  
 
Table 5.2: Statistics of the forecast pgdp2 and pgdp6 level, as well as the calculated one-year ahead 
inflation forecasts for the sample with all respondents and in the sample with only those with more than 
12 observations. 
                                                        22 Looking at the figure it seems as there are two outliers in the beginning of the survey. Around 1970 there is 
one change in the median of pgdp2 that is one, much higher than the others. For the difference in the median 
forecasts there is also one difference that stands out, being about -0.7 in around the beginning of 1970. These 
outliers will be eliminated because of our choice of starting the sample in the fourth quarter of 1974.  
pgdp2 pgdp6 forecast1yr pgdp2 pgdp6 forecast1yr
Observations 6403 5975 5974 5757 5391 5390
Mean 139.18 144.99 3.74 139.61 145.42 3.77
Std 32.16 36.12 2.16 32.69 36.59 2.17
Min 104.41 105.70 -4.57 104.41 105.70 -4.57
Max 235 247 31.14 235 247 31.14
Statistics All >=12
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5.4.2 Individuals with some missing forecast values  
The missing values in the survey affect the relationship between the number of respondents 
in a quarter and inflation forecasts in the same quarter (as previously shown in figure 5.4 and 
figure 5.5). 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that the patterns of forecasted values of pgdp2 and pgdp6 for given 
individuals are similar. However, some differences exist. Some individuals forecasted one of 
the levels, but not the other one in a given quarter. In some quarters there are no individuals 
who have forecasted both levels, leaving us without any inflation forecasts that quarter. When 
restricting the dataset to include only those with 12 or more responses, this problem has not 
been eliminated. Figure 5.12 presents the number of inflation forecasts each quarter, showing 
that this problem exists in the three first quarters of 1969, the first quarter of 1970 and the 
third quarter of 1974. This figure is similar to figure 5.5, except that it is for the restricted 
sample containing only those with 12 responses or more. For all those quarters, it is the 
forecast for pgdp6 that is missing.  
Figure 5.10: Plots of the median forecast found in 
the SPF minus the new median after dropping those 
participants who responded less than 12 times to the 
survey for pgdp2, pgdp6 and the inflation forecast. 
Figure 5.11: The difference between the median 
inflation forecasts, calculated as the median from 
the SPF minus the new median when dropping 
forecasters with 12 or less responses against time. 
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When analysing we want to have at least one inflation forecast for each quarter. Hence, it is 
preferable to do something about the missing forecasts problem. There are different solutions 
one could think of. Examples are to restrict the sample to only include forecasts after the last 
missing one-year ahead forecast (as presented in 5.4.2.1) and filling in an estimated measure 
for the missing values 23 . These two alternatives have different positive and negative 
consequences. While the first one does not demand us to alter the dataset, it does force us to 
delete a lot of observations. And while the second one does not require us to delete 
observations, we have to change the data. Then some of the forecasts that we analyse will not 
be an actual forecast. 
When choosing one of the given alternatives, we emphasize the fact that changing the dataset 
is a task that needs a lot of consideration. Additionally we do not know of anyone else who 
have worked or are working with the SPF doing anything similar. Hence, given that this is 
“only” a master thesis paper, we do not wish to alter the data to a great extent. Therefore we 
choose the option of restricting the sample to include forecasts only after the third quarter of 
1974.24  
There are other aspects, not related to the missing values, which also leads us towards this 
conclusion. With the period from 1968 to 1973 considered to be a challenging period to 
forecast, leaving this period out of the sample might actually strengthen our analysis (Su &                                                         
23 In terms of filling in an estimated value for the missing values, there are several methods one could think of. 
Examples are to make a liner projection if having the other pgdp levels necessary to do so, to fill in lead and lag 
values of pgdp2 and pgdp6, and to find out how the individual has performed compared to the mean before and 
then fill in a value equivalent to those for the missing value. 
24 After making this restriction we again restrict the sample to those with less then 12 responses. These will be 
the ones who, because of this restriction, now have too few responses. 
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Figure 5.12: The number of inflation forecasts each quarter in 
the sample with individuals with 12 or more responses only. 
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Su, 1975). The fact that in the early years, 1968, 1969 and 1970 the forecasts were rounded to 
their whole number, causing the forecasts in these years to be quite erratic, also suggests that 
the eliminating these years could be the best solution (Croushore, 2006) 25 (these issues are 
discussed in appendix one). 
In the following we present how the dataset is altered when we exclude the quarters before 
the third quarter of 1974. In appendix 2.3 we present one option of filling in estimated values, 
and how that would have altered the dataset.  
5.4.2.1 Restricting the sample to those after the last missing inflation forecast 
The alternative of restricting the sample to forecasts made after the third quarter of 1974 do 
not demand us to change the data that are still included in the dataset. However, the mean and 
median values will be altered because we have less data. In addition we will be missing out 
on a lot of data, especially because the largest number of survey respondents were in the 
beginning.  
In this section we present how starting the sample to in the fourth quarter of 1974 changes the 
data. The new number of forecasts per individual, the number of survey responses per 
individual and the number of responses per survey are shown in table 5.3. Also presented are 
the new values of the pgdp2, pgdp6 and the forecasted inflation. The corresponding values 
for the whole time span are previously presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2. We see that the 
average number of surveys per respondent is now 42.75, which is a small decline from the 
previous number of 44.53. The number of respondents per survey has also declined, while the 
number of forecasts per respondents is almost the same as before, with 41.52 now, compared 
to the previous 41.86. The fact that these numbers have declined could make our analysis 
weaker. However, because we focus on the individuals and the number of forecasts per 
individual is almost unchanged, this does not seem to be a severe problem. 
The forecasted values of both pgdp2 and pgdp6, thus also the inflation has decreased a little. 
This is natural, because some of the early years with a high inflation are now deleted.  
 
                                                        
25 The fact that the forecasts have a larger dispersion in the beginning than later (as shown in figure 5.6 and 5.7) 
could also be an advantage of this alternative, leaving us with a dataset where the data are more stable. 
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5.4.3 Reallocation of identification numbers  
The individual forecasters in the SPF have confidential identification numbers. These are 
supposed to be consistent over time, and one should be able to trace a given forecaster from 
survey to survey (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). Even though one 
identification number is supposed to belong to one specific individual, this is not guaranteed 
true for all individuals. This section discusses whether this could involve problems when 
analysing the individual respondents. To our knowledge, this problem has not been debated 
in any previous literature.26  
When ASA/NBER conducted the survey, from its start in 1968 until the first quarter of 1990, 
hard-copy historical records are missing (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). Thus, 
we should be careful when interpreting the results from the individuals who are forecasting in 
this period. The problem arises if an identification number stopped responding for a long 
time, before responding again later. Then the identification number could have been given to 
another forecaster, which can cause problems when we analyse the individuals’ forecast 
behaviour. 
A possible solution is to divide individuals who have large gaps in their responses into two or 
more individuals. However, the Philadelphia Fed is not sure if the individual numbers really 
were re-used. It could be that a person decided to stop responding to the survey for a long 
time, and then started again at a later stage. Nevertheless, if the gap is big enough we can 
argue that the respondent can have changed over the years anyhow. To call her or him a new                                                         
26A reason could be that many previous studies use consensus forecast where this is not a problem. Those who 
are conducting individual tests have not discussed the issue either, maybe because they were not aware of the 
problem at the time. We do not know exactly when the awareness of this problem arisen. 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for number of surveys answered and forecasted values in 
the data sample starting in 1974q3. 
Nmb forecasts per ind Nmb surveys per ind Nmb responses per survey
Mean 41.516 42.746 32.833
Std 24.209 25.704 7.466
Min 7 12 9
Max 102 118 49
pgdp2 pgdp6 Inflation forecast
Mean 136.703 142.140 3.640
Std 35.228 38.861 2.256
Min 104.41 105.7 -4.569
Max 235 247 31.137
Statistics forecasted values
Only after 1974q3
Statistics nmb of surveys 
answered
Only after 1974q3
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Gap between responses Obs Mean Std Max Gap
No gap 4381 1 0 1
All 5590 1.671 3.415 52
With gap 1209 4.103 6.812 52
From 1974q4 4327 1.449 1.937 47
person would then not be terribly wrong. When deciding how large the gap should be before 
the identification numbers are divided up, we need to consider that some responses can be 
absent due to natural causes such as child birth and sick leave. The gap should therefore be 
large enough to consider such causes, for example 5 years (or 20 quarters) or more. 
In table 5.4 we present how large the gaps are in the restricted sample containing only those 
with 12 or more responses. This is also presented for the shorter sample where the forecasts 
before the fourth quarter of 1974 are excluded. On average the gap is about 1.67 quarters in 
the total sample, and with one quarter gap being no gap there are several individuals do not 
have a gap. When only looking at the shorter sample, the average gap is smaller, 1.45 
quarters. If we take a look at those with gaps only, the mean gap is about 4.10 quarters, a bit 
more than one year. The largest gap is at 52 quarters, or 13 years. 
We want to find if many individuals have large gaps. The possibility of individuals having 
several large gaps also exists. When examining we did not find any individuals who have 
more than one gap longer than five years, thus no individuals with several longer gaps than 
five years either. The maximum gap of the total sample and the shorter sample together with 
the number of individuals having a gap longer than five, ten, fifteen and twenty years are 
presented in table 5.5. 42 individuals have a gap larger than five years, 17 have a gap of more 
than ten, but no one have a gap larger than 15 years.  
Table 5.4: Statistics of the gaps between individual responses. We show statistics for 
observations without any gaps, for observations in the total sample, for the 
observations with gap as well as the shorter sample starting in 1974q4.   
Table 5.5: The maximum gap in the total sample and in the shorter sample 
starting in 1975q4, together with the number of individuals with a gap longer 
than 5, 10, 15 and 20 years. 
Gap All From 1974q4
Max Gap (yr) 13 11.75
>5yr 42 13
>10yr 17 2
>15yr 0 0
>20yr 0 0
Gap length/Number of individuals with gap
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 39 
19
70
q1
19
75
q1
19
80
q1
19
85
q1
19
90
q1
19
95
q1
Q
ua
rte
r
1 2 3 4 5
Number of individuals with gaps larger than five years
19
70
q1
19
75
q1
19
80
q1
19
85
q1
19
90
q1
19
95
q1
Q
ua
rte
r
1 2 3 4 5
Number of individuals with gaps larger than ten years
We also want to locate where in the survey the gaps are located. Looking at figure 5.13 and 
figure 5.14 we see that the large gaps are located mainly in the beginning of the survey. Most 
gaps longer than five years are before 1975, the same period where the largest number of 
individuals with gaps is localized. In the third quarter of 1970 there are five individuals with 
gaps larger than five years. Also between 1975 and 1982 there are some gaps larger than five 
years. From 1982 there are no gaps of this size before the three localized just before 1995. 
With only three such large gaps coming from Philadelphia Feds period, this problem exist 
mostly during the ASA/NBER period. All but two of the gaps longer than ten years are 
located before 1975. 
Because a lot of the gaps are located in the beginning of the survey, the problem decreases 
when we choose to use data only after the third quarter of 1974. Table 5.5 shows us that there 
are only 13 individuals with gaps longer than five years and only two with gaps longer than 
ten years in this period. 
This leaves us somewhat unsecure about the severity of the problem. Together with the fact 
that the problem decreases when choosing to use the sample starting in the fourth quarter of 
1974, we choose not to divide the uncertain individuals in more than one respondent.  
The industry number introduced in the Philadelphia Fed period of the survey leads to another 
potential problem. If the forecasters change place of employment, the issue of whether the 
identification number should follow the individual or the place of employment arise (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). The survey tried to solve this by letting the 
identification number stay with the firm if the forecast seems more associated with the firm 
Figure 5.14: Number of individuals with gaps 
larger than ten years through time The points 
indicate where the gap started 
Figure 5.13: Number of Individuals with gaps 
larger than five years through time. The points 
indicate where the gap started 
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than with the individual and vice versa. If the identification number is more identified with a 
firm than an individual, individual rationality tests will examine whether the firm is rational 
rather than the individual. We examine this problem, and find it not to be a big problem in 
our data because there are only seven individuals were this could be a problem. These are 
individual number 65, 407, 420, 421, 426, 448 and 463. For most of those the industry 
variable switches from one to two. One exception is number 65, who first has an industry 
variable of one, then two, before being categorized with an industry variable of three. The 
other exception is individual 463 where the variable changes from two to three. 
5.4.4 Overlapping observations and autocorrelation 
Because we use forecasts that span a four-quarter horizon, there may be some overlapping 
observations that can create autocorrelation. When shocks occur they will affect the actuals, 
and thus the forecast errors for several consecutive periods, because the forecasts span a 
longer period than the sampling frequency (Croushore, 2006). When a shock hit the 
economy, for example the oil price shock in 1973q2, all forecast errors that include this 
quarter will be affected. This means that the forecast errors for this given example will be 
correlated in the surveys conducted in 1972q2, 1972q3, 1972q4, 1973q1 and 1973q2. 
A “normal” ordinary least squares regression (OLS) require the errors to by serially 
uncorrelated. Because the abovementioned overlapping observations will create a moving 
average (MA) error term, the OLS parameter estimates will not be efficient in this sample, 
and tests performed by OLS will therefore be biased (Hansen & Hodrick, 1980; Harri & 
Brorsen, 2009). A normal OLS also requires homoscedasticity, meaning that the error terms 
have a constant variance. If forecasting is more difficult in some periods than others, 
heteroskedasticity might exist. This will make the OLS regression not efficient. To be able to 
perform tests, we have to find a correct way of running regressions that accounts for both of 
the abovementioned problems.  
One way of correcting for the overlapping observations problem is to use a restricted sample, 
thus cutting the SPF sample into five pieces (Harri & Brorsen, 2009). This will, however, 
limit our dataset, and we will not be able to exploit all the information that we have, using 
only each fifth observation. Because this would give us even fewer responses per individual 
than we already have, this does not seem like a good solution. Also the fact that we cannot be 
sure that the individuals have responded in exactly these necessary quarters is an argument 
against using this solution.  
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Another solution is to use the overlapping observations, but to account for autocorrelation 
when testing. Several estimators that are both heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
have been constructed (HAC estimators). These make hypothesis testing valid when using 
data with overlapping observations (Harri & Brorsen, 2009). Such estimators are favourable 
for our analysis, and include among others Hansen and Hodrick (Hansen & Hodrick, 1980), 
and Newey-West (Newey & West, 1987). By computing a weighted variance – covariance 
matrix that gives less weight to the errors made in the observations that are either highly- 
serially correlated or heteroskedastic, the Newey-West method guarantees for a positive 
definite covariance matrix. This consistent covariance matrix is computed by using the OLS 
residuals (Harri & Brorsen, 2009). The method can easily be done in Stata, by running tests 
with p-values based on a chi-squared test using this method.27  
Because of the advantages of the Newey-West method, this is the method we want to use in 
our analysis. However, because the method exploits information in lags, some problems can 
arise if the data we are analysing have missing values. If m is the specified maximum lag, the 
method multiplies the covariance of lag j by the weight [1- j/(m+1)] (Petersen, 2009). If an 
individual respondent have not given responses every quarter when participating in the 
survey, he or she may not have the lags necessary for making the estimates. This can be a 
problem in our analysis, and we will mention those if they rise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 The Newey-West variance HAC estimator accounts for autocorrelation up to and including a lag of m. Thus, 
autocorrelation at lags greater that m is ignored. We have to be aware of how many lags to use. If the overlap is 
5, then the errors are MA(4). As the lag length increases, so do the standard errors estimated by the Newey- 
West method. Hence, the standard errors will be higher, and the t-statistics lower than when running an OLS 
regression. 
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6. Analysis 
This section contains our main analysis of the data. We use the revised dataset where we 
restricted the sample to those with 12 or more responses. We also choose to start the sample 
in the fourth quarter of 1974 (as discussed in section five). Starting in section 6.1 we first take 
a look and the data, investigating briefly how the forecasted inflation and the actual data have 
evolved through time. 28 Then, in section 6.2, we examine the forecast errors calculating 
different accuracy measures to see how accurate the inflation forecasts of the respondents 
have been. The main part of our analysis involves testing if the forecasters are rational or not, 
section 6.3.  
Previous literature has studied the accuracy and rationality of inflation expectations 
(Zarnowitz, 1985; Thomas, 1999; Mankiw, et al., 2003; Clements, 2004; Croushore, 2006; 
Gerberding, 2006). However, there have been relatively few studies analysing individual 
forecasts. Examples of such are Keane and Runkle (1990) and Zarnowitz (1985). With this in 
mind, stating what we can contribute to the literature is important. First, we have a new 
sample, which also includes the financial crisis. Our analysis will therefore be of current 
interest. Our analysis of the individual data is also more detailed than previous literature. We 
find how many individuals who are rational and how many who perform better than the 
consensus. We also find which individuals that are the best forecasters in terms of each test. 
These are the main topics of section 6.2 and 6.3, where we examine these issues looking at 
the whole data sample.  
Other interesting issues regarding rationality of forecasts also arise. Examining the industry 
variable in the SPF and whether or not there are differences between the individual 
respondents employed in the different industry categories is something we do not have 
knowledge of other papers investigating. In this thesis we add to the previous literature by 
looking into this industry variable. This discussion is presented in section 6.4.  
A lot of previous papers have investigated differences between different sub-periods, for 
example differences between expansions and contractions (for instance Su and Su (1975), 
McNees (1992), and Mehra (2002)). Adding to the literature, we examine how the Volcker                                                         
28 A discussion about whether large forecast errors could have originated because of challenging time period 
that could have created forecasting difficulties is presented in appendix one. This discussion involves presenting 
what previous literature has found.  
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disinflation affected forecasters performances. In a paper from 2002 Mehra excluded the 
Volcker disinflation from the entire sample, and found that the SPF performed better when 
this period was excluded. However, we do not have knowledge of literature examining this 
on an individual level and in a very detailed manner. Our motivation behind focusing on this 
period is that when we look at the differences between the actual and the forecasted inflation 
in figures 6.1 and 6.2, the forecast performance of the respondents seems to have been 
different these years. Our discussion and analysis of the Volcker disinflation’s effect on the 
forecasts are presented in section 6.5.  
Having a new data sample containing the financial crisis makes us question whether the 
financial crisis had an effect on the forecasts. Adding to the literature we examine the 
rationality during the recent crisis. We also examine the performance of the individual 
respondents during this special time period. This analysis is presented in section 6.6. 
With our detailed analysis of individual respondents, we may find differences and 
disagreement between individual respondents. Such distinctions between individuals are 
something that most macroeconomic models do not account for (Mankiw, et al., 2003). 
Hence, to be able to understand how individuals form their expectations is important to look 
for differences and patterns among the individual respondents. This is a task we wish to 
contribute to in this paper. 
6.1 A preliminary comparison of the forecasted inflation and the actual inflation 
When comparing the calculated inflation forecasts with the actual data, we have to transform 
the actual values in the same manner as we did with the survey data: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃1𝑌𝑅𝑡 = [� 𝐼𝑃𝐷𝑡𝐼𝑃𝐷𝑡−4� − 1] 
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In figure 6.1 we see how the mean forecasted inflation of the individuals in the SPF as well as 
the actual inflation have evolved through time. We use the forecasted one-year ahead 
inflation made each quarter and compare them with the actual inflation that same quarter. The 
forecast error in a given quarter in the graph is thus the calculated actual inflation over the 
next year, minus the calculated forecasted one-year ahead inflation made in that quarter.29  
By looking at figure 6.1 we find differences, with larger forecast errors between the predicted 
and the actual inflation in the first years of the survey than later. This is in line with previous 
literature by McNees (1992) Thomas (1999), Gerberding (2006) and Croushore (2006). Some 
of the explanation may be that the levels of the predicted inflation, as well as the dispersion 
in the actual inflation were also higher these years (Mehra, 2002; Thomas, 1999). By plotting 
all the individual forecasts against the actual inflation in figure 6.2, we see that the pattern of 
the mean forecasts, naturally, reflect the individual respondents’ forecasts. 
                                                        
29 This is the way we will present the forecast error and the actual data in the entire paper.  
Figure 6.1: The calculated mean inflation 
forecast from the SPF and the calculated actual 
inflation for the entire sample. The forecasted 
value presents the one-year ahead inflation 
forecast given in that quarter, and the 
corresponding actual the next year inflation. 
Figure 6.3 The calculated mean inflation forecast 
from the SPF and the calculated actual inflation 
for the shorter sample starting in 1974q4.  
Figure 6.2: The actual inflation and the individual 
inflation forecasts from the SPF for the entire 
sample. The forecasted value presents the one-
year ahead inflation forecast given in that 
quarter, and the corresponding actual the next 
year inflation. 
Figure 6.4: The actual inflation and the 
individual inflation forecasts from the SPF for 
the shorter sample starting in 1974q4. 
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Because we choose to restrict the sample to the quarters after the fourth quarter of 1974 
(explained in 5.4.2), some of the large differences in the beginning will be eliminated. Figure 
6.3 shows the mean inflation forecasts against the actual inflation in this new and shorter 
period of time, and figure 6.4 plots the individual forecasts against the actual inflation. When 
comparing figure 6.1 and figure 6.3 we see that the problems with missing forecasts of 
inflation (represented by a forecast of zero in figure 6.1) for some quarters are absent. Some 
other forecasts with large forecast errors made in the beginning of the survey are naturally 
also eliminated. 
Even with our shorter dataset the forecast errors still seem to be much larger in the beginning 
than later. The standard deviations of the individual responses over the years show us the 
dispersion in the forecasts and can hint when the inflation was hardest to predict. Large 
standard devations involves relatively large differences between the forecasts of individuals, 
which again indicate diasgreement between respondents. A large disagreement may indicate 
that it is hard to predict the inflation. 30  The standard deviation of the whole sample is 
presented in figure 5.7, section 5.2. Figure 6.5 shows the standard devations of the forecasts, 
together with the level of the actual inflation, for our shorter sample starting in the fourth 
quarter of 1974. We see that the level of the standard deviation follow to some degree the 
same pattern as the level of the actual inflation, being higher when the level of the actual 
inflation is higher. This relationship seems to hold, at least before around 1995. After year 
2000 the level of the actual inflation have increased without the standard deviation of the 
forecasts following, thus this relastionship seem to have ceased.  
                                                        
30 We could imagine that investigating the probability forecasts of each individual would give us a more valid 
measure of when the uncertainty involving the inflation were the highest, thus when predicting the inflation was 
difficult. However, Giordani and Söderlind (2002) examined this and found that the dispersion between 
individual forecasters to be a good measure of uncertainty and disagreement. 
Figure 6.5: The standard deviations of the forecasts and the level of the actual inflation over time. 
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6.2 Evaluating forecasts using different accuracy measures 
This section examines the accuracy of the respondents’ inflation forecasts. We analyse the 
forecast accuracy of both the consensus forecasts and the forecasts of individual respondents 
from the fourth quarter of 1974 until the end of 2010 (using the accuracy measures described 
in section 4.1). We find the individuals who are the best forecasters in terms of each accuracy 
measure and whether these are the same when using different accuracy measures. In addition 
we compare them with the consensus accuracy measures. We start presenting the accuracy 
measures for the consensus in section 6.2.1, before continuing with the individuals in chapter 
6.2.2. Different from only calculating the accuracy measures of the consensus (as done for by 
for example Thomas (1999)), examining the forecasts of the individuals is to our knowledge 
relatively seldom. 
 
6.2.1 Forecast accuracy of the consensus forecasts 
The accuracy measures for the consensus mean and median forecasts for the entire survey 
period are presented in table 6.1. With the errors calculated by subtracting the forecasted 
value of the inflation for a given period from the actual inflation in the same given period, a 
positive mean error (ME) indicates underestimation, while a negative ME indicates 
overestimation. The ME values are negative for both the mean and median consensus, hence 
the forecasters overestimates the inflation on average. An overestimation of the actual value 
could be explained by a negative development in actual values (DeLong, 1997; Thomas, 
1999; Mehra, 2002), and with the inflation level decreasing during our sample, this 
explanation seems to hold.31 With the inflation measured in percentages, and the ME of the 
                                                        
31 However, in the most recent years, the inflation level has been much more stable, hence the overestimation 
should not be as distinct in the more recent surveys. The Volcker disinflation period in the early 1980s is the 
period where the inflation is decreasing the most, indicating that this period might be the reason for the 
overestimation result. Hence, when looking at a more previous sample, as done in 6.4.2, and the sample where 
we have excluded the Volcker disinflation, section 6.5.1, we may expect the results to differ. 
Mean Median
ME: Mean Error -0.275 -0.281
MAE: Mean Absolute Error 0.865 0.885
RMSE: Root mean squared error 3.313 3.382
MNSE: mean normalized squared error 2.222 2.263
Standard devation 2.014 2.075
Number of forecasts per individual 41.909 42
Accuracy measures for the consensus
Table 6.1: Accuracy measures for the consensus in the whole sample starting in 1974q4. 
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mean consensus being 0.28 (and quite similar using the median consensus), the inflation 
forecasts is on average 0.28 % too high. Because the ME takes the sign of the errors into 
account, the magnitude of this measure is not very reliable, because of a probability of 
positive values offsetting negative ones. 
The mean absolute error (MAE), which disregards the sign of the errors are presented in the 
second rows of table 6.1. MAE has a value at 0.87 for the mean consensus forecasts, with the 
median being a bit higher. Hence, the respondents’ forecast errors are a bit less than one 
percent on average, not giving us any information of whether they usually underestimate or 
overestimate the inflation. The root mean squared error (RMSE) also disregards the sign of 
the errors, and in addition it penalizes large errors more heavily than small errors. Also for 
the RMSE and the mean normalized squared error (MNSE), which accounts for the variation 
in the actual inflation, the mean and median consensus values are quite similar, with the 
median being a bit higher than the mean. We also present the standard deviations of the 
inflation forecasts, showing that the consensus deviation from the mean forecast is over two 
percent. The consensus mean and median numbers of forecasts per individual is 41.9 for the 
mean and 42 for the median, indicating that the individuals on average have been forecasting 
in about ten years, given that their forecasts are mostly consecutive. 
6.2.2 Forecast accuracy of individuals 
This section calculates the accuracy measures of each individual. We find the best and the 
worst forecasters in terms of each measure, and we examine if these best and worst exhibit 
any patterns. In order for us to gain a better understanding of how expectations of individuals 
Figure 6.6: The inflation forecast errors and the mean and median inflation forecast errors 
over time. The errors are calculated as the actual inflation minus the forecasted inflation. 
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are formed, for example whether they are accurate as the rational expectations hypothesis 
presumes (Gerberding, 2006), differences between them can be important to examine. 
The individual respondents’ one-year ahead inflation forecasts and the actual inflation are 
presented in figure 6.3. The forecast errors together with the mean and median forecast error 
over time are presented in figure 6.6. The forecast errors were larger in the beginning of the 
survey period, than in the more recent surveys. This indicates that it was harder to forecast in 
the beginning, when the level and the dispersion of the actual inflation were higher. This is in 
accordance with results found by McNees (1992), Thomas (1999) and Croushore (2006), and 
are issues that we will discuss when looking at the forecast accuracy of the individuals. 
We continue with calculating the different accuracy measures for the individual respondents. 
Starting with presenting the pattern of the calculated accuracy measures of the individuals in 
section 6.2.2.1 we continue examining the ten most accurate and the ten least accurate 
forecasters in terms of each accuracy measure, in section 6.2.2.2. In 6.2.2.3 we investigate if 
the best and the worst forecasters in terms of the accuracy measures overlap, thus if some 
forecasters are better than others in terms of all measures.  
6.2.2.1 A first look at the calculated accuracy measures for the individuals 
The calculated accuracy measures of each individual respondent are presented in figures 6.7-
6.10, and in figure 6.11 we present the standard deviation of the actual inflation in the periods 
where the individual respondents answered the survey. By taking a quick look at the figures, 
we see that there are large differences in terms of accuracy between the individual 
respondents.  
A common pattern is found when looking at ME, MAE and RMSE in figures 6.7-6.9. For all 
these accuracy measures the largest values are among the first individual numbers, who are 
located mostly in the beginning of the survey. This indicates that the forecasters performed 
worse in the beginning; hence that forecasting might have been harder in the early years of 
the survey than later. Therefore, when allowing positive errors to offset negative ones using 
the ME measure, when not allowing such offsetting of values using the MAE and the RMSE 
measures, as well as when penalizing larger errors more than small errors in the RMSE 
measure, the early respondents are worse than the late respondents. These findings are in 
accordance with other studies (Croushore, 2006; Gerberding, 2006). 
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Because the time period the individuals are forecasting the inflation for seems to matter for 
their accuracy, finding a way to normalize for time seems relevant. We do this by finding the 
respondents’ MNSE value. The MNSE accounts for the dispersion in the actual inflation, 
measured by the standard deviation in the actual inflation in the given periods (as explained 
in section 4.1.4). Looking at the individual respondents’ MNSE values presented in figure 
6.10, the pattern of the highest values being located with the lowest individual numbers is 
less prominent. The explanation is to some degree seen in figure 6.11, with the standard 
deviation of the actual inflation being higher for respondents with low individual numbers 
located in the beginning of the survey. Thus, when normalizing for the variation in the actual 
inflation in the individual respondents’ forecasting period, the earliest forecasters do not seem 
clearly worse than the later ones. Again these results for the individuals seems to be in line 
with the abovementioned consensus studies, with early studies finding a poor survey 
performance that according to Croushore (2006) can be explained by the period of time they 
were examining. The 1970s and 1980s included oil price shocks and bad monetary policy 
(Croushore, 2006), followed by the Volcker disinflation period that made the inflation 
unstable and unpredictable, increasing the dispersion in the inflation and making forecasting 
harder. 
With the ME measure allowing positive errors to offset negative ones, we should be able to 
discover patterns of over,- and underestimation by the individual respondents. With a 
negative ME value indicating overestimation, figure 6.7 seems to show a larger degree of 
overestimation in the beginning of the survey, where some individuals have large negative 
values of the ME. However, also in more recent times, from approximately individual 
number 400 to 500, there were a period of overestimation. Thus, making any conclusions 
regarding over,- and underestimation is hard. 
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6.2.2.2 Examining the best and the worst ten individuals in terms of accuracy 
In this section we first find the ten most and the ten least accurate individuals in terms of each 
measure, presented in tables 6.2-6.9. In addition to their rank and their accuracy measure 
values, we present their individual number, their time period of forecasting, their sum of 
errors, their number of forecasts and their standard deviations of both forecast errors and the 
actual inflation in their period of forecasting. We want to investigate if any patterns that can 
highlight why some forecasters are accurate and others are not exist.  
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Figure 6.7-.6.10: The calculated accuracy measures for each individual number. 
Figure 6.11: The standard deviations in the 
period of forecasting for each individual  
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Taking a first glance at the tables, we see that the most accurate ones with the lowest ranks, 
naturally have much lower accuracy values than the worst ones. With the level of the 
accuracy measures RMSE and MNSE being higher, the differences are naturally much higher 
for these measures than for the ME and the MAE. The differences are presented by the 
“absolute difference” in the first row in table 6.10-6.12. Because positive errors can offset 
negative ones when calculating ME, a larger ME value does not necessarily imply that the 
errors of the best respondents are small, and vice versa for the worst respondents. The 
standard deviation of the forecast errors of the respondents, presented in the third row of table 
6.10, are, however, larger for the worst ten than the best ten, pointing towards larger errors 
made by the worst ten respondents in terms of ME.  
From the discussion in chapter 6.2.2.1 as well as previous literature, we would expect the best 
forecasters to be located in the beginning of the survey and the worst to be located later. This 
seems to hold for the most accurate and the least accurate forecasters concerning ME, MAE 
and RMSE. In terms of ME, the majority of the most accurate ones forecasted only after1990, 
while most of the least accurate ones forecasted much earlier. The respondents ranked best by 
RMSE have responded in the end of the survey, with an exception being individual 145. The 
worst respondents ranked by RMSE are located in the beginning of the survey.  
As discussed in section 6.2.2.1 this timely pattern may be explained by the variation in the 
actual inflation in the different periods of time. However, looking in the fourth row in table 
6.10, we see that the opposite is true for the ME measure. The inflation actually has a larger 
dispersion in the forecasting periods of the best ten compared to the periods of the worst. The 
pattern is more like we expect it for both MAE and RMSE, with the dispersion in the actual 
inflation being higher in the forecasting period of the worst ten compared to the best ten. 
Ranking individuals by MNSE, can highlight this pattern further. The second column in table 
6.8, presents the period of forecasting of the best respondents in terms of MNSE. Here we do 
not discover a very obvious timely pattern. However, even though some of the best 
respondents in terms of MNSE were located in the end of the survey, we have almost no late 
respondents among the ten worst, seen in the second column in table 6.9. Thus, it seems like 
the forecasting performance of the respondents were to some degree worse in the beginning 
of the survey, even when we account for the standard deviation of the inflation. With these 
results, is seems hard for us to make any conclusions regarding whether the dispersion in the 
actual inflation can account for why the worst individuals are located mostly in the beginning 
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of the survey. Even though the dispersion in the actual inflation itself do not make us able to 
make any conclusions regarding why the accuracy was worse in the beginning, some of the 
factors highlighted by Croushore (2006) could still have had an impact. For example the oil 
price shocks and the bad monetary policy in the 1970’s and 1980’s made the future of the 
economy more unpredictable, and could alone have made forecasting harder. 
The sum of errors in column five in the tables 6.2-6.9 expresses whether the best and the 
worst forecasters seem to overestimate or underestimate the inflation. For all measures, the 
average of the sum of errors are positive for the ten most accurate respondents, while the ten 
least accurate ones have negative errors. This indicates underestimation by the best 
respondents and overestimation by the worst.32 Because those ranked worst in terms of ME, 
MAE and RMSE forecasted in an early period when the inflation level was decreasing, and 
the best ranked forecasted in a more recent period with a more stable actual inflation, these 
results are in line with previous mentioned consensus results found by Thomas (1999) and 
Mehra (2002). 
We also take a look at the number of forecasts per respondent. The mean number of forecasts 
for the worst and the best respondents are presented in the last row in tables 6.10-6.13. For 
ME there is a large dispersion among the best ten respondents (column six in table 6.2). Their 
mean of 47.9 forecasts is a bit higher than the consensus mean of 41.91. Also for RMSE and 
MNSE the number of forecasts among the best ones varies a lot. While the average number 
of forecasts for the most accurate ones in terms of both MAE and RMSE are lower than the 
consensus, the forecasters ranked best by MNSE have a higher average number of forecasts. 
Some of the best respondents in terms of MNSE have more forecasts than the mean 
consensus. Individual number 65 affects the average a lot, because he or she has predicted the 
inflation for 99 quarters (column six in table 6.8). For all accuracy measures, the average 
numbers of forecasts made by the least accurate forecasters are smaller than the average of 
the most accurate forecasters.33 An explanation can be that worst did not gain any forecast 
experience, or they may be “random” respondents, not caring much about the forecasts they 
make. 
                                                        
32 The degree of underestimating in terms of the sums of errors by the most accurate ones are naturally lower 
than the degree of overestimating by the leas accurate ones, because the best ones are better forecasters with 
lower errors, as shown by the absolute value of the sums of errors in tables 6.10-6.13.  
33 The difference is not very high for the respondents in terms of the RMSE measure. 
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531 2005q2-2009q4 1 0.508 -3.375 11 -1.244 0.462 0.442 0.947
405 1990q3-2007q2 2 0.511 2.513 33 -0.926 1.503 0.455 0.495
422 1990q4-2010q4 3 0.514 -6.964 29 -1.297 1.155 0.558 0.476
510 1999q2-2010q4 4 0.558 6.327 46 -1.459 1.068 0.354 0.780
502 1999q2-2005q1 5 0.579 1.253 16 -1.017 1.481 0.376 0.549
544 2005q2-2009q2 6 0.581 4.606 15 -0.974 1.491 0.625 0.968
507 1999q2-2010q4 7 0.585 5.450 42 -1.415 1.521 0.334 0.723
546 2005q3-2010q4 8 0.593 2.432 21 -1.570 1.561 0.517 0.849
465 1995q4-2003q1 9 0.595 -1.534 26 -1.482 1.045 0.485 0.423
500 1999q3-2003q2 10 0.600 1.717 14 -0.808 1.234 0.481 0.374
Std real 
inflation
Std of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
lowest 
MAE
 MAE
Sum of 
errors
Respon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
lowest 
mean 
absolute 
error 
(MAE)
472 1995q2-2010q4 1 -0.001 -0.071 52 -1.654 1.884 0.538 0.747
446 1993q2-2008q1 2 0.004 0.283 66 -1.746 2.276 0.527 0.703
448 1993q2-2008q1 3 0.020 0.020 30 -1.814 1.401 0.627 0.587
524 2003q1-2010q4 4 0.026 0.721 28 -1.993 1.626 0.641 0.885
431 1991q1-2010q4 5 0.028 1.699 61 -2.554 2.199 0.572 0.660
424 1990q4-2010q4 6 -0.029 -0.721 25 -1.849 1.870 0.789 0.681
145 1974q4-1981q2 7 0.034 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.064 1.570
65 1974q4-2007q3 8 0.046 4.598 99 -2.436 2.175 2.184 2.142
31 1974q4-1986q2 9 -0.059 -1.990 34 -4.452 4.269 1.345 2.369
411 1990q4-2010q4 10 0.059 3.880 66 -1.828 2.581 0.707 0.702
Std of real 
inflation
Respon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
lowest 
mean 
error 
(ME)
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
lowest ME ME
Std of 
errors
Sum of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
100 1983q3-1990q1 1 -2.251 -40.510 18 -5.647 0.804 1.884 0.542
23 1981q3-1986q3 2 -2.196 -35.134 16 -3.771 0.789 1.290 1.104
5 1981q3-1984q4 3 -1.865 -24.240 13 -2.520 -0.517 1.220 0.911
47 1975q1-1984q1 4 -1.729 -39.762 23 -22.332 1.183 5.352 2.199
22 1975q4-1980q4 5 1.702 28.939 17 -0.895 9.000 2.080 1.352
79 1981q3-1987q4 6 -1.630 -35.856 22 -3.352 -0.100 1.476 0.958
13 1981q4-1988q3 7 -1.553 -24.847 16 -7.125 -0.054 2.048 0.789
434 1991q1-1994q3 8 -1.538 -13.845 9 -2.646 0.006 0.828 0.176
69 1981q3-1989q4 9 -1.484 -28.201 19 -3.468 0.280 1.619 0.871
68 1981q3-1986q2 10 -1.484 -26.704 18 -2.781 0.063 0.828 1.035
Std real 
inflation
Respon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
highest 
mean 
error 
(ME)
Individual 
number Time period
Std of 
errors
Maximum 
error
Rank by 
highest 
ME
ME
Sum of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Table 6.2: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of ME 
Table 6.3: General patterns of the ten worst respondents in terms of ME  
Table 6.4: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of MAE 
Table 6.5: General patterns of the ten worst respondents in terms of MAE 
148 1974q4-1981q2 1 2.429 16.324 20 -6.076 5.039 2.733 1.382
100 1983q3-1990q1 2 2.365 -40.510 18 -5.647 0.804 1.884 0.542
23 1981q3-1986q3 3 2.294 -35.134 16 -3.771 0.789 1.290 1.104
125 1974q4-1981q2 4 2.271 8.910 27 -9.888 9.052 3.171 1.420
9 1981q4-1988q4 5 2.215 22.072 24 -2.199 9.177 2.796 0.748
47 1975q1-1984q1 6 2.203 -39.762 23 -22.332 1.183 5.352 2.199
93 1974q4-1989q3 7 2.187 1.951 16 -5.806 6.084 2.414 1.438
31 1974q4-1986q2 8 2.132 -1.990 34 -4.452 4.269 1.345 2.369
43 1974q4-1988q3 9 2.068 32.297 43 -2.676 6.107 1.273 2.537
5 1981q3-1984q4 10 1.865 -24.240 13 -2.520 -0.517 1.220 0.911
Std of 
errors
Individual 
number
Respon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
largest 
mean 
absolute 
error 
(MAE)
Maximum 
errorTime period
Rank by 
largest 
MAE
 MAE
Sum of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Std real 
inflation
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 54 
472 1995q2-2010q4 1 0.010 -0.071 52 -1.654 1.884 0.538 0.747
446 1993q2-2010q4 2 0.035 0.283 66 -1.746 2.276 0.527 0.703
448 1993q2-2008q1 3 0.107 0.588 30 -1.814 1.401 0.627 0.587
524 2003q1-2010q4 4 0.136 0.721 28 -1.993 1.626 0.641 0.885
145 1974q4-1981q2 5 0.143 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.064 1.570
424 1990q4-2010q4 6 0.144 -0.721 25 -1.849 1.870 0.789 0.681
431 1991q1-2010q4 7 0.218 1.699 61 -2.554 2.199 0.572 0.660
465 1995q4-2003q1 8 0.301 -1.534 26 -1.482 1.045 0.485 0.423
502 1999q2-2005q1 9 0.313 1.253 16 -1.017 1.481 0.376 0.549
549 2006q1-2010q4 10 0.320 1.321 17 -1.771 1.209 0.473 0.805
Std real 
inflation
Std of 
errors
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
errorRespon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
lowest 
root- 
mean 
squared 
error 
(RMSE)
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
lowest 
RMSE
RMSE
Sum of 
errors 
Number of 
forecasts
100 1983q3-1990q1 1 9.548 -40.510 18 -5.647 0.804 1.884 0.542
60 1974q4-1993q3 2 9.120 -64.489 50 -2.902 1.970 1.259 1.407
23 1981q3-1986q3 3 8.783 -35.134 16 -3.771 0.789 1.290 1.104
47 1975q1-1984q1 4 8.291 -39.762 23 -22.332 1.183 5.352 2.199
35 1981q3-1992q2 5 8.248 -52.811 41 -2.788 0.893 1.156 0.843
79 1981q3-1987q4 6 7.645 -35.856 22 -3.352 -0.100 1.476 0.958
66 1981q3-1989q4 7 7.221 -38.212 28 -3.297 1.177 1.140 0.831
22 1975q4-1980q4 8 7.019 28.939 17 -0.895 9.000 2.080 1.352
5 1981q3-1984q4 9 6.723 -24.240 13 -2.520 -0.517 1.220 0.911
69 1981q3-1989q4 10 6.470 -28.201 19 -3.468 0.280 1.619 0.871
Std real 
inflation
Std of 
errors
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
errorRespon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
highest 
root-
mean 
squared 
error 
(RMSE)
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest 
RMSE
RMSE
Sum of 
errors 
Number of 
forecasts
 
472 1995q2-2010q4 1 0.011 -0.071 52 -1.654 1.884 0.538 0.747
446 1993q2-2010q4 2 0.042 0.283 66 -1.746 2.276 0.527 0.703
145 1974q4-1981q2 3 0.115 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.064 1.570
448 1993q2-2008q1 4 0.140 0.588 30 -1.814 1.401 0.627 0.587
524 2003q1-2010q4 5 0.145 0.721 28 -1.993 1.626 0.641 0.885
424 1990q4-2010q4 6 0.175 -0.721 25 -1.849 1.870 0.789 0.681
31 1974q4-1986q2 7 0.222 -1.990 34 -4.452 4.269 1.345 2.369
431 1991q1-2010q4 8 0.268 1.699 61 -2.554 2.199 0.572 0.660
65 1974q4-2007q3 9 0.316 4.598 99 -2.436 2.175 2.184 2.142
158 1974q4-1981q2 10 0.322 1.712 21 -2.315 2.543 1.655 1.342
Std real 
inflation
Std of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Sum of 
errorsRespon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
lowest 
mean 
norma- 
lized 
squared 
error 
(MNSE)
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
lowest 
MNSE
MNSE
100 1983q3-1990q1 1 12.975 -40.510 18 -5.647 0.804 1.884 0.542
434 1991q1-1994q3 2 10.986 -13.845 9 -2.646 0.006 0.828 0.176
440 1991q3-1994q2 3 10.114 -8.549 12 -1.088 -0.430 0.209 0.060
35 1981q3-1992q2 4 8.982 -52.811 41 -2.788 0.893 1.156 0.843
427 1991q1-1993q4 5 8.459 -11.909 12 -1.385 -0.508 0.299 0.165
23 1981q3-1986q3 6 8.361 -35.134 16 -3.771 0.789 1.290 1.104
407 1990q3-2010q4 7 8.353 -50.628 65 -2.823 1.040 0.712 0.565
66 1981q3-1989q4 8 7.920 -38.212 28 -3.297 1.177 1.140 0.831
79 1981q3-1987q4 9 7.811 -35.856 22 -3.352 -0.100 1.476 0.958
60 1974q4-1993q3 10 7.689 -64.489 50 -2.902 1.970 1.259 1.407
Std real 
inflationRespon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
highest 
mean 
norma- 
lized 
squared 
error 
(MNSE)
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest 
MNSE
MNSE
Sum of 
errors
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Std of 
errors
Table 6.6: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of RMSE 
Table 6.7: General patterns of the ten worst respondents in terms of RMSE 
Table 6.8: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of MNSE 
Table 6.9: General patterns of the ten worst respondents in terms of MNSE 
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6.2.2.3 Some of the best and the worst forecasters overlap 
We want to investigate whether the best and the worst forecasters in terms of the different 
accuracy measures overlap. This could be done by comparing the tables 6.2-6.9. We also 
summarized these tables by listing the best and the worst ten forecasters in terms of each 
accuracy measure. These tables are presented in appendix 3.1, table A3.1 and A3.2.  
Some respondents overlap, with some being among the best for several accuracy measures, 
and others being among the worst for several accuracy measures. This pattern diminishes 
when taking the variation in the actual inflation into account. However, also for the MNSE 
there are some respondents who overlap with the other measures. 
6.2.3 Concluding remarks regarding forecast accuracy 
Summarizing our accuracy findings we see that the accuracy measures of the individual 
forecasters vary a lot.34 For both the mean and the median consensus forecasts’ and for the 
individual respondents’ ME, MAE and RMSE there seems to be a timely pattern. The best 
ten respondents are located in the end of the survey and the worst are located in the beginning 
of the survey. This pattern is weaker when we normalize with the standard deviation of the 
actual inflation using the MNSE measure. Thus, the dispersion in the actual inflation seems 
to affect the forecast accuracy. Together with the level of the actual inflation, this dispersion 
is higher in the beginning than later. This made it harder to forecast the inflation, thus the                                                         
34 Some summarizing tables, one with the mean and the median accuracy measure for the consensus mean and 
median forecasts and for the best ten respondents and the worst ten respondents are presented in the appendix 
3.2, table A3.3 and A3.4. 
Mean values Best ten Worst ten Absolute difference
MAE 0.562 2.203 1.640
Sum of errors 1.242 -6.008 7.251
Std of errors 0.463 2.348 1.885
Std of real inflation 0.658 1.465 0.806
Nmb of forecasts 25.3 23.4 1.90
Mean values Best ten Worst ten Absolute difference
RMSE 0.173 7.907 7.734
Sum of errors 0.415 -33.027 33.442
Std of errors 0.609 1.848 1.238
Std of real inflation 0.761 1.102 0.341
Nmb of forecasts 33.9 24.7 9.20
Mean values Best ten Worst ten Absolute difference
ME 0.013 -1.403 1.390
Sum of errors 0.903 -24.016 24.919
Std of errors 0.899 1.863 0.963
Std of real inflation 1.105 0.994 0.111
Nmb of forecasts 47.9 17.1 30.80
Mean values Best ten Worst ten Absolute difference
MNSE 0.175 9.165 8.990
Sum of errors 0.743 -35.194 35.937
Std of errors 0.994 1.025 0.031
Std of real inflation 1.169 0.665 0.504
Nmb of forecasts 43.4 27.3 16.10
Table 6.10-6.13: An overview of the ten best and ten worst respondents in terms of each accuracy 
measure 
Table 6.12: Overview RMSE Table 6.13: Overview MNSE 
 
Table 6.11: Overview MAE 
 
Table 6.10: Overview ME 
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forecasts of the respondents are worse in this early period. Hence, both consensus and the 
individual forecasters seem to be in accordance with previous research (Croushore, 2006). 
For the ten most accurate and the least accurate respondents this pattern is weaker, with no 
late respondents among the ten worst ranked by the MNSE. 
The least accurate respondents seem to overestimate the inflation with negative sums of 
errors. Previous research states overestimation by survey respondents when the inflation level 
is decreasing (Thomas, 1999; Mehra, 2002). Because the least accurate respondents in our 
sample are located in the beginning of the survey when the level of inflation was decreasing, 
this relationship seems to hold also in our data.  
In terms of number of forecasts per individual for the best ten and the worst ten, there is a 
prominent tendency of the worst respondents having responded fewer times than both the 
best respondents and the consensus. This makes us believe that it is hard to forecast 
accurately when having made few forecasts, thus having little experience. In appendix 3.2, 
table A3.4 we present an overview of the number of individual forecasts of the best and the 
worst ten survey participants. 
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6.3 The rationality of the inflation forecasts 
After examining the accuracy measures of the individuals in chapter 6.2 we have established 
that individual accuracy differences exist. In this section we go one step further, testing the 
rationality of the calculated one year-ahead inflation forecasts. We begin testing the 
rationality of the consensus mean and median forecasts in 6.3.1, continuing with the 
rationality of individuals in section 6.3.2. We use different rationality tests, we compare the 
individuals with the consensus and we find which individuals who are the best forecasters in 
terms of rationality. Again it is important for us to examine the differences between 
individuals, because we want to understand how the forecasts of individuals are formed in 
more detail. This is important to see if the assumption of rational expectations made by many 
macroeconomic models (Mehra, 2002) can be defended.  
 
6.3.1 The consensus forecasts are unbiased, though not strong-form rational  
We start using the test of bias described in section 4.2.1, to test if the mean and the median 
consensus forecasts are biased or not. We regress the forecast error on a constant using the 
Newey-West method in Stata. The Newey-West variance HAC estimator handles 
autocorrelation up to and including a lag of m, ignoring autocorrelation in lags larger than m. 
Because the number of overlapping quarters is five, the errors are MA(4), and we tell the 
Newey-West estimator to handle autocorrelation in lags up to four quarters (this is explained 
in more detail in section 5.4.4).  
When testing for bias, we test if the forecast errors are zero on average. In other words, we 
test how accurate the forecasts are. Thus, we will find similar results as in section 6.2. 
Previous literature presents different results. Early studies give poor results, indicating 
biasedness that gave a bad reputation to the survey measures (as found by for example 
Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), Pearce (1979) and Zarnowitz (1985) and later discussed by 
Croushore (2006)). However, more recent studies find that the forecasts of survey 
respondents are unbiased (Gerberding, 2006; Croushore, 2006), indicating that episodes in 
the early years can be responsible for the earlier bad results. The results of the bias test are 
shown in table 6.14. We present the p-values of the tests as well as the estimated constant and 
coefficients for the different variables. With the null of unbiasedness rejected at low p-values, 
we see that the mean and median consensus forecasts are not biased with p-values over 10 %. 
Because the forecasts cannot be claimed biased, we call them unbiased, even though the 
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correct thing statistically would be to say that we could not claim them biased.35 Hence, the 
first criterion of rationality is fulfilled, a result in line with the abovementioned recent 
studies. The constant is negative for both the mean and median consensus forecasts; meaning 
that the forecast error is negative. The forecasters therefore seem to overestimate the 
inflation. This result is in line with the accuracy measures of the consensus presented in 6.2.1, 
and can again be explained by the negative development in actual values, as suggested by for 
example DeLong (1995) and Thomas (1999)). 
We continue with the efficiency tests presented in 4.2.2. Previous literature has found varying 
results using different efficiency tests, with survey respondents passing some efficiency tests 
(Mankiw, et al., 2003; Croushore, 2006; Gerberding, 2006), but not tests of strong-form 
efficiency (Roberts, 1998; Thomas, 1999; Gerberding, 2006).  
The first efficiency test, described in 4.2.2.1, tests if historical actual values can help us 
explain the forecast error by adding lagged actual inflation as an independent variable. Figure 
6.12 plots the lagged actual inflation and the consensus forecasts’ forecast error against time. 
They seem to follow a similar pattern, but when performing the test neither the constant nor 
the lagged inflation are significant (as presented in table 6.14). Thus the mean and median 
consensus forecasts are weak- form efficient in terms of this test. Hence, they are, as some of 
the abovementioned literature suggest, to some degree efficient.  
                                                        
35 When testing for efficiency, we will in the same manner sometimes say that they are efficient if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, even though the most statistically correct thing to do would be to just claim them not 
unefficient. This is because always using the last option is a bit inconvenient when discussing these issues as 
much as we do in this paper.  
Figure 6.12: The lagged actual inflation and the 
consensus forecast error over time 
Figure 6.13: The mean and median forecast error 
and the forecast itself over time. The errors are 
calculated as the actual inflation minus the 
forecasted inflation. 
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Efficiency test number two (described in section 4.2.2.2) examines if there is information in 
the forecasts themselves that can explain the forecast error. The mean and median forecast 
error and the forecast are plotted in figure 6.13. No values in the test results presented in table 
6.14 are significant, thus the consensus forecasts are weak-form efficient also according to 
this test. 
Efficiency test three demands the previous forecast errors not to be persistent. Looking at 
table 6.14, we can reject the joint null hypothesis that the constant and the coefficient of the 
previous forecast error together are zero. Thus, knowing previous forecast errors would have 
improved the forecasts of today, and because the forecasters should have knowledge of their 
previous errors this test fails the rationality criterion. We should, however, keep in mind the 
fact that the actuals that we use are revised data (a problem discussed in 3.2.1). Hence, the 
respondents may not know the exact forecast errors when they make their new predictions 
(Croushore, 2006), and the demand that the respondents should know their previous forecast 
error could therefore be a bit loosened (Ball & Dean, 2003).36 
For us to be able to claim the forecasts of the consensus strong-form rational, their forecasts 
need to pass efficiency test four. This test demands that the entire information set that the 
individuals should have knowledge of when predicting, do not correlate with the forecast 
error. We use the lagged actual inflation and the forecast itself and in addition we include the 
federal funds interest rate and the unemployment rate in the United States (as discussed in 
4.2.2). This will not be the complete information set that all individuals should know of, but 
                                                        
36 This argument applies in our later analyses when performing efficiency test three, even though not always 
mentioned.  
Figure 6.14: The federal funds rate (source: Ecowin) and the unemployment 
rate (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics) over time.  
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we regard it as a good approximation. Figure 6.14, plots the federal funds rate and the 
unemployment rate over time.  
When demanding all coefficients to be zero at the same time, the null of rationality is rejected 
with a p-value of zero, presented in the last row of table 6.14. Hence, the consensus is not 
strong-form rational, because they do not seem to account for all the information they should 
have available when predicting the inflation. This result is in line with research by Mankiw et 
al. (2003) and Gerberding (2006). We also take a look at the estimated coefficients of the 
regression, interpreting using economic theory. This is done in the same manner as in 
Mankiw et al. (2003). For the lagged inflation, the coefficient has a positive value. With the 
thought that a high inflation in one period should be followed by a high inflation in the next 
period, this positive value indicates that the survey respondents reacted too little to the recent 
inflation news. Turning to the estimated federal funds rate, the coefficient is negative. A high 
nominal interest rate indicates contractionary monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, 
leading to the conclusion that a high nominal interest rate today could signal a lower inflation 
tomorrow. With the estimated coefficient being negative, high interest rates lead forecasters 
to predict a too high inflation, hence make negative forecast errors, and again the survey 
respondents seems to be under- reacting to the new they receive. The estimated coefficient 
for the unemployment rate is also negative, indicating that the respondents are overestimating 
the inflation when the unemployment is high. This is because a period of higher 
unemployment is usually followed by a lower inflation (Gärtner, 2006). Hence, survey 
participants seems to underestimate the inflation based on recent news of other 
macroeconomic variables, a result in line with Mankiw et al. (2003) and Ball and Croushore 
(2003). 
We conclude that the consensus is unbiased and, when adding the lagged actual inflation as 
well as the forecast itself, also weak-form efficient. However, when adding the lagged 
forecast error and the other actual values that they should be aware of and account for, they 
do not pass the efficiency test, hence they are not strong-form rational. In accordance with 
other abovementioned studies, they are therefore quite accurate, even though not strong-form 
rational. 
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6.3.2 Testing rationality of the individuals 
This section tests how rational the inflation forecasts of the individual respondents are. Again 
we start with unbiasedness, in section 6.3.2.1, before turning to the efficiency tests, section 
6.3.2.2. Individual forecasts from the SPF (the ASA/NBER study at the time) have been 
examined by early studies by Zarnowitz (1985) and Keane and Runkle (1990). While 
Zarnowitz (1985) found the individual respondents not rational and also biased, Keane and 
Runkle (1990) found that the individuals were rational. Keane and Runkle (1990) argued that 
the results against rationality of other literature at the time could be due to the fact of 
consensus testing. With this result, together with more recent consensus studies finding the 
consensus unbiased and to some degree efficient, we expect to find that the individual 
respondents make relatively good forecasts. In addition to test individuals’ performances and 
show how many of them who are rational in terms of each test, we also find the best 
individuals in terms of each test. These are the ones with the highest probability of being 
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.275 -0.281
α=0 0.105 0.113
α (constant) -0.458 -0.353
β (lagged infl.) 0.051 0.021
α=β=0 0.120 0.173
α (constant) -0.247 -0.116
β (forecasted infl.) -0.007 -0.044
α=β=0 0.231 0.268
α (constant) -0.096 -0.090
β (forecast error) 0.603 0.617
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 1.296 1.601
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.433 0.336
β2 (forecasted infl.) -0.024 0.115
β3 (fed funds) -0.256 -0.293
β4 (unemployment) -0.232 -0.272
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 
3: Lagged 
forecast error
Efficiency test 
4: Information 
set
Test
Rationality tests for consensus
Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Efficiency test 
1: Lagged 
actual values
Efficiency test 
2: Forecasted 
inflation
Table 6.14: Results if the rationality tests of the consensus mean and median 
forecast for the entire sample. 
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rational. We hope that investigating these best forecasters can give us valuable and perhaps 
new information about the individuals.  
6.3.2.1 Individuals are unbiased  
We start by performing the test of bias using Newey-West regressions. When running 
Newey-West regressions it is important to be aware that they exploit information in lags (as 
explained in 5.4.4 and 6.3.1). For some individuals the sufficient amount of lags necessary 
for the Newey-West method to be able to create a consistent covariance matrix is not 
available. For these individuals we cannot perform the Newey-West regression, thus we will 
not be able to test their rationality. When running the test of bias there is only one respondent, 
number 21, who has this problem. When we have excluded this individual we are left with 
141 individuals to test biasedness for.  
Table 6.15 presents the number of individuals who are unbiased and the part they make up of 
the total number of individuals. Also presented is the number of individuals better than the 
consensus.37 Due to the time and space limit of this paper, we do not present the coefficients 
from the individual regressions.38  
When demanding a 1 % significance level to reject the null hypothesis 73.0 % of the 
respondents cannot be rejected as unbiased forecasters, presented in the first column of table 
6.15. Using the “normal” significance level of 5 % this has sunk to 61.0 %, and on a 10 % 
level, not more than almost half the individuals make forecasts that cannot be claimed biased. 
The respondents with a p-value larger than the consensus p-value of 10.5 % (presented in 
table 6.14), thus, the amount of individuals who perform better than the consensus is also a 
bit more than 50 %. Due to the fact that many former studies have claimed that consensus 
forecasts are more accurate than most individuals (Zarnowitz, 1984), with one article actually 
claiming the consensus better than almost all individual forecasters (McNees, 1987), this 
result is surprising. Hence, individual respondents seem to make good predictions.  
With over 60 % of the forecasters passing the test of unbiasedness at a 5% significance level, 
we conclude that most of the respondents forecasts cannot be rejected unbiased. This result is 
in line with recent literature of consensus as well as Keane and Runkle’s (1990) test of the 
individuals.                                                          
37 The consensus value we use in this analyse, is the consensus calculated as the mean of all respondents. This 
goes for the efficiency test analysis as well. 
38 This applies in our later individual analyses, in section 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 as well. 
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We have ranked the individuals based on their p-values. The individuals with the highest p-
values are the “best” forecasters in terms of unbiasedness, because they have the largest 
probability of unbiased forecasts. We start examining the accuracy of the best ten individuals 
in terms of unbiasedness. The accuracy measures of these best forecasters and their ranking 
in terms of the accuracy measures are presented in table 6.16. Because having unbiased 
forecasts on average mean that the average forecasts are quite accurate, we expect some 
472 1995q2-2010q4 1 0.995 -0.071 52 -1.654 1.884 0.888 0.747
446 1993q2-2010q4 2 0.985 0.283 66 -1.746 2.276 0.931 0.703
448 1993q2-2008q1 3 0.956 0.588 30 -1.814 1.401 0.995 0.587
145 1974q4-1981q2 4 0.942 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.280 1.570
31 1974q4-1986q2 5 0.935 -1.990 34 -4.452 4.269 2.483 2.369
524 2003q1-2010q4 6 0.928 0.721 28 -1.993 1.626 0.846 0.885
424 1990q4-2010q4 7 0.919 -0.721 25 -1.849 1.870 0.916 0.681
93 1974q4-1989q3 8 0.874 1.951 16 -5.806 6.084 2.952 1.438
431 1991q1-2010q4 9 0.872 1.699 61 -2.554 2.199 0.848 0.660
158 1974q4-1981q2 10 0.853 1.712 21 -2.315 2.543 1.403 1.342
Std of real 
inflation
Maximum 
error
Std of 
errors
Bias test: 
Respon- 
dents 
ranked 
by the 
highest p-
value
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest p p- value
Sum of 
errors 
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
472 -0.001 1 0.748 29 0.010 1 0.011 1
446 0.004 2 0.735 25 0.035 2 0.042 2
448 0.020 3 0.836 51 0.107 3 0.140 4
145 0.034 7 0.994 75 0.143 5 0.115 3
31 -0.059 9 2.132 134 0.341 11 0.222 7
524 0.026 4 0.666 17 0.136 4 0.145 5
424 -0.029 6 0.766 32 0.144 6 0.175 6
93 0.122 22 2.187 135 0.488 19 0.407 15
431 0.028 5 0.630 15 0.218 7 0.268 8
158 0.082 16 1.164 93 0.374 12 0.322 10
Individual 
number ME Rank ME MAE
Bias test: ten 
best 
respondents 
accuracy 
measures and 
rankings in 
terms of 
accuracy 
measures
Rank MAE RMSE
Rank 
RMSE MNSE
Rank 
MNSE
Table 6.15: An overview of the test of bias of the individual respondents for the sample. 
“All” is the total number of individuals who we have performed the test on, while the 
values under “the unbiased” are the number of individuals passing the test/better than the 
consensus mean forecast’s p-value. 
Table 6.16: An overview of the accuracy measures for the ten individuals with the highest p-
value of being unbiased. 
Table 6.17: An overview of general patterns concerning the ten individuals with the highest 
p-value of being unbiased. 
 
All The unbiased
141
1% significance 103 0.730
5%significance 86 0.610
10% significance 72 0.511
Better than consensus 72 0.511
Test of bias : 
Overview unbiasedness:
Number of individuals: Part 
being 
unbiased
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overlapping between these individuals and the best in terms of the accuracy measures. This 
holds for ME, RMSE and MNSE. For MAE the pattern is not as clear. Because the best ten in 
terms of unbiasedness are overlapping many of the best ten for most of the accuracy 
measures, we make the expected conclusion that the individuals with the highest probabilities 
of having unbiased forecasts are also some of the most accurate forecasters.   
In table 6.17 we present some general patterns among those ten best individuals, presented in 
the same manner as we presented the ten best and worst in terms of the accuracy measures in 
section 6.2.  They have high p-values, all being over 85 %, and when looking at their time 
periods of forecasting, we see that most of them are late forecasters. This implies that the 
respondents’ forecasts have improved over the years, in line with results presented in 6.2.2, 
as well as results in previous literature (for example Croushore (2006)). The early 
respondents among these ten best have large standard deviations of both the actual inflation 
and of the forecast errors. This indicates that a large variation in the actual inflation tends to 
give a large variation in the errors, and at the same time a large variation in errors indicates 
difficulties when making forecasts.   
The sum of errors are for most individuals positive, thus the most accurate individuals seem 
to have been underestimating the actual inflation. This a different conclusion then the 
consensus conclusion for the individual respondents (section 6.3.1), but in line with the 
results of the best ten respondents in terms of the different accuracy measures, presented in 
6.2.2. The sums of errors are, however, not that large, so this implication is not very strong. 
The number of inflation forecasts ranges from 16 to 66, with no clear pattern. This leaves it 
difficult to conclude that gaining forecasting experience by predicting the inflation many 
times is an advantage for making accurate forecasts. 
These best individuals are also ranked in terms of the other rationality tests, presented in a 
table in appendix 4, table A4.1. There is not much overlapping between these, implying that 
the ones who have the highest probability of being unbiased not necessarily have a higher 
probability of being efficient. 
6.3.2.2 Efficiency tests 
In the previous section we saw that most of the respondents are unbiased. Because of the 
relatively good recent rationality results of the consensus (Gerberding, 2006; Croushore, 
2006) and Keane and Runkle’s rationality results of individual respondents in 1990 we expect 
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relatively good results for the efficiency tests also. This section performs efficiency tests on 
the individual respondents. Again the four tests discussed in 4.2.2 are used. 
The results are divided in different issues. First we present the amount of individuals with 
sufficient observations for us to be able to perform the tests (1), before (2) testing if we can 
conclude with efficiency or not. Finally we take a look at the ten best individuals in terms of 
each test (3). 
Individuals with sufficient observations for testing 
Because of the problem of not having the sufficient amount of observations to be able to run 
the Newey-West regressions (as explained in 5.4.4), there are some individuals for whom we 
cannot perform the efficiency tests. This problem arises for individual number 21 when 
adding lagged actual values, the forecast itself and when adding the information set. For these 
tests we are left with 141 individuals. For efficiency test three, adding the lagged forecast 
error, there are more individuals without sufficient observations. This is because we need 
sufficient observations of the lagged forecast error to be able to run the regression. We have 
to exclude 26 respondents, leaving us with a sample of 115 respondents for this test. 
The majority of individuals do not pass any of the efficiency tests 
In this sub-section we present the rationality results of the individual respondents’ efficiency 
tests. Table 6.18 presents the individuals who are efficient based on the different significance 
levels for all efficiency tests. The p-value of the mean consensus forecast and the fraction of 
the individuals that performs better than the consensus is also presented. 
Looking at table 6.18, we see that efficiency test one, adding the lagged actual inflation, has a 
mean consensus p-value of 12.0 %. The number of individuals with a p-value larger than 
12.0% is 51. In terms of percentages, 36.2 % of all individuals have performed better than the 
consensus. This is quite a large percentage given that the previous claim that the consensus is 
much better than almost all individuals (McNees, 1987). At a 5 % significance level the 
number of respondents that cannot be claimed efficient in this first efficiency test is 68, a bit 
under 50 % of the entire sample. Hence, the majority of the respondents are not weakly 
efficient and thus not rational in terms of this test. However, being able to claim almost half 
the individuals efficient, tells us that the individuals are quite good forecasters. 
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Adding the forecast itself, in efficiency two presented in table 6.18, we see that 12.8 % of the 
forecasters have a p- value larger than the consensus value of 23.1 %. At a 5 % significance 
level, there are only 39 respondents where the joint null is rejected. Hence, only 27.7 % of the 
individuals are efficient in terms of the forecast itself not explaining some of the forecast 
errors. The forecast itself is definitely something the forecasters have information about when 
making forecasts. This conclusion seems to point towards most of the respondents not being 
efficient and rational.  
Turning to the test where we add the lagged forecast error, efficiency test number three 
(described in section 6.2.2.3) table 6.18 shows that the consensus p-value is zero. When 
finding the part of the individuals who have performed better than the consensus we want to 
exclude the individuals who also have p-values very close to zero. We therefore set the p-
value limit that they should be better than to 0.0001. Doing this leave us with almost 75 % of 
the individual respondents being better than the mean consensus forecast, a result tending 
towards the individuals performing very well compared to the consensus. However, the made 
assumption that we can set the limit at 0.0001 might give us more individuals better than the 
consensus than what is really true, contributing to this very high percentages of individuals 
performing better than the consensus. 
For efficiency test three 36.5 % of all respondents cannot be rejected efficient on a 5 % 
significance level. Thus, the lagged forecast error can explain some of the current forecast 
error for most respondents, and most of the forecasters do not account for their previous 
forecast errors as we expect them to. The majority can therefore not be claimed weakly 
rational based on this efficiency test. Again we should keep in mind that the actuals that we 
use are revised data, and that the exact forecast error therefore cannot be known to the 
respondents (Croushore, 2006). Even though the majority is not weakly rational, there are 
many forecasters who seems to be performing well.  
For the respondents to be strong-form efficient, and thus strong-form rational, they have to 
pass the fourth efficiency test, where we add the information set (as described in section 
4.2.2.4). The results of this test are also presented in table 6.18. When testing individual 
respondents the individuals should optimally have one information set each, based on the 
information they have available and base their forecasts on when responding to the survey. 
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This is, however, hard to retrieve, because we do not have any specific information about the 
respondents, other than their forecasts and their industry variable (the industry variable is 
analysed in detail in section 6.4). Therefore, the information set that we use here and expect 
the respondents to have knowledge about is, except for their own forecasts, the same for all 
individuals. The new information added are the economic variables discussed in the 
consensus section, the federal funds interest rate and the unemployment rate in the United 
States.  
Table 6.18: The number of individuals who are efficient and rational based on the different efficiency 
tests, and the part that they make of all respondents. The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the 
part of the individuals who are better than this consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all 
sample” the number of individuals who we have performed the tests on, while the numbers to each 
significance level are the number of individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 141 88 68 60
Part of all 0.624 0.482 0.426
Better than the mean consensus:
Consensus p-value 0.120
Nmb 51
Part of all 0.362
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 141 48 39 25
Part of all 0.340 0.277 0.177
Better than the mean consensus:
Consensus p-value 0.231
Nmb 18
Part of all 0.128
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 115 62 42 32
Part of all 0.539 0.365 0.278
Better than the mean consensus:
Consensus p-value 0.000
Nmb 86
Part of all 0.748
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 141 11 4 1
Part of all 0.078 0.028 0.007
Better than the mean consensus:
Consensus p-value 0.000
Nmb 41
Part of all 0.291
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview efficiency tests for the individual respondents in the whole sample
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 68 
Also this test has a consensus p-value of zero, and we demand the ones being better than the 
consensus to have a p-value higher than 0.0001. The fraction of individuals better than the 
consensus is here 29.1 %. At a 5% significance level, only 4 out of 141 respondents can be 
claimed efficient or strong-form rational.  
From our results we see that the majority of the individuals do not pass any of the efficiency 
tests, but in some tests a large fraction of them does. This is in line with literature stating that 
most strong efficiency tests reject rationality of inflation forecasts, but that many of them still 
are quite accurate (Gerberding, 2006). 
The ten best forecasters in terms of each test 
We have ranked the ten respondents with the highest p-values in terms of the joint null 
hypothesis for each test. In this section we present these individuals. We first take a look at 
their calculated accuracy measures, presented in tables 6.19-6.22, as well as their rankings in 
terms of these accuracy measures (1). Then we present some general patterns or the lack of 
such among these ten best (2). Their rankings in terms of the other efficiency tests are also 
discussed. In appendix 4.2 we take a look at the four strong-form rational respondents. 
The “most” rational ones are not necessarily the most accurate ones 
As for the test of bias, we examine the accuracy measures of the ten best individuals in terms 
of each efficiency test. These are presented in the tables 6.19-6.22.39  
The calculated accuracy measures for ME, RMSE and MNSE are, for most of the ten best in 
the different efficiency tests, smaller than the corresponding consensus values, presented in 
table 6.1, section 6.2.1. This implies that the forecasters are more accurate than the 
consensus, and is true for all the weak-form efficiency tests. Given that these are the best 
respondents, this result may not be surprising, but it is still a result against the mentioned 
claim by McNees (1987) that consensus forecasts are better than almost all individuals. 
However, when examining MAE we do not find any clear pattern of small or large values for 
any of three weak efficiency tests. For the strong-form efficiency test, presented in table 6.22, 
we do not find any clear relationship between the values of the accuracy measures when 
comparing them with the consensus values. This makes it is hard for us to conclude that the                                                         
39 Again, it seems natural with some overlapping in terms of the best having low rankings of the accuracy 
measures, because having an average forecast error of zero is one of the criterions in all the efficiency tests. This 
implication is though not as strong as for the test of bias because we now demand also other variables not being 
able to explain the error. 
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best ones in terms of strong-form efficiency, make more accurate forecasts than the other 
respondents.  
General patterns among the best ten are hard to find 
Turning to looking for general patterns among the best ten in terms of each efficiency test, we 
present the individuals’ time period of forecasting, the number of forecasts they have made, 
their sum of errors, etc. These are presented in tables 6.23-6.26. 
We expect the p-values of the ten best to be high if a lot of the best individual respondents are 
efficient. This pattern holds for efficiency test one and three as presented in the p-value 
column of table 6.23 and 6.26. However, when looking at efficiency test two the p-values of 
the best ten have a large range, from 53 % to 96 %. Hence there are not many respondents 
with a very large (if by large we think of p-values above 50 %) probability of being efficient 
when performing this efficiency test. Looking at efficiency test four there are no high p- 
values, and only one individual who can be claimed rational based on all significance levels, 
and four at ”normal” 5 % significance level. This is a natural result because the majority of 
the best ten are not efficient based on this test. The four strong-form rational ones are 
presented in appendix 4.2. 
Examining the best respondents’ time period of forecasting, we do not find any clear patterns 
for most of the tests. For efficiency test number one, table 6.23, there is a pattern of the best 
respondents being located late in the survey, for test two there are both early and late 
respondents and for test three there, three out of the four “best” are early respondents. Test 
four, presented in table 6.26, shows a small tendency of the best forecasters being located in 
the end of the survey. Looking at all tests together, we cannot conclude that the best 
forecasters in terms of efficiency are located in any particular time span of the survey. This 
result is a bit different from our results in terms of accuracy (as discussed in 6.2.2.2), and also 
a bit different than we expected, because previous literature have found that forecast 
performance have improved (Croushore, 2006). However, with efficiency test one and four 
tending towards the best ones being late respondents, there is also in this data, a small 
tendency towards the expected result being true.  
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429 -0.063 12 0.637 16 0.447 15 0.577 20
34 0.089 17 1.032 80 0.418 13 0.337 11
424 -0.029 6 0.766 32 0.144 6 0.175 6
502 0.078 15 0.579 5 0.313 9 0.423 16
543 0.234 35 0.745 28 0.992 31 0.997 32
541 0.254 40 0.804 41 1.017 32 1.065 36
65 0.046 8 0.813 44 0.462 17 0.316 9
528 0.327 51 0.739 26 1.600 47 1.687 46
524 0.026 4 0.666 17 0.136 4 0.145 5
527 0.286 46 0.679 18 1.402 44 1.491 44
RMSE
Rank 
RMSE MNSE
Rank 
MNSE
Efficiency test 1: 
ten best 
respondents 
accuracy 
measures and 
rankings in 
terms of 
accuracy 
measures
Individual 
number ME Rank ME MAE Rank MAE
98 0.104 18 1.248 103 0.579 23 0.390 14
145 0.034 7 0.994 75 0.143 5 0.115 3
124 0.254 39 0.831 49 0.949 30 0.824 28
78 -0.274 43 1.147 91 1.129 36 0.750 26
546 0.116 21 0.593 8 0.531 22 0.576 19
535 -0.240 36 0.715 23 1.124 35 1.188 39
549 0.078 14 0.612 12 0.320 10 0.357 12
507 0.130 25 0.585 7 0.841 27 0.989 31
34 0.089 17 1.032 80 0.418 13 0.337 11
510 0.138 27 0.558 4 0.933 35 1.056 35
RMSE
Rank 
RMSE MNSE
Rank 
MNSE
Efficiency test 2: 
ten best 
respondents 
accuracy 
measures and 
rankings in terms 
of accuracy 
measures
Individual 
number ME Rank ME MAE Rank MAE
488 -0.642 83 0.776 36 2.487 68 3.969 97
462 -0.780 99 0.840 54 2.467 66 4.499 106
432 -0.619 82 0.752 30 1.637 48 4.127 100
502 0.078 15 0.579 5 0.313 9 0.423 16
60 -1.290 128 1.395 110 9.120 140 7.689 132
39 -1.107 124 1.498 120 3.990 100 3.231 79
42 -0.274 45 0.858 57 1.025 34 0.717 25
498 0.815 100 0.840 55 4.076 102 5.715 120
520 0.345 54 0.785 38 1.888 56 2.059 57
145 0.034 7 0.994 75 0.143 5 0.115 3
RMSE
Rank 
RMSE MNSE
Rank 
MNSE
Efficiency test 4: 
ten best 
respondents 
accuracy 
measures and 
rankings in terms 
of accuracy 
measures
Individual 
number ME Rank ME MAE Rank MAE
Table 6.19: The accuracy measures of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency 
test one, and the rankings of those in terms of the different tests. 
 
Table 6.22: The accuracy measures of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency 
test four, and the rankings of those in terms of the different tests. 
 
Table 6.21: The accuracy measures of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency 
test three, and the rankings of those in terms of the different tests. 
 
144 0.298 47 1.124 89 1.334 42 1.089 38
34 0.089 17 1.032 80 0.418 13 0.337 11
465 -0.059 11 0.595 9 0.301 8 0.463 17
125 0.330 52 2.271 138 1.715 51 1.439 43
543 0.234 35 0.745 28 0.992 31 0.997 32
549 0.078 14 0.612 12 0.320 10 0.357 12
527 0.286 46 0.679 18 1.402 44 1.491 44
548 0.326 50 0.625 13 1.495 45 1.622 45
500 0.123 23 0.600 10 0.459 16 0.750 27
485 -0.259 41 0.924 68 1.347 43 1.733 48
RMSE
Rank 
RMSE MNSE
Rank 
MNSE
Efficiency test 
3: ten best 
respondents 
accuracy 
measures and 
rankings in 
terms of 
accuracy 
measures
Individual 
number ME Rank ME MAE Rank MAE
Table 6.20: The accuracy measures of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency 
test two, and the rankings of those in terms of the different tests. 
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Wanting to check if the best forecasters are overestimating or underestimating, we take a look 
at the sum of errors, the fifth column of tables 6.23-6.26. As for the test of bias, the sums of 
errors are positive for efficiency test one and three, implying some degree of underestimation 
by the best forecasters. However, when performing efficiency test four, the sum of errors are 
actually mostly negative, implying overestimation. For efficiency test two the pattern is 
unclear, leaving us with an overall inconclusive pattern. 
We investigate whether there seems to be a positive effect from answering to the survey 
several times. Such a pattern could imply that the forecasters “learn” and improve if they 
forecast the inflation many times. However, for most of the tests the opposite is true. For test 
one and two, the differences in the numbers of responded forecasts are large, but the majority 
has fewer forecasts than the consensus, presented in table 6.1, section 6.2.1. For efficiency 
test three and four, the highest number of forecasts of the best ten is far below the consensus 
value of about 42. These numbers implies that it does not seem to be an advantage or a 
“learning- effect” coming from forecasting several times. Making a lot of forecasts could 
rather seem to be a disadvantage, making it hard get among the “top ten” respondents.40 A 
previous study by Lamont (2002) might be able to explain this relationship. Lamont (2002) 
finds that older and more established forecasters tend to give more radical forecasts, and are 
therefore less accurate, maybe because of a wish of getting a reputation. This finding is, 
however, not completely in line with our result in 6.2.2.2, where the more accurate 
forecasters had made inflation forecasts several times more than the least accurate ones.   
We also rank the best individuals of the different efficiency tests in terms of the other 
rationality tests, finding not much overlapping. Thus, there does not seem to be a clear 
pattern in terms of the ones ranked best by one test also being among the best ones in the 
other tests. These tables are presented in the appendix 4.1, in table A4.2-A4.5. 
                                                        
40 It could be that some of these best forecasters simply did not respond to the survey during the most 
challenging times and episodes, leaving them with better and more accurate forecasts. This could be an 
interesting topic to dig into, but with the time limit and space issues of this paper, we do not examine this issue 
further. 
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488 1995q2-2001q4 1 0.293 -9.632 15 -1.269 0.553 0.542 0.402
462 1995q2-1999q1 2 0,095* -7.802 10 -1.613 0.300 0.604 0.306
432 1991q1-1994q3 3 0,058* -4.332 7 -1.522 0.464 0.618 0.157
502 1999q2-2005q1 4 0,056* 1.253 16 -1.017 1.481 0.744 0.617
60 1974q4-1993q3 5 0,049** -64.489 50 -2.902 1.970 0.878 2.370
39 1974q4-1984q2 6 0,041** -14.385 13 -2.887 1.390 1.330 2.077
42 1975q4-1984q2 7 0,034** -3.835 14 -2.595 1.588 1.173 2.235
498 1998q4-2010q4 8 0,030** 20.382 25 -0.235 2.000 0.500 0.766
520 2002q1-2010q4 9 0,020** 10.343 30 -1.720 1.951 0.942 0.853
145 1974q4-1981q2 10 0,016** 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.280 1.420
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Std of 
errors
Std of real 
inflation
Sum of 
errors 
Efficiency 
test 4: 
Respon- 
dents 
ranked by 
the 
highest p-
value in 
terms of 
Ho: 
α=β1=β2=
β3=β4=β5
=0
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest p p- value
 
 
429 1991q1-2008q4 1 0.997 -3.164 50 -1.497 1.678 0.798 0.658
34 1974q4-1981q3 2 0.988 1.962 22 -2.514 2.024 1.269 1.428
424 1990q4-2010q4 3 0.973 -0.721 25 -1.849 1.870 0.916 0.675
502 1999q2-2005q1 4 0.971 1.253 16 -1.017 1.481 0.744 0.617
543 2005q2-2009q3 5 0.939 4.210 18 -1.721 1.634 0.909 0.990
541 2005q2-2010q4 6 0.922 4.069 16 -1.846 1.721 0.980 0.882
65 1974q4-2007q3 7 0.890 4.598 99 -2.436 2.175 0.967 2.237
528 2005q1-2010q4 8 0.871 7.839 24 -3.070 1.769 0.954 0.900
524 2003q1-2010q4 9 0.868 0.721 28 -1.993 1.626 0.846 0.902
527 2004q3-2010q4 10 0.846 6.867 24 -2.867 1.333 0.927 0.937
Std of 
errors
Std of real 
inflationp- value
Sum of 
errors 
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Efficiency 
test 1: 
Respon- 
dents 
ranked by 
the 
highest p-
value in 
terms of 
Ho: α=β=0
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest p
98 1974q4-1986q1 1 0.962 3.226 31 -2.534 2.429 1.481 2.413
145 1975q5-1981q2 2 0.863 0.609 18 -1.549 2.850 1.280 1.420
124 1974q4-1979q4 3 0.822 3.551 14 -0.989 1.902 0.967 1.303
78 1974q4-1989q1 4 0.811 -4.653 17 -2.940 1.965 1.399 2.372
546 2005q3-2010q4 5 0.750 2.432 21 -1.570 1.561 0.789 0.841
535 2005q2-2010q4 6 0.710 -5.271 22 -2.070 1.432 0.894 0.882
549 2006q1-2010q4 7 0.680 1.321 17 -1.771 1.209 0.777 0.805
507 1999q2-2010q4 8 0.639 5.450 42 -1.415 1.521 0.710 0.774
34 1974q4-1981q3 9 0.617 1.962 22 -2.514 2.024 1.269 1.428
510 1999q2-2010q4 10 0.530 6.327 46 -1.459 1.068 0.629 0.774
Sum of 
errors 
Efficiency 
test 2: 
Respon- 
dents 
ranked by 
the 
highest p-
value in 
terms of 
Ho: α=β=0
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest p p- value
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Std of 
errors
Std of real 
inflation
144 1975q1-1981q2 1 0.972 5.965 20 -3.043 2.099 1.397 1.448
34 1974q3-1981q3 2 0.971 1.962 22 -2.514 2.024 1.269 1.428
465 1995q4-2003q1 3 0.956 -1.534 26 -1.482 1.045 0.710 0.407
125 1974q4-1981q2 4 0.951 8.910 27 -9.888 9.052 3.353 1.420
543 2005q2-2009q3 5 0.943 4.210 18 -1.721 1.634 0.909 0.990
549 2006q1-2010q4 6 0.933 1.321 17 -1.771 1.209 0.777 0.805
527 2004q3-2010q4 7 0.919 6.867 24 -2.867 1.333 0.927 0.937
548 2005q3-2010q4 8 0.882 6.850 21 -1.688 1.190 0.703 0.841
500 1999q3-2003q2 9 0.878 1.717 14 -0.808 1.234 0.657 0.361
485 1995q2-2004q1 10 0.875 -6.997 27 -2.109 1.705 1.078 0.552
Number of 
forecasts
Minimum 
error
Maximum 
error
Std of 
errors
Std of real 
inflation
Efficiency 
test 3: 
Respon- 
dents 
ranked by 
the 
highest p-
value in 
terms of 
Ho: α=β=0
Individual 
number Time period
Rank by 
highest p p- value
Sum of 
errors 
Table 6.25: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency test three  
Table 6.23: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency test one  
 
Table 6.24: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency test two 
Table 6.26: General patterns of the ten best respondents in terms of efficiency test four  
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6.3.3 Concluding remarks on the rationality of forecasts 
Different conclusions can be drawn from the performed tests. For the consensus mean and 
median forecasts we cannot reject the null of rationality in the test of bias and in efficiency 
test one and two. This indicates unbiasedness and weak-form efficiency, thus weak-form 
rationality for the consensus. However, in terms of efficiency test three and four, the null of 
efficiency is rejected, and we can therefore not claim the forecasters rational. This is in 
accordance with other previously mentioned literature (Gerberding (2006), stating that survey 
participants are quite accurate, though not strong-form rational. 
Turning to the individual respondents, the conclusions are a bit altered. At a significance 
level of 5 %, over 50 % of the respondents do not have biased forecasts, thus the first 
criterion of rationality is fulfilled. However, turning to the efficiency tests, neither of the 
weak-form efficiency tests nor the strong-form test gives us that more than half of the 
respondents are efficient. When demanding strong-form rationality, only 2.8 % of all 
individuals pass the test. Even for the best ten individuals the null of strong-form rationality 
is rejected at a 10 % and a 5 % significance level for most of these best respondents, and we 
conclude with most of the respondents not being strong-form rational. This result seems to 
coincide with Zarnowitz (1984) and McNees (1987) who states that the consensus is better 
than the individual forecasters. However, looking at the fraction of individual respondents 
who are rational, efficient and better than the consensus in each test, we find many 
respondents who have a relatively good forecasting performance.  
The ten respondents with the largest p-values for all tests are not overlapping much in terms 
of being among the best ten in several tests. This implies different individual conclusions in 
the different tests. Drawing any conclusions regarding whether some respondents always are 
better than others is therefore difficult. However, for most rationality tests, except the fourth, 
the best respondents tend to have low accuracy measures. This indicates that the efficient 
ones are also accurate, as we would expect. However, because this does not hold for the 
strong-form rationality test it is hard for us to be too sturdy stating this as a fact. 
Other patterns worth mentioning are that for the test of bias and the efficiency test of adding 
the lagged actual forecast (efficiency test one) most of the best respondents are located in the 
end of the survey, a result coinciding with the accuracy results in 6.2.2.2. This pattern is not 
as clear in the other tests. The standard deviation of the actual inflation in the forecasting 
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period of those individuals can explain some of this, because the variation in the inflation 
level is higher for the forecasters in the beginning of the survey. 
The pattern of underestimating the inflation among the best also seems valid for most tests. 
However, this pattern is reversed for the strong-form rationality test, leaving us with 
difficulties drawing conclusions. Another pattern is that the best respondents have relatively 
few numbers of forecasts. Hence, gaining experience by answering to the survey many times 
does not seem to improve the forecasts. This finding is supported by Lamont (2002). 
It is hard to make strong conclusions about the individuals’ forecasting performance. The fact 
that the different tests give us different “best” individuals, and that the patterns of these are 
not clear, shows us that individual differences exists. Such differences can be important to 
document, because of the stated fact that many economic models do not take differences and 
disagreement between individuals into account, assuming that individuals make rational 
forecasts (Mehra, 2002; Mankiw, et al., 2003). 
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6.4 Examining differences between industries 
So far we have not used the information regarding the industry the individuals are employed 
in. We have information about the industry variables from the second quarter of 1990 (Chew 
& Price, 2008). In this section we investigate if there are differences between the individuals 
employed in the different industries using data from the SPF. To our knowledge this has not 
been done before.  
Most empirical studies examining professional survey participants assume that forecasters 
will produce and present their best estimates, because they are paid to do so. Because 
consensus forecasts, which are stated better than individual respondents by many are 
available to the public, it seems strange that firms still produces rather inaccurate forecasts 
(Laster, et al., 1999). Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) suggest that this is because the 
forecasters are overconfident, and therefore put too little weight on the available consensus 
forecasts. Others (Laster, et al., 1999; Lamont, 2002; Gerberding, 2006) suggest that some 
forecasters pursue other goals than accuracy when making predictions. One example is to 
have a strategic goal of getting a reputation, and therefore publish rather extreme forecasts. 
Examining if there are differences between the performances of individuals with different 
industry variables in the SPF may give us a hint of whether such differences exist between 
the different firms in this survey.  
A study by Laster et al. (1999) examines differences between survey participants employed 
in different firms, investigating the professional survey participants in the “Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators.” They suggest that some survey respondents deliberately bias their 
forecasts, for example because of a wish of getting publicity. They sort the respondents in six 
different industry categories, finding significant differences between them. The thought is 
that the firms who are expected to make forecast accuracy a high priority should produce 
forecasts closest to the consensus. In their findings industrial corporations were closest to the 
consensus. Such firms value accuracy more than publicity because they use forecasts 
extensively for internal planning. They also found that individual forecaster firms together 
with consulting and advisory firms seem to make forecasts far from the consensus, probably 
because they value publicity and media attention in addition to accuracy (a result also 
supported by Lamont (1999)). Banks and econometric forecasting firms have more 
intermediate results compared to the consensus. Even though one might expect these to value 
accuracy highly, econometric forecasting firms may have an additional pressure to outshine 
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competitors, and banks may be able to attract new clients with favourable publicity. Hence, 
these two types of firms may value publicity in addition to accuracy. 
An important feature of the SPF is that the forecasters are anonymous. Strategic incentives 
should therefore be non-existing. However, many of the individuals responding to the SPF 
also publish forecasts to the public, and the thought of them giving different forecasts to the 
public and the survey seems unlikely. Hence, strategic incentives can exist for the SPF 
forecasters as well. However, it is likely that some of the firms do not publish their forecasts. 
Therefore the strategic incentives of the forecasters in the SPF may be smaller than in other 
surveys.  
There are three different industry variables in the SPF. Individuals with industry variable one 
are employed in a financial service provider firm, while individuals with industry variable 
two are employed in nonfinancial service firms. The third industry variable contains those 
where they cannot decide whether the individual is employed in industry one or two. A 
financial service provider is involved in insurance, investment and commercial banking, 
payment services, hedge and mutual funds, asset management or in association of financial 
service providers. If employed in a nonfinancial service provider, one is employed at a 
university, a manufacturing firm, a forecasting firm, an investment advisor firm, a research 
firm or a consultant firm (Chew & Price, 2008; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). 
Wanting to find out if Laster et al.’s (1999) results hold in the SPF, we have to compare their 
different industries with the industry variables of the SPF. With banks and asset management 
firms being located in the first category in the SPF, we expect industry one to have relatively 
accurate results, which not deviate too much from the consensus. Industry two contains both 
manufacturing firms who should be relatively accurate, and consultant firms who are the least 
accurate in Laster et al.’s study. Hence, it seems hard to make any conclusions regarding 
what result to expect for industry two. However, with consultant and investment advisor 
firms, as well as forecasting firms being located in this category, we believe that the strategic 
incentives of those may be stronger than the accuracy incentives of the manufacturing firms. 
Hence, we conclude with believing that strategic incentives of publicity and attention are 
stronger for industry two.  
When dealing with the industry variables it is important to be aware that some of the 
respondents may have changed their employment over time, implying that the industry 
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variable can have changed (Chew & Price, 2008). However, in section 5.4.3 we find that this 
is not a big problem in our data. When performing tests, the individuals with different 
industry variables will at each time belong to the industry where they at that time are 
classified.41  
Before performing tests, we start presenting how the forecasts of the respondents in the 
different industries and the number of individuals in each industry classification have evolved 
through time. We also present the consensus mean and median forecasts in this period after 
the second quarter of 1990. The consensus mean and median forecasts are presented in figure 
6.15, while figure 6.16 presents the mean forecasts of the individuals in the different 
industries and the actual inflation. The deviations from the actual inflation follow to some 
degree similar patterns for the different industries, but there are some distinctions. For 
industry three it looks like we have one (or more) outlier in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Because industry three includes fewer forecasters than the other industries (as seen in figure 
6.17), this outlier could exist because of one single respondents mistake.42 Figure 6.17 shows 
the number of survey participants categorized in the different industries each quarter. In the 
beginning the majority of individuals were employed in financial service provider firms, 
labelled with industry variable number one. Later the individuals employed in nonfinancial 
servicer provider firms, have outnumbered this “industry”.43 When analysing it is important 
to be aware that we do not have very many individuals employed in each industry to examine. 
This makes the statistical tests weaker, and makes it hard to draw very sturdy conclusions. 
We show the dispersion in the forecasts, presented by the standard deviation of the forecasts, 
in the three industries in figure 6.19. We see that there are differences in the forecasts for the 
different industries when comparing them with eachother as well as when comparing them 
with the whole sample. The highest dispersion in the data is for industry three. The dispersion 
in this industry is zero up until about 1995, because there was only one individual located in 
this industry before 1995. If only comparing the standard deviation of forecasts for industry 
                                                        
41 We should also be aware of the fact that when the panel changes over time, the amount of individuals in the 
different categories might also change; meaning that if we want to look at different sub-periods, there can be a 
lot of differences in the number of individuals available for analyses in each industry. 
42 Because of the unknown nature of the firms of individuals with individual number three, as well as the 
number of respondents in this category being very low, we will not discuss this industry as much as the other 
two. 
43 From here on we will sometimes call the financial service provider firms industry one, the nonfinancial 
service provider firms industry two and the unknown ones industry three. 
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one and two, presented in table 6.18, we see that there are timely differences between them. It 
is, however, hard to say that one of the industries have more dispersed forecasts than the 
other one.  
Figure 6.15: The consensus mean and median 
forecasts and the actual inflation from 1990q2. 
The values in a given quarter are the forecast 
given of the next years inflation that quarter and 
the actual inflation for the next year. 
Figure 6.16: The mean forecast of the individuals 
in each industry and the actual inflation over time. 
The values in a given quarter are the forecast 
given of the next years inflation that quarter and 
the actual inflation for the next year. 
Figure 6.19: The standard deviation of the forecasts in each industry over time. 
Figure 6.18: The standard deviation of the 
forecasts in industry one and two over time 
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Figure 6.17: The number of individuals 
employed in each industry over time 
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When examining the forecast performance of the individuals employed in the different 
industries, we start comparing the accuracy measures in section 6.4.1. When testing the 
rationality of the individuals, we divide the sample in three by their industry variables. Then 
we perform the tests of rationality on these three samples’ consensus forecasts as well as the 
individuals.44 Because the sample starts in the second quarter of 1990, the high inflation 
period in the beginning of the survey (presented in figure 6.1), and the period of the Volcker 
disinflation, is now excluded. To be able to compare the different industries with the 
performance of the total sample in the same period properly, we first examine the total 
sample of forecasts in this period, presented in 6.4.2. Afterwards we test individuals 
employed in industry number one in section 6.4.3, continuing with the other industry 
variables in 6.4.4 and 6.4.5.  
6.4.1 Comparing accuracy measures in the different industries 
We calculate the accuracy measures in the different industries, looking for differences in the 
forecasting performance of these individuals that we should be aware of.45 The accuracy 
measures for the consensus of the sample starting in the second quarter of 1990 as well as for 
the different industries is presented in table 6.27. Looking at ME we see that the pattern of 
overestimating the inflation level is present also in this sample.46 This pattern is also valid for 
the different industries. One observed difference is that the consensus of industry one has a 
lower ME value than the others as well as the total sample in this period. This means that 
they are more accurate than the other industries based on this measure.  
In terms of MAE the different industries have very similar values, though industry two and 
three have somewhat smaller values than industry one. Thus, the different industries have 
very similar average errors when we do not allow for positive errors to offset negative ones. 
For RMSE, which punishes larger errors more than errors, the consensus of industry one has 
lower values than the others. This indicates that these are more accurate in terms of not 
having many large errors. The difference between industry one and two is quite large, with  
                                                        
44 However, we do not examine the individuals as thoroughly as we did previously, by finding the ten best, their 
rankings in terms of accuracy measures, etc, This is due to the time and space of this paper, in addition to the 
samples now being more limited with fewer respondents and a smaller time span. 
45 Because of space issues, we only do this for the consensus.  
46 This is the same result as the one we got for the entire sample, presented in 6.2.1. However, now the Volcker 
disinflation period is excluded, hence this cannot be explained by the decreasing inflation in that special period. 
However, looking at figure 6.15, the inflation seems to be decreasing in this period also, indicating that the 
explanation proposed by Thomas (1999) might still be valid.  
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 80 
RMSE values of 0.90 and 2.38 for the two, respectively.47  
We conclude that the consensus of the respondents in industry one is a bit better than the 
respondents in the other industries, at least in terms of the RMSE. Assuming that individuals 
employed in industry two have stronger strategic incentives than those employed in industry 
one, this finding in accordance with previous results presented by Laster et al. (1999).  
6.4.2 Testing rationality of forecasts after the Philadelphia Fed took over the survey 
We start testing the rationality of all forecasts from the second quarter of 1990, the period 
where we have information about the industry variable of the individuals. This allows us to 
compare the forecasts of the different industries with the forecasts of the total sample in the 
same period.48 Important being aware of is that both the Volcker disinflation period, as well 
as the early period where the inflation was very high (in the beginning of the survey, as 
presented in figure 6.1) ended before 1990, and is therefore excluded from this sample. We 
expect that the exclusion of these unstable periods will affect the results in this sample.   
As mentioned in the beginning of chapter six, a lot of previous research examines the 
performance of forecasts in different sub-periods, for example during booms and recessions. 
We have chosen not to examine such issues alone. However, our choice to examine the 
period after the second quarter of 1990 makes us able to at the same time compare this period 
with the whole sample, examining whether the accuracy and rationality of the forecasts have 
changed. In this later period they have had better control of the identification number of 
individuals, less gaps and missing values in the respondents’ forecasts, and they have data 
                                                        
47 Because the time period of forecasting is the same for the respondents in each industry, the MNSE measure, 
taking account of the standard deviation of the actual inflation, naturally shows the same patterns as RMSE.  
48 Because we only have three industry variables in the SPF, with the third one being very small, the analysis 
will mostly focus on comparing industry one and two. If one industry is better than the whole sample, the other 
one will naturally be worse, and vice versa. With this regard testing the whole sample may not seem very 
important. However, because of other interesting aspects in terms of examining this shorter sample (as 
explained in 6.4.2), we choose to analyse this sample alone. 
Measure Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ME -0.198 -0.173 -0.099 -0.092 -0.261 -0.224 -0.300 -0.322
MAE 0.729 0.728 0.751 0.740 0.744 0.728 0.732 0.730
RMSE 1.804 1.578 0.903 0.840 2.378 2.045 2.734 2.931
MNSE 2.159 1.888 1.104 1.027 2.796 2.404 3.344 3.585
Overview consensus accuracy measures for the industries and the total sample this period
All sample from 1990q2 Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry 3
Table 6.27: The accuracy measures of the mean and median consensus forecasts in the period 
from1990q2, and for the consensus of the different industries. 
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that are more consistent than before. 49  These factors make this time period especially 
interesting when we compare the performance of forecasts in this period with the 
performance in whole sample. For the abovementioned reasons we can expect the forecasters 
to be more rational in this time period. Such a result will at the same time be in line with 
previous literature, finding that the forecasting performance have been better in a more recent 
time period (Croushore, 2006; Gerberding, 2006). The results of the consensus mean and 
median forecasts are presented in section 6.4.2.1, while the results of the individual 
respondents are discussed in 6.4.2.2. 
6.4.2.1 The probability of the consensus being unbiased is larger in this shorter sample  
The consensus mean and median forecasts of the period starting in the second quarter of 1990 
are pictured in figure 6.15. The results of the tests are presented in table 6.28. The p-values of 
each test and the coefficients corresponding to the variables included in the regression are 
presented. Both consensus values pass the test of bias, with the probability values for the null 
hypothesis of unbiasedness being 28.9 % and 35.6 % for the mean and the median consensus, 
respectively. The conclusion of unbiasedness is the same as for the whole sample, but the p- 
values are higher, being 10.5 % and 11.3 % for the mean and median consensus of the whole 
sample, presented in table 6.14. Hence, the probability of the forecasts being unbiased have 
increased. This indicates more accurate respondents in this later period, a result in line with 
our expectations. The constant terms, thus, the errors are negative. This indicates 
overestimation, and is also a result in line with the results of the whole sample. 
Turning to the efficiency tests, the respondents’ consensus forecasts passes the first test 
where we add the lagged actual inflation. For the other efficiency tests the consensus fail the 
efficiency criterion. Hence, the consensus forecasts are not efficient and not strong-form 
rational in this period. This result is quite similar to the results of the consensus of the entire 
time period, indicating that the forecasts were not better in this later time period. The 
consensus passes one less test than the overall consensus, indicating that the forecasts have 
actually worsened. This result is a bit surprising, because the inflation level has been more 
stable in this period. However, the fact that the probability of unbiasedness is higher in this 
later period makes it hard for us to state that the forecasts have gotten worse. 
                                                        
49These issues are presented in 5.4.3, 5.4.2 and in a discussion of the consistency of the forecasts is presented in 
appendix 2.5. 
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When interpreting the coefficients we again find similar results as the whole sample. The 
lagged inflation coefficient is positive while the coefficients of the federal funds rate and the 
unemployment rate is negative, with all three indicating that the forecasters underreact to new 
information (the intuition behind this is explained in section 6.3.1). 
6.4.2.2 The forecasts of the individual respondents are relatively similar  
Table 6.29 presents the results of the individual respondents’ forecasts. The majority of the 
individual respondents who pass each test for the different significance levels and the part 
they make of the sample are presented. Again, we are not able to run the test for all the 
individuals because some have missing lagged values needed to perform the Newey-West 
method.50 The majority of the survey participants pass the test of bias; hence we can present 
them unbiased. The fraction of all individuals passing the test of bias on a 5 % significance 
level is 62.2%, very similar to the corresponding part of the whole sample, at 61.0 % 
                                                        
50 This is because of the lack of sufficient forecasts, as explained in 5.4.4 and 6.3.2.2. This goes for the tests on 
the individual respondents in the different industries as well. The number of individuals that we are able to 
perform the tests for is shown in the tables where the tests results are presented. 
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.198 -0.173
α=0 0.289 0.356
α (constant) -0.493 -0.468
β (lagged infl.) 0.152 0.151
α=β=0 0.435 0.506
α (constant) 1.513 1.560
β (forecasted infl.) -0.730 -0.747
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -0.017 -0.011
β (forecast error) 0.631 0.621
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 1.943 1.912
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.560 0.585
β2 (forecasted infl.) -1.129 -1.207
β3 (fed funds) -0.095 -0.078
β4 (unemployment) -0.071 -0.057
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 
1: Lagged 
actual values
Efficiency test 
2: Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 
3: Lagged 
forecast error
Efficiency test 
4: Information 
set
Rationality tests for the consensus of the period where we have 
industry variables
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Table 6.28: The results of the rationality tests of the mean and median 
consensus forecasts in the period after 1990q1. 
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presented in table 6.15. Hence, we cannot claim any differences in terms of biasedness 
between the individual respondents in this limited sample and the entire sample.  
Turning to the efficiency tests focusing on the 5 % significance level in table 6.29, we see 
that the majority of the individual respondents pass the first test of efficiency, but not the 
other three. This finding is the same as for the consensus of the whole sample. Because the 
majority of the individuals do not pass the efficiency criterion, they cannot be claimed 
rational. With the majority of the survey participants passing one efficiency test in this 
period, compared to none in the whole sample, the forecasts seems to have improved a bit 
when excluding the earliest data. This is in accordance with previous research by Gerberding 
(2006) and Croushore (2006).  
 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 82 59 51 45
Part of all 0.720 0.622 0.549
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 72 51 42 40
Part of all 0.708 0.583 0.556
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 82 18 16 11
Part of all 0.220 0.195 0.134
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 67 39 26 18
Part of all 0.582 0.388 0.269
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 72 8 4 1
Part of all 0.111 0.056 0.014
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests when the Philadelphia Fed conducted the survey
Table 6.29:  The results of the rationality tests of the individual respondents from 1990q2. The 
consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the part of the individuals who are better than this 
consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all sample” the number of individuals who we 
have performed the tests on, while the numbers to each significance level are the number of 
individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
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6.4.3 Industry variable 1- financial service provider 
This section examines the individuals employed in industry one. We start presenting the 
consensus mean and median forecasts in section 6.4.3.1. In section 6.4.3.2 we examine the 
performance of the individual respondents. 
6.4.3.1 The consensus of industry one has a high probability of unbiasedness 
Table 6.30 presents the results of the consensus of industry one together with the coefficients 
related to each added variable.51 The consensus of industry one is unbiased with high p-
values over 60 % for both the mean and the median. Hence, they are unbiased, as was the 
total sample this period. The p-value of the consensus in industry one is, however, much 
higher than for the whole sample starting in the second quarter of 1990. It is thus more 
probable that the consensus of industry one is unbiased, indicating better forecasting 
performance in this industry. This is in line with the accuracy measures presented for the 
                                                        51 The coefficients indicate the same patterns as for the whole sample and for the shorter sample starting in the 
second quarter of 1990. The coefficients of the lagged inflation, the federal funds rate and the unemployment 
rate all indicate that forecasters underreact to new information. 
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.099 -0.092
α=0 0.616 0.639
α (constant) -0.380 -0.424
β (lagged infl.) 0.142 0.165
α=β=0 0.748 0.694
α (constant) 1.712 1.734
β (forecasted infl.) -0.806 -0.816
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 0.020 0.015
β (forecast error) 0.644 0.642
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 1.882 1.897
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.573 0.572
β2 (forecasted infl.) -1.175 -1.189
β3 (fed funds) -0.791 -0.075
β4 (unemployment) -0.061 -0.060
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 2: 
Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 3: 
Lagged forecast 
error
Efficiency test 4: 
Information set
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Efficiency test 1: 
Lagged actual 
values
Rationality tests for consensus, Industry 1
Table 6.30: Results for the rationality tests of the consensus mean and 
median forecasts of industry one. 
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industries and the whole sample in table 6.27. This is also in accordance with previous 
literature when we assume that the individuals in industry one have stronger accuracy 
incentives than strategic incentives compared with the other industries (Laster, et al., 1999).52  
The consensus forecasts are weakly efficient based on efficiency test one. However, based on 
the other efficiency tests we can reject the null of efficiency. Because they do not pass all 
rationality tests, we conclude that the consensus of industry one is not strong-form rational, 
showing the same statistical results of all tests as the total sample this period. However, even 
though not strong-form rational, the respondents are quite accurate, because of the very high 
probability of unbiasedness. These results are also in line with previous literature (Croushore, 
2006; Gerberding, 2006).  
6.4.3.2 The majority of individuals in industry one are unbiased 
Table 6.31 summarizes all tests performed on the individual respondents in industry one. 
Again we present the number of individuals passing the tests on different significance level. 
We have a total of 40 individuals employed in industry one that we are able to run the test of 
bias for. 
When testing for bias 52.5 % of all individuals cannot be claimed biased at a 5 % 
significance level. We conclude that most of the individuals in this industry do not have 
biased forecasts. This is the same conclusion as for the consensus forecasts of this industry as 
well as the individual respondents of the whole sample. Even though the p-values for 
unbiasedness for the consensus was larger for this industry than in the entire time period, the 
part of all individuals being unbiased is smaller. 
Performing efficiency test one, 52.8 % of the respondents in industry one are efficient at a 
5% significance level. Hence, we conclude that most individuals are efficient and weakly 
rational based on this test. Again the result is similar as for the whole sample this period. 
Turning to efficiency test two, only 17.5 % of the total number of respondents can be claimed 
efficient. When adding the lagged forecast error in efficiency test three, we have to limit our 
sample to 33 respondents. None of the significance levels gives us over 50 % of the                                                         
52 Because we only have three industries in the SPF, with industry three being undefined and including few 
respondents, our examination involves mostly a comparison between industry one and two. Laster et al. (1999) 
compares the industries and the consensus in this period, with the assumption that the consensus is the best, but 
since we only have (almost) two industries to compare, one of them will naturally be better than the consensus 
forecasts. 
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individuals being efficient. 42.4 % of the respondents are efficient on the “normal” 5 % 
significance level.  
Because the respondents in this industry are employed in financial service provider firms, we 
expect them to have knowledge about the important actual economic values, such as the 
federal funds interest rate and the unemployment level that we add when running efficiency 
test four. However, at a 5 % significance level only two individuals cannot be claimed 
efficient. In percentages this leaves us with 5.7 % of the individuals being strong-form 
rational, hence the majority of the respondents are clearly not efficient in the financial service 
provider industry.  
6.4.3.3 Concluding remarks of industry one 
The overall conclusions regarding the consensus mean and median forecasts and the 
individual respondents in industry one are that the forecasters cannot be claimed strong-form 
rational. It is only the efficiency test where we add the lagged actual inflation, efficiency test 
one, where more than 50 % of the respondents and the consensus forecasts can be said to be 
Table 6.31: The results of the rationality tests performed on the individual respondents 
employed in industry one. The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the part of the individuals 
who are better than this consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all sample” the number 
of individuals who we have performed the tests on, while the numbers to each significance level 
are the number of individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 40 23 21 20
Part of all 0.575 0.525 0.500
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 36 22 19 18
Part of all 0.611 0.528 0.500
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 40 9 7 6
Part of all 0.225 0.175 0.150
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 33 16 14 12
Part of all 0.485 0.424 0.364
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 35 2 2 1
Part of all 0.057 0.057 0.029
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests of individuals in industry 1: Financial service 
provider firms
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efficient and weakly rational. In the other tests the consensus and the majority of respondents 
fail the rationality criterion. These results are the same as for the total sample this same 
period, indicating that the individuals in this industry do not particularly stand out when 
comparing with the other industries in the sample.  
6.4.4 Industry 2- nonfinancial service provider 
This section examines the respondents employed in the second industry, in nonfinancial 
service provider firms. Because this industry includes consultant firms, forecaster firms and 
university employed workers, we expect them to have stronger strategic incentives. Hence, 
we think that they value publicity and media attention more than respondents employed in 
industry one. Therefore they might value accuracy less than industry one, hence give less 
accurate forecasts. Again, the consensus forecasts are first examined, in section 6.4.4.1, 
before investigating the individual respondents, in 6.4.4.2. 
6.4.4.1 The consensus of industry are unbiased, but with lower probability than industry 
one 
The test results of the consensus mean and median forecasts are presented in table 6.32.53 
Also the consensus for industry two can be claimed unbiased with p-values of 16.4 % and 
22.7 % for the mean and the median consensus, respectively. These values are smaller than 
those for both the total sample this period and industry one, indicating less accurate forecasts 
among industry two. This is in line with the accuracy measures presented in table 6.27, and 
with the hypothesis that these respondents have more strategic incentives and therefore make 
less accurate forecasts. 
The consensus of the individuals in industry two also pass efficiency test one, but the null of 
rationality is rejected based on the other efficiency tests. Hence, we reject strong-form 
rationality for the consensus of industry two, again making the same conclusion as for 
industry one. However, the p-values are also lower than the corresponding ones for industry 
one, indicating a lower probability of the forecasts of individuals in industry two being 
efficient. Hence, it seems that the strategic incentives we believe to be stronger in this 
industry have resulted in them trying to make forecasts that stand out. This implies that they 
are taking larger risks, increasing the probability of making mistakes.                                                          
53 Again the coefficients indicate that the forecasters to underreact to new information (the intuition is explained 
in section 6.3.1.  
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6.4.4.2 The majority of individual respondents in industry two are unbiased and efficient in 
terms of efficiency test one 
Table 6.33 summarizes our test results of the individual respondents in industry two. The 
number of individuals employed in the nonfinancial service providing industry is 42. Testing 
for bias at a 5 % significance level we see that 66.7 % of all respondents employed in the 
industry cannot be claimed biased. Hence, most respondents in industry two are unbiased, 
fulfilling the first criterion for rationality. This result is somewhat different than for the 
consensus forecasts, with a larger majority of the individuals being unbiased in industry two 
than in industry one. Hence, the presumed strategic incentives of them wanting to make 
forecasts that stand out do not seem to have given the individuals more biased forecasts.  
When testing for efficiency, we again start adding the lagged actual inflation. A bit more than 
half of the respondents are unbiased on a 5 % significance level. Hence, we conclude that 
most individuals are efficient, and weakly rational, in the sense that they do take the previous 
actual inflation into account when making forecasts. This result is very similar to the 
corresponding result of industry one.  
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.261 -0.224
α=0 0.164 0.227
α (constant) -0.598 -0.609
β (lagged infl.) 0.177 0.197
α=β=0 0.237 0.282
α (constant) 1.484 1.502
β (forecasted infl.) -0.725 -0.728
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -0.035 -0.028
β (forecast error) 0.620 0.607
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 1.947 1.959
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.562 0.568
β2 (forecasted infl.) -1.139 -1.171
β3 (fed funds) -0.094 -0.089
β4 (unemployment -0.068 -0.064
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 1: 
Lagged actual 
values
Efficiency test 2: 
Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 3: 
Lagged forecast 
error
Efficiency test 4: 
Information set
Rationality tests for consensus, Industry 2
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Table 6.32: Rationality tests for the consensus mean and median forecast of industry two. 
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Efficiency test two draws us to a different conclusion. Only 26.2 % of the individuals are 
efficient at a 5 % significance level. The fraction of efficient respondents is a bit higher than 
for industry one, otherwise the results are very similar. Because the forecast itself should not 
be able to explain some of the forecast error, the respondents cannot be said to be weakly 
rational based on this test. This result might be a bit surprising; especially if a lot the 
individual forecasters in this industry are employed in forecaster firms, who therefore should 
be very aware of their own forecasts. The reason for this result can be the mentioned strategic 
incentives, implying that other goals than making the most accurate forecast as possible exist.  
The results when adding the previous forecast error are quite similar. 27 % of the respondents 
in this industry are efficient on a 5 % significance level; hence the majority is not efficient. 
Even though more than half 56.8 % of the respondents are efficient on a 10 % level, we 
conclude that the majority of respondents employed in the nonfinancial service providing 
industry are not weakly rational in terms of this test.  
The results of efficiency test four give even weaker results. Again, we would expect the 
forecasters to be very much aware of the development of other economic variables. Looking 
Table 6.33: Results for the rationality tests performed on the individuals employed in industry two. 
The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the part of the individuals who are better than this 
consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all sample” the number of individuals who we have 
performed the tests on, while the numbers to each significance level are the number of individuals who 
passes the test based on this level. 
 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 42 33 28 24
Part of all 0.786 0.667 0.571
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 38 26 20 18
Part of all 0.684 0.526 0.474
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 42 12 11 7
Part of all 0.286 0.262 0.167
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 37 21 10 5
Part of all 0.568 0.270 0.135
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 38 6 2 0
Part of all 0.158 0.053 0.000
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests of individuals in industry 2: Financial service 
provider firms
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at the joint null hypothesis there are, however, only two individuals who are efficient and 
strong-form rational at a 5 % significance level. In percentages the number is 5.3 % of all 
respondents, almost the exact same as for industry one.  
6.4.4.3 Concluding remarks for industry two 
We conclude that the individual respondents employed in the nonfinancial providing industry 
are unbiased, but cannot be claimed rational based on three of the efficiency tests. This goes 
for both the consensus and the majority of the individual respondents, leaving us with the 
same conclusion as for industry one and the total consensus. Hence, there are not many 
differences between the two industries in terms of rationality of the individual forecasters.  
6.4.5 Industry 3- unknown 
In the third industry there are very few individuals to examine. However, we do perform the 
tests on this sample as well, presenting the result of the consensus in table 6.34, and for the 
individuals in table 6.35. With the sample being very limited with only seven respondents 
located in this category, and for some tests even fewer due to the problems with the lags in 
the Newey-West regression (explained in 5.4.4) we should not put too much weight on this 
analysis.  
The results for the consensus in table 6.34 shows that the consensus of the individuals in 
industry three are unbiased and weakly efficient based on efficiency test one. In efficiency 
test two and four, efficiency is rejected at all significance levels. For efficiency test three we 
cannot reject efficiency if demanding 1 % significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Turning to the tests on the individual respondents in table 6.35, the test of bias shows us that 
five out of seven, or 71.4 % of all respondents are unbiased. Hence, the majority of 
respondents in also this industry are unbiased. Performing the efficiency tests, 80 %, of the 
individuals are efficient when we add the lagged actual inflation, performing efficiency test 
one. Adding the forecast itself leaves us with only one, or 14.3 % of all individuals efficient, 
while the same number for efficiency test three is 80 %. Hence, they are efficient when 
adding the forecast error, but not when adding the forecast itself. This conclusion seems 
rather odd, but might be explained by the constrained sample that we examine. Adding the 
information set in efficiency test four leaves us with no individuals we can claim efficient, 
hence no respondents that are strongly rational at a 5 % significance level. 
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Mean Median
α (constant) -0.315 -0.338
α=0 0.146 0.118
α (constant) -0.151 -0.243
β (lagged infl.) -0.044 -0.012
α=β=0 0.454 0.361
α (constant) 1.675 1.681
β (forecasted infl.) -0.816 -0.820
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -0.103 -0.109
β (forecast error) 0.420 0.443
α=β=0 0.023** 0.016**
α (constant) 2.121 2.084
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.485 0.495
β2 (forecasted infl.) -0.945 -0.959
β3 (fed funds) -0.141 -0.136
β4 (unemployment) -0.119 -0.114
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 1: 
Lagged actual 
values
Efficiency test 2: 
Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 3: 
Lagged forecast 
error
Efficiency test 4: 
Information set
Rationality tests for consensus, Industry 3
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Table 6.34: Result of the rationality tests of the consensus mean and median forecast of industry 3. 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 7 6 5 4
Part of all 0.857 0.714 0.571
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 5 5 4 4
Part of all 1.000 0.800 0.800
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 7 1 1 1
Part of all 0.143 0.143 0.143
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 5 5 4 2
Part of all 1.000 0.800 0.400
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 5 1 0 0
Part of all 0.200 0.000 0.000
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests of individuals in industry 3: unknown categorized 
employment
Table 6.35: Results of the rationality tests performed on the individuals employed in ”industry” 
three. The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the part of the individuals who are better than this 
consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all sample” the number of individuals who we have 
performed the tests on, while the numbers to each significance level are the number of individuals 
who passes the test based on this level. 
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The conclusions regarding the individuals with an “inconclusive” industry are that the 
majority and the consensus are unbiased and weakly efficient based on efficiency test one, 
the same findings as for the total sample this period and the other industries. The individual 
respondents are also rational when we add the forecast error, even though the consensus 
forecasts only passes this test on a 1 % significance level. When demanding strong-form 
rationality, the consensus forecasts as well as no of the individuals pass the criterion of 
efficiency.  
6.4.6 Concluding remarks regarding the industries 
Examining the tests performed on the different industries, there are few distinct differences to 
be found. The consensus’ results are quite similar for all three industries and for the total 
sample this period. They all have unbiased forecasts that are efficient when performing 
looking at efficiency test one. They are, however, not efficient based on the other rationality 
tests. The fact that the results are so similar may not be very surprising, given that they are all 
professionals, who may have the same background in terms of education, etc. Hence, they 
have many of the same premises for making predictions. Another explanation can be that the 
strategic incentives of the forecasters in the SPF may be smaller than in other surveys, 
because some of them may not publish their forecasts. 
One difference we find worth mentioning is the fact that the consensus mean and median 
forecasts of industry one have a larger probability of being unbiased than the consensus of 
industry two. This implies that the strategic incentives of getting publicity and attention of the 
individuals employed in industry two may exist. This result is in line with the results found 
by Laster et al. (1999). 
We summarize our findings for the individual respondents in the different industries as well 
as the total sample in table A4.8 in appendix 4, listing the number of individuals in each 
industry for whom we cannot reject the null hypothesis of rationality. For industry one and 
two, as well as for the total sample we conclude with unbiasedness and efficiency for the 
majority of individuals in terms of efficiency test one. For the other tests most of the 
respondents in both these industries as well as the total period sample cannot be claimed 
efficient and rational. The number of efficient respondents when we add the lagged forecast 
error in efficiency test three is a bit higher for industry number one, but when we add the 
forecast itself in efficiency test two, it is the other way around. Hence, we cannot conclude 
that the respondents employed in one industry are better in than the other industry. 
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Even though the consensus mean and median forecasts  of industry one have a larger 
probability of being unbiased, a larger fraction of the individuals in industry two can be 
claimed unbiased. Hence, it seems as though most of the individuals in industry two are more 
accurate, but that there are some who are worse than industry one, making their consensus 
forecasts’ values lower. A possible explanation can be that the strategic incentives of getting 
attention, making forecasts that stands out, may be strong for some of the individuals in 
industry two. Therefore a minority may take larger risks and make larger mistakes, thus 
making the consensus values inaccurate. 54 Industry two includes individuals employed in 
manufacturing firms who probably have no strategic incentives and individuals employed in 
consulting and forecaster firms, who may have large strategic incentives. Thus, this 
explanation seems valid, and is also in accordance with the paper by Laster et al. (1999).  
Looking at the third industry variable, we also conclude with unbiasedness and weak-form 
efficiency based on efficiency test one. We can also claim efficiency when we add the lagged 
forecast error. But because of the weakness of this analysis due to the very small number of 
individuals, it is hard for us to make any strong conclusions regarding industry number three. 
Therefore we cannot claim them different than the ones employed in the two other industries 
either. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
54 This should imply that the median consensus of industry two are better than the mean, an argument that is 
confirmed by looking at table 6.34, with the mean p-value being 16.4 % and the median being 22.7 %. However, 
the median consensus p-value is still lower than the consensus values for industry one.  
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6.5 The Volcker disinflation period 
Paul Volcker was appointed chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
Board in August 1979. At this time the inflation was as high as 11%, but within the next three 
years, Volcker reduced the inflation rate to 4% by using contractionary monetary policy. As 
stated by Mankiw et al. (2003), this change in policy makes it interesting to study inflation 
expectations in this period. This section examines accuracy and rationality of survey 
respondents during the Volcker disinflation, in addition to investigating the forecast 
performance of the survey when this period is excluded.  
Previous papers have studied the forecasting performance of individuals during different sub-
periods, finding that certain events have affected the forecasting performance (Mehra, 2002; 
Giordani & Söderlind, 2002). However, we do not have knowledge of many, at least not very 
recent papers examining the Volcker disinflation period alone. One exception is Mehra 
(2002), who found that excluding the Volcker disinflation period did not alter the results of 
the mean forecasts of the Livingston and Michigan surveys. However, the SPF forecasters 
seemed to perform better when the Volcker disinflation period was excluded. We test if the 
results of Mehra (2002) hold, and while Mehra (2002) looked at mean forecasts, we also 
focus on individual respondents. We do not have much knowledge of other studies 
investigating the performance of individual respondents during the Volcker disinflation. One 
exception is the mentioned paper by Mankiw et al. (2003), which finds that forecasters in the 
Michigan survey adjusted slowly to the disinflation. Hence, we hope to gain more knowledge 
of the forecast behaviour of individuals through this study. 
The mean forecasts and the actual inflation are presented in figure 6.20. When Volcker 
gained his position the inflation was very high, and it peaked at about 10 % in 1980. During 
his first years in this position the inflation fell a lot. In the start of 1980 the inflation was high 
and the average forecasters underestimated the inflation. However, when the inflation started 
to fall the forecasts did not manage to “keep track” with the inflation. Hence, the average 
forecasts overestimated the inflation during this period. This pattern continued until around 
1985.  
Figure 6.21 presents the mean forecast of the SPF against the actual inflation in the “falling 
inflation period.” To picture the development we present the period 1979-1985 as the 
Volcker disinflation period, even though Volcker did not gain his chairman position before 
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august 1979 and held this position until august 1987. When looking at the figure the forecast 
performance seems to have been relatively poor during this period. To examine if and how 
this period affected the forecasts, we start taking a look at the different accuracy measures in 
section 6.5.1. Then we turn to testing rationality of the forecasts in the Volcker disinflation 
period, section 6.5.2. In section 6.5.3 we examine the total the time span without this period.  
6.5.1 The forecast accuracy is worse during the Volcker disinflation 
To get an overview of whether the Volcker disinflation did affect the performance of the 
forecasts we calculate the accuracy measures for the consensus mean and median forecasts 
when we exclude the Volcker disinflation as well as for the Volcker disinflation period only. 
These measures are presented in table 6.36, together with the consensus of the whole sample.  
Because of Mehra’s (2002) findings we expect the accuracy of the consensus to be better 
when we exclude the Volcker disinflation period. The reasoning is that when a central bank 
changes their monetary policy, the previously established credible inflation “target” is 
altered. If the public have not discovered the new target level they may continue to expect a 
higher inflation than the realized one, thereby making systematic forecast errors (Thomas, 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ME -0.275 -0.280 -0.126 -0.093 -0.897 -1.066
MAE 0.865 0.884 0.699 0.708 1.557 1.624
RMSE 3.311 3.378 1.366 1.006 4.747 5.640
MNSE 2.216 2.260 1.006 0.741 2.875 3.416
Standard deviation 2.014 2.075 1.842 1.842 2.727 2.727
Accuracy measures for the consensus
Only the Volcker disinflationExcluding the Volcker disinflationThe entire sample
Figure 6.21: The mean forecast from the SPF and the 
actual inflation in the Volcker disinflation period, 
from 1979-1982. The values in a given quarter are 
the forecast given of the next years inflation that 
quarter and the actual inflation for the next year. 
Table 6.36: The accuracy measures for the consensus mean and median forecasts in the whole 
sample, in the sample where the Volcker disinflation period is excluded and in the Volcker 
disinflation period only (1979-1985). 
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Figure 6.20: The mean forecast and the actual 
inflation from 1974q4- 2010q4. The values in a 
given quarter are the forecast given of the next 
years inflation that quarter and the actual 
inflation for the next year. 
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1999; Mehra, 2002).  
From the accuracy measures presented in table 6.36, we see that the sample where the 
Volcker disinflation is excluded performs better than the sample that only includes the 
Volcker disinflation. It is also better than the total sample where the Volcker disinflation is 
not excluded. The ME is negative for all samples, indicating that consensus forecasts 
overestimate the inflation. This overestimation is, however, much higher during the Volcker 
disinflation than when we exclude this period. The mean error value of the mean consensus is 
-0.90 during the disinflation, compared to -0.13 when this period is excluded. Hence, some of 
the overestimation of the whole sample can have originated from this period with a 
decreasing inflation. This is in line with studies by DeLong (1995) and Thomas (1999), who 
suggests overestimation by survey participants when the actual inflation is declining. The 
explanation is probably that the forecasters did not see the decrease in inflation coming as 
fast and severe as it did when Volcker was appointed chairman of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve (Mehra, 2002; Giordani & Söderlind, 2002). 
The RMSE measure (row three in table 6.36), which punishes large errors more than small 
ones, have much higher values for the consensus forecasts during the Volcker disinflation 
period than when this period is excluded. Hence, the sum of errors is larger, and there may be 
several very large errors in the Volcker disinflation period. Even when accounting for the 
larger dispersion in the actual inflation in this period, presented by the standard deviation of 
the actual inflation when we calculate the MNSE measure, the accuracy is worse during the 
Volcker disinflation period.55 This indicates that even when we account for the changing 
level of the actual inflation in this period, the forecasters performed worse, a somewhat 
surprising result. Thomas (1999) finds that regime shifts can cause systematic errors in 
certain period, even when agents are fully rational. If we think of the disinflation as such a 
regime shift, this theory may explain this result. 
6.5.2 The rationality of forecasts during the Volcker disinflation period 
This section tests the rationality of the forecasts during the disinflation period. Using 
forecasts from the Volcker disinflation period only, we limit our dataset to fewer individuals 
than before. We have a total of 55 individuals in our sample of individuals during this period. 
However, due to the demands of the Newey-West method, we cannot test the rationality of all                                                         
55 The Volcker disinflation period has larger MNSE values, presented in the fourth row in table 6.36. 
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these individuals using all efficiency test (explained in 5.4.4). The number of individuals that 
we have performed the tests for are shown together with the test results in table 6.38. We start 
presenting the results for the consensus in section 6.5.2.1 before continuing with the 
individual respondents in 6.5.2.2. 
6.5.2.1 The consensus forecasts are biased and irrational during the Volcker disinflation  
The results for the consensus are presented in table 6.37, showing the p-values for the 
different rationality tests, as well as the coefficients belonging to each variable. While the 
consensus mean and median forecasts for the whole sample could be claimed unbiased, the 
results for the consensus in the Volcker disinflation period seem to be more biased. This is 
not very surprising, considering the pattern in figure 6.21 and previous results by for example 
Mehra (2002). Both the mean and the median consensus forecasts can be claimed biased if 
we demand a 10 % significance level for rejecting the null. However, on a 5% significance 
level only the test of the median consensus forecasts rejects the null of unbiasedness. Both 
the mean and median consensus forecasts cannot be rejected unbiased on a 1 % significance 
level. Because the forecast performance in this period looks very poor in figure 6.21, it is 
somewhat surprising that the p-value of unbiasedness is not smaller. Even though we cannot 
claim the forecasts unbiased, the fact that we cannot reject unbiasedness at a 1 % significance 
level, and for the mean consensus not on a 5 % significance level either, is a bit surprising. 
All efficiency tests have p-values of zero when using forecasts from the disinflation period 
only. The results of these tests are presented in table 6.37. Thus, as expected, the mean and 
median consensus forecasts during the Volcker disinflation period are not rational. The 
estimated coefficients for the lagged inflation are positive for both the mean and the median 
consensus in efficiency test one, while it is positive for the mean and negative for the median 
in efficiency test four. A positive estimated lagged inflation coefficient indicates that the 
respondents of the survey did not react enough to news about the past inflation, when 
thinking that a high inflation in one period should be followed by a high inflation in the next 
period (Mankiw, et al., 2003). Hence, most estimated coefficients for inflation are in line with 
the fact that the respondents did not manage to keep track of the disinflation in this period 
(Giordani & Söderlind, 2002).56 
                                                         
56 The coefficients regarding the federal funds rate and the unemployment rate are again negative, indicating 
that the forecasters underreact to new information. 
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6.5.2.2 The majority of individual respondents are not rational during the Volcker 
disinflation, though a rather high fraction of them are 
The results of the rationality tests performed for the individual respondents who responded to 
the survey during the Volcker disinflation period are presented in table 6.38.  
Starting with the test of bias, we see that we can reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for 
the majority of individuals at all significance levels. At a 5 % level 41.8 % of the individuals 
are unbiased. Hence the individual forecasters have biased forecasts in this period. This result 
deviates from the results of the whole sample, indicating less rationality in the Volcker 
disinflation period. The fact that the forecasters perform worse during the Volcker period is 
expected. However, finding that we cannot claim biasedness for as many as 41.8 % of the 
individuals are somewhat surprising. Hence, the individuals did not perform very badly even 
though the inflation were on its way down more than they expected it to. 
Continuing with the efficiency tests, the majority of the individuals fail the efficiency 
criterion for all tests.  The closest proportion of individuals passing one of the tests at a 5 % 
significance level is 20 % of all individuals in efficiency test one and four.  
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.897 -1.066
α=0 0.083* 0.040**
α (constant) -2.333 -2.104
β (lagged infl.) 0.183 0.112
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -3.774 -3.175
β (forecasted infl.) 0.459 0.350
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -0.966 -1.111
β (forecast error) 0.389 0.353
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) -0.613 -1.105
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.281 -0.240
β2 (forecasted infl.) 0.399 0.950
β3 (fed funds) -0.337 -0.309
β4 (unemployment) -0.971 -0.152
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 1: 
Lagged actual 
values
Efficiency test 2: 
Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 3: 
Lagged forecast 
error
Efficiency test 4: 
Information set
Rationality tests for consensus during the Volcker disinflation
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Table 6.37: Results of the rationality tests for the consensus mean and median 
forecasts during the Volcker disinflation period (1979-1985). 
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6.5.3 The rationality of forecasts when the Volcker disinflation period is excluded 
This section tests the rationality of the rest of the sample, the whole period excluding the 
Volcker disinflation period. Hence, we investigate whether the forecasters’ performances are 
different when this “extraordinary” period is excluded from the sample. Section 6.5.3.2 
examines the consensus forecasts, while section 6.5.3.2 examines the individual forecasts. 
6.5.3.1 The consensus is unbiased, but not strong-form rational when excluding the 
disinflation period 
Table 6.39 presents the results for the consensus when the Volcker disinflation period is 
excluded, showing the p-values for each test and the estimated coefficients belonging to each 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 55 27 23 20
Part of all 0.491 0.418 0.364
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 41 6 2 2
Part of all 0.146 0.049 0.049
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 40 9 8 7
Part of all 0.225 0.200 0.175
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 26 6 3 2
Part of all 0.231 0.115 0.077
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 40 13 8 5
Part of all 0.325 0.200 0.125
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests for the Volcker disinflation period: 1979-1985
Table 6.38: Results of the rationality tests performed for the individuals who forecasted during 
the Volcker disinflation period (1979-1985). The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the part 
of the individuals who are better than this consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all 
sample” the number of individuals who we have performed the tests on, while the numbers to 
each significance level are the number of individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
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variable. 57  For the test of bias the p-values for both the mean and the median consensus 
forecasts are much higher than during the Volcker disinflation period and than the total 
sample (presented in respectively section 6.5.2.1 and 6.3.1). With both p-values being higher 
than 10 %, we cannot reject the null of unbiasedness for both the mean and median consensus 
forecasts. Hence, the consensus of this period passes the first rationality criterion. This result 
is in line with Mehra’s (2002) result; the forecast performance of the SPF improves when the 
Volcker disinflation period was excluded.  
For the first efficiency test, the null of efficiency cannot be rejected. Adding the forecasts 
itself in efficiency test two gives us high probability values of the joint null being true. 
Hence, the consensus passes these two tests of efficiency. However, when adding the forecast 
error and the information set in efficiency test three and four, the p-values of the null 
hypothesis is zero for both the mean and the median consensus. Therefore the consensus does 
not pass these tests. 
                                                        
57 We do not focus on interpreting the coefficients here. However, they have the same signs as for the other 
performed tests, indicating underreacting of the new information by the respondents (with the coefficients of the 
lagged inflation being positive, and negative for the unemployment rate and the federal funds rate). 
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.126 -0.093
α=0 0.406 0.550
α (constant) -0.590 -0.601
β (lagged infl.) 0.166 0.183
α=β=0 0.112 0.115
α (constant) -0.260 -0.234
β (forecasted infl.) 0.042 0.045
α=β=0 0.657 0.764
α (constant) 0.024 0.044
β (forecast error) 0.647 0.645
α=β=0 0*** 0***
α (constant) 1.012 0.832
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.500 0.549
β2 (forecasted infl.) -0.185 -0.248
β3 (fed funds) -0.210 -0.190
β4 (unemployment) -0.175 -0.147
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 1: 
Lagged actual 
values
Efficiency test 2: 
Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 3: 
Lagged forecast 
error
Efficiency test 4: 
Information set
Rationality tests for the consensus when excluding the Volcker 
disinflation from the sample
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Table 6.39: Results for the rationality tests for the consensus mean and 
median forecasts when the Volcker disinflation period is excluded. 
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We conclude with the consensus passing the test of bias as well as two tests of efficiency 
when the Volcker disinflation period is excluded. As expected, this is a result much better 
than the results when looking at the Volcker disinflation only. Comparing with the consensus 
of the whole sample (presented in section 6.3.1), the conclusions are similar. One difference 
is that the probability values for unbiasedness and efficiency in efficiency test two are much 
higher for this sample than in the entire sample. Hence, we can say that the forecast 
performance have improved when the disinflation period is excluded, as Mehra (2002) 
suggests. However, the improvement does not seem very distinct.  
6.5.3.2 Most individual respondents are unbiased, though not strong-form rational when 
the disinflation period is excluded 
Table 6.40 presents the test results of the individual respondents’ inflation forecasts in the 
sample where the Volcker disinflation period is excluded. Again we present number of 
individuals who pass the tests and the part they make of all individuals.   
In the test of bias 69.8 % of the individuals are unbiased at a 5 % significance level.58 Hence, 
as expected, the majority of the individual forecasts are unbiased when excluding the Volcker 
disinflation. Looking at efficiency test one, 47.1 % of all individuals are efficient at a 5 % 
significance level, a result very similar to the one we got when looking at the total sample 
(see section 6.3.2). The corresponding values for efficiency test two and efficiency test three 
are respectively 26.4 % and 41.6 %. When demanding strong-form rationality only 4.1 % of 
the individuals pass the rationality criterion. Hence, we conclude that individual respondents 
are not strong-form efficient, and thus not strongly rational even when we exclude the 
Volcker disinflation period. Hence, the individual respondents do not seem to have improved 
a lot when the disinflation period excluded. This result does not correspond to Mehra’s 
(2002) SPF result. Instead it is in accordance with his results for the Michigan survey and the 
Livingston survey. 
                                                        58 Also at a 10 % level, and naturally, also at a 1 % level, the majority also passes the test of bias. 
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 102 
6.5.4 Concluding remarks regarding the Volcker disinflation period 
The accuracy measures of the mean and median consensus forecasts presented show us that 
the forecast accuracy was worse during the Volcker disinflation period. When performing 
rationality tests, both the consensus and the majority of the individual forecasts have weaker 
rationality results than the entire sample. This leads us to the natural conclusion that the 
forecasts made in the Volcker disinflation period are worse than in the whole sample, as 
Mehra (2002) and Giordani and Söderlind (2002) suggests. However, even though rejected at 
a 5 % significance level for the median consensus, the p-values of the consensus tests of 
unbiasedness are not as low as we may expect when comparing the mean forecasts and the 
actual inflation in this period in figure 6.21. Additionally, even though the majority of the 
individual forecasters are biased, we could not reject unbiasedness for 41.8 % of the 
individuals. Hence, it does not seem like the forecasters were performing very badly even 
during this special disinflation period.  
When we exclude the Volcker disinflation period, the results of the tests do not vary a lot 
from the results from the entire sample. One difference is that the probability values of 
Table 6.40: Results of the rationality tests performed on the individual respondents when the 
Volcker disinflation period is excluded from the sample. The consensus mean forecast’s p-value 
and the part of the individuals who are better than this consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is 
for “all sample” the number of individuals who we have performed the tests on, while the numbers 
to each significance level are the number of individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 129 101 90 77
Part of all 0.783 0.698 0.597
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 121 75 57 51
Part of all 0.620 0.471 0.421
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 129 42 34 23
Part of all 0.326 0.264 0.178
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 101 56 42 29
Part of all 0.554 0.416 0.287
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 121 7 5 2
Part of all 0.058 0.041 0.017
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests when excluding the Volcker disinflation 
period:1979-1985
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unbiasedness and efficiency in the consensus tests are higher in the bias test and in efficiency 
test two. For the individual forecasters one difference is that the part of individuals who are 
rational and efficient based on most efficiency tests are larger for the sample when the 
Volcker disinflation period is excluded than in the sample where we look at the Volcker 
disinflation period alone. The proportions are, however, not better than in the total sample. 
Because the conclusions of the tests are the same, the consensus and the individual 
respondents are not rational even when accounting for the Volcker disinflation period. 
While the forecasts are worse during the Volcker disinflation period, leaving the period out of 
the sample does not “help” our rationality conclusion. The individual respondents and the 
consensus of the sample are not strong-form rational even with this period excluded. And 
even though the forecasters in the Volcker disinflation period have biased forecasts, the 
number of individuals with unbiased forecasts is actually higher than we expected. The p-
value for unbiasedness for the mean and median consensus forecasts is also higher than 
expected. This is a result not completely in line with Mehra’s (2002) SPF findings that the 
forecasters’ performance increased when the Volcker disinflation period excluded.59 The fact 
that the performance in the Volcker disinflation is not as bad as we expected, may be a 
contributing factor to why the sample where these are excluded do not perform particularly 
better than the entire sample.  
The overall conclusion is that the Volcker disinflation period affected the forecasts to some 
degree, but cannot be claimed the reason to why the forecasters are not rational. A possible 
explanation can be that the forecasters in the survey are professionals. Being professionals, 
they may have known that Volcker planned decreasing the inflation, and therefore managed 
to make relatively good forecasts.  
 
 
 
                                                        
59 The fact that our study is examined later than Mehra’s study should be noted. The sample we use when 
excluding the Volcker disinflation is much longer than the sample of Mehra, implying that the effect of 
excluding the Volcker disinflation naturally is smaller. 
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6.6 The recent financial crisis 
In this section we analyse the rationality of forecasters during the recent financial crisis. The 
data is relatively new, and we do not have knowledge of others examining this period. Hence, 
this analysis can bring something new to the existing literature. Previous literature states that 
disturbances in the economy, for example high unemployment, large government deficits and 
a moderate recession, can cause difficulties for forecasters (Su & Su, 1975).60 We therefore 
believe that the recent financial crisis can have caused difficulties for the respondents of the 
SPF when predicting the next year inflation. With the disturbances in the economy starting in 
the summer of 2007, we choose to look at data from the third quarter of 2007 until the fourth 
quarter of 2010.61 It is important to note that we do not have a lot of data to work with in this 
analysis. This makes the analysis weaker than it would have been if we had a large sample of 
individuals (and in addition a longer time sample) to examine.  
Figure 6.22 presents the mean forecast of the individuals and the actual inflation in this 
period. In the figure there seems to have been large differences between the two.62 In the 
third quarter of 2008 the error was over 1.5 %. Hence, the actual inflation in the third quarter 
of 2009 was much lower than the forecasters thought it would be in the third quarter of 2008. 
To examine if and how the forecasts have been affected by the financial crisis, we start 
looking at the accuracy measures of the consensus in section 6.6.1. The rationality tests of the 
forecasts are presented in section 6.6.2.  
                                                        
60 This is discussed in appendix one. 
61 Where the data in the fourth quarter of 2010 being forecasts for the expected inflation in the fourth quarter of 
2011, and the actual data we compare it with the actual inflation in the fourth quarter of 2011. 
62 It is, however, important to be aware of the fact that the y-axe does not have a very wide range, from 0.5 % to 
2.5 %. 
Figure 6.22: The mean forecast from the SPF and the actual inflation during the financial 
crisis, 2007q3 until 2010q4. The values in a given quarter are the forecast given of the next 
year inflation that quarter and the actual inflation for the next year. 
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6.6.1 The forecast accuracy is not worse during the financial crisis 
The accuracy measures of the consensus mean and median forecasts during the financial 
crisis may give us a first hint to whether the financial crisis has made forecasting more 
difficult. The accuracy measures for the consensus forecasts in the financial crisis are 
presented in table 6.41. For comparison the forecast accuracy of the consensus in the total 
sample, in the sample where the Volcker disinflation is excluded and the sample starting in 
the second quarter of 1990 are also presented. 
ME values of the consensus forecasts made during the crisis are negative, with values a bit 
smaller than for the total sample. This means that the respondents have been overestimating 
the inflation in this period.  With large negative errors, at least in 2008 (visualized in figure 
6.22), this seems to be correct, but the figure also shows us that the pattern is changing a lot 
in this period. When comparing with the total sample, the ME values are not worse during the 
financial crisis. It is important to be aware that the total sample includes early periods with 
large irregularities in the inflation, for example the Volcker disinflation. If we compare with 
the ME in the sample where the Volcker disinflation period is excluded, we see that the ME 
is much higher in the financial crisis. This also holds when comparing the consensus mean 
and median ME values for the financial crisis with the values in the sample starting in the 
second quarter of 1990. 
MAE, row two in table 6.41, is not higher during the financial crisis either. If we compare 
with the sample where the Volcker disinflation period is excluded, the MAE values of the 
consensus are very similar. The RMSE values of the forecasts are much lower during the 
financial crisis than in the total sample, and also lower than the values for the sample where 
the Volcker disinflation period is excluded and for the shorter sample starting in the second 
quarter of 1990. Also the MNSE values are lower in the financial crisis sample than in the 
other three samples. This indicates that even when accounting for the lower dispersion in the 
actual inflation in this late period, the forecast accuracy is better during the recent crisis. 
With the accuracy measures being relatively low, the forecasts during the financial crisis 
have not worsened. For several measures they are actually better than in the whole sample. 
Looking at figure 6.22 this is a bit surprising.  
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6.6.2 The rationality of forecasts during the financial crisis 
This section presents the analysis of the rationality of the forecasts during the financial crisis. 
We follow the same pattern as we did in our previous sections, starting with the results for 
the consensus, in section 6.6.2.1. The analysis of the individual respondents is presented in 
section 6.6.2.2. The data from the financial crisis contain 52 individuals. 
6.6.2.1 The consensus is not biased and are also efficient in most tests 
Table 6.42 present the results for the consensus mean and median forecasts, containing the p-
values for each test as well as each variable’s coefficient.63 With both the mean and median 
consensus having relatively high p-values, both over 50 %, we cannot claim the forecasts 
biased in this period. With p-values much higher than the corresponding ones for the total 
sample, presented in table 6.14, and in the sample starting in the second quarter of 1990, this 
gives us no indication of worsened forecasts during the financial crisis. Instead, the 
forecasters are more accurate and have a larger probability of being unbiased. 
Turning to the efficiency tests, we see that the mean and median consensus pass test two and 
three, indicating relatively efficient forecasters. For efficiency test one we can reject 
efficiency at a 10 % level, though not at a “normal” significance level of 5 %. As in our other 
samples, the null of rationality is rejected for efficiency test four. Thus, the consensus 
forecasts in the financial crisis is not strong-form rational.  
                                                        
63 In this analysis we will not focus on interpreting the coefficients. However, taking a look at them, in table 
6.42, we see that they do not all have the same signs as for the other samples and tests. For example are the 
coefficients of the federal funds rate and the unemployment rate positive, leading us to the opposite conclusion 
than previously. It is important to be aware that this sample is relatively short, and that we do not have a lot of 
information about how new information have affected the inflation forecasts. Hence, we choose not to make 
strong conclusion regarding these patterns.   
Table 6.41: The accuracy measures for the consensus mean and median forecasts in the 
whole sample, and in the financial crisis (2007-2010). 
The entire sample The financial crisis Excluding  Volcker Sample from 1990q2
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ME -0.275 -0.280 -0.200 -0.201 -0.126 -0.093 -0.198 -0.173
MAE 0.865 0.884 0.610 0.630 0.699 0.708 0.729 0.728
RMSE 3.311 3.378 0.747 0.751 1.366 1.006 1.804 1.578
MNSE 2.216 2.260 0.904 0.909 1.006 0.741 2.159 1.888
Accuracy measures for the consensus 
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We conclude that the consensus mean and median forecasts during the current financial crisis 
performs pretty well. They pass the bias test with large p-values and we cannot reject 
efficiency in three out of the four tests. Hence, the forecasts seem to be more accurate and 
rational in this period. Because of the seriousness of the crisis, and what other literature has 
found about the rationality of forecasters in earlier crisis, this result seems rather surprising. 
The results may be explained with the level of and the change in the actual inflation being 
lower this period, indicating that forecasting is easier (Thomas, 1999). However, because the 
MNSE measure is lower in this period (presented in row four in table 6.41), the dispersion in 
the actual data does not seem to be the explanation. Thus, it may seem that forecasts actually 
have improved over the years, maybe due to more sophisticated analysis techniques and a 
better understanding of the economy. The conclusion that forecasts have improved is thus in 
accordance with previous research by for example Croushore (2006), even when the sample 
that we look at is the financial crisis.  
Table 6.42: Results for the rationality tests for the consensus mean 
and median forecasts during the financial crisis (2007-2010). 
Mean Median
α (constant) -0.200 -0.201
α=0 0.573 0.587
α (constant) 0.917 1.043
β (lagged infl.) -0.818 -0.890
α=β=0 0.081* 0.055*
α (constant) 1.571 1.534
β (forecasted infl.) -1.002 -0.981
α=β=0 0.179 0.111
α (constant) -0.364 -0.305
β (forecast error) -0.333 -0.272
α=β=0 0.745 0.726
α (constant) -12.775 -9.982
β1 (lagged infl.) 0.887 0.623
β2 (forecasted infl.) 0.762 -0.875
β3 (fed funds) 0.055 0.375
β4 (unemployment) 1.146 1.013
α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0 0*** 0***
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
* Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  10% s igni ficance level
** Rejects  the nul l  hypothes is  on a  5% s igni ficance level
*** Rejects  the nul l  on a   1% s igni ficance level
Efficiency test 
2: Forecasted 
inflation
Efficiency test 
3: Lagged 
forecast error
Efficiency test 
4: Information 
set
Rationality tests for the consensus during the financial crisis
Test Hypothesis for 
rationality
Coefficients and p- values
Test of Bias
Efficiency test 
1: Lagged actual 
values
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6.6.2.2 Individual respondents are unbiased, but not strong-form efficient 
The results of the rationality tests performed on the individual respondents are presented in 
table 6.43. Again we present the part of all individuals who passes the tests and the number of 
individuals who fulfil the demands of the Newey-West method (which are explained in 
section 5.4.4). 
When performing the test of bias we have 41 individuals to test. Almost all of those, 87.8 % 
cannot be claimed biased at a 5 % significance level. Thus, the majority of individual 
respondents are unbiased. With the number of unbiased individuals being high, we have no 
indication of them performing worse than before. There are instead a larger fraction of 
individuals who are unbiased, again leading towards the conclusion that the individual 
respondents have become better forecasters. 
The efficiency tests give us fewer individuals who pass the tests. For most tests less than 50% 
of the individuals are efficient at a 5 % significance level. The exception is test three, where 
Table 6.43: Results for the rationality tests performed on the individual respondents for the sample 
only containing the financial crisis (2007q3-2010q4). The consensus mean forecast’s p-value and the 
part of the individuals who are better than this consensus is also presented. “Total nmb” is for “all 
sample” the number of individuals who we have performed the tests on, while the numbers to each 
significance level are the number of individuals who passes the test based on this level. 
All sample 1 % 5 % 10 %
Test of bias: α=0
Total nmb 41 38 36 32
Part of all 0.927 0.878 0.780
Efficiency test 1: α=β=0
Total nmb 35 27 15 11
Part of all 0.771 0.429 0.314
Efficiency test 2: α=β=0
Total nmb 41 21 14 9
Part of all 0.512 0.341 0.220
Efficiency test 3: α=β=0
Total nmb 29 23 19 17
Part of all 0.793 0.655 0.586
Efficiency test 4: α=β1=β2=β3=β4=0
Total nmb 34 4 2 1
Part of all 0.093 0.059 0.029
Test of bias : 
Eff. test 1: 
Eff. test 2:
Eff. test 3: 
Eff. test 4: 
Overview rationality tests during the financial crisis: 2007q3-2010q4
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65.5 % pass the test. Hence, the forecasters in this period seem to be very aware of their 
previous forecast error. The period we are examining is a period with a lot of attention and 
focus on the economy. Thus, this finding may not seem too odd. For efficiency test one, 
42.9% of all individuals are efficient, with the corresponding numbers for test two and four 
being 34.1 % and 5.9 %. When comparing with the whole sample, in table 6.18, and the 
shorter sample starting in the second quarter of 1990, in table 6.29, almost all tests have a 
larger, or similar part of individuals passing the tests during the financial crisis. Hence, there 
seem to be more individuals efficient during the financial crisis. 
6.6.3 Concluding remarks about the forecasts during the financial crisis 
Summing up our findings we see that neither the consensus nor the individual respondents 
have performed worse during the financial crisis. The consensus forecasts’ accuracy 
measures are mostly lower than in the total sample and in the shorter sample starting in the 
second quarter of 1990. The consensus mean and median forecasts have high p-values for 
unbiasedness and relatively high p-values for efficiency. It is only in the test of strong-form 
efficiency we reject efficiency in this sample. Also the individual forecasters seem to have 
been performing well during the financial crisis. Almost all individual respondents are 
unbiased, and the fractions of efficient individuals are for many tests higher than in the 
corresponding tests for previous data samples.  
The concluding remark is that the forecasters show no tendency of worse performances 
during the financial crisis. Several tests actually indicate that they have improved their 
forecasts, a conclusion opposite of what we would expect. The thought that the lower 
dispersion in the actual inflation in this period, as pictured when comparing figure 6.22 and 
figure 6.1, could explain some of this, does not seem to hold because of a low MNSE 
measure. Hence, it seems like the financial crisis have not made forecasting worse, and the 
previous finding that forecasters have improved over the years, seems to hold. It is important 
to note that the situation in the world economy is still quite anxious. We cannot be sure that 
the effect of the financial crisis have past, thus it will be preferable to examine the effect of 
the crisis for a longer sample than the one we have available. Also the fact that the dataset is 
quite small is a weakness of this analysis. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
This aim of this paper has been to contribute to the broad existing literature of inflation 
expectations by examining the rationality of professional individual forecasters in a 
thoroughly manner. Using survey measures we compare consensus forecasts with individual 
forecasts, investigating if they are rational or not. We find that both the consensus and the 
majority of individual forecasts are quite accurate, though not strong-form rational, and that 
the forecasts seem to have improved over the time period. These results are in accordance 
with previous studies of the consensus (Croushore, 2006; Gerberding, 2006). However, we 
find that the behaviour of individuals varies. Both the accuracy measures and rationality tests 
performed on each individual reveal dispersions between the “best” and the “worst” 
forecasters. Because a lot of previous literature and most macroeconomic models presume 
that individuals have relatively similar expectations, it is important to highlight these findings 
(Mankiw, et al., 2003).  
Previous literature has often stated that the consensus outperform individuals (Zarnowitz, 
1984; McNees, 1987). Even though we find that the majority of individuals pass fewer 
efficiency tests than the consensus, we also find that a relatively large fraction of individuals 
outperform the consensus in several rationality tests. Hence, the consensus does not seem to 
be better than almost all individuals, as McNees (1987) states. 
The industry variable in the SPF has to our knowledge not been examined previously. In our 
analysis the forecasts from professionals employed in different industries did not differ much. 
Using a previous study by Laster et al. (1999) we find that the forecasters employed in 
nonfinancial service provider firms can possess larger strategic incentives. These incentives 
can cause some of the forecasters in this “industry” to be less accurate than those employed 
in financial service provider firms. Our analysis of the Volcker disinflation period and the 
recent financial crisis find both the consensus and the individual forecasters to be more 
accurate and rational than we expected. Even though the majority of individuals were biased 
during the Volcker disinflation, there were many individuals for whom biasedness could not 
be claimed. In the financial crisis, both the consensus and the individuals performed better 
during the crisis than in the total sample and than the shorter sample starting in the second 
quarter of 1990. 
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Our analyses find individuals to be quite accurate, even when accounting for special episodes 
and different employment. Even though strong-form rationality is rejected for all tests, our 
results indicate that professional forecasts are relatively good. Our results also indicate 
differences between individuals. To find how and why individuals differ, maybe developing a 
new model or hypothesis regarding how individuals form their expectations could be an 
interesting topic for further research, and is a topic some forecasters already have began 
examining (Mankiw, et al., 2003). As stated by Bernanke in his speech in Cambridge July 10, 
2007: “a deeper understanding of the determinants and effects of the public's expectations of 
inflation could have significant practical payoffs” (Bernanke, 2007). Hence, getting better 
knowledge about how inflation expectations are formed is desirable, and the broad research 
of these expectations should continue. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Inflation forecasting in different time periods 
In 6.1 we mention that it seems to be harder to predict the inflation in certain time periods. 
This could be because of special episodes, different policies, etc. Several articles mention this 
fact. In this appendix we will present some of those and what they have found. 
Su and Su (1975) evaluated the SPF (at the time the ASA/NBER Business Outlook Survey) 
in an early study. Because it was written in an early stage of the survey, they did not have a 
lot of observations to investigate, and the article was also written in a challenging period. 
Some of the issues that they discuss could still be important to consider. They say that the 
forecasting period from 1968 to 1973 is generally considered to be a difficult period for 
forecasters. Su and Su (1975) claim that his was because of a high unemployment level, a 
moderate recession, a rapid inflation, a serious auto strike, a large government deficit as well 
as a foreign trade deficit. Even though our sample is restricted to after this period, the fact 
that these factors can make forecasting more difficult is something we should keep in mind. 
In addition to the fact that some of these factors may be present at some time in our data, the 
historical data that forecasters often use when making predictions will be of little value when 
coming from this period.  
Croushore (2006) also points out some episodes that may be able to explain the poor 
performance of forecasters, like the fact that the inflation rose much higher than the 
forecasters believed after the oil-price shocks in the 1970s. He also states that the overlapping 
observations problem will be of importance when investigating these episodes.64 Another 
problem with the SPF mentioned by Croushore (2006) is that in the early forecasts for the 
GNP deflator, they rounded the forecast to the nearest whole number, and this caused the 
forecasts to be quite erratic in these early years of the survey. This goes for 1968, 1969 and 
1970. When looking at the forecasted inflation, for example in figure 6.1 in section 6.1, this 
seems hard to confirm because there were very few forecasts these years, with forecasted 
inflation missing for many of the quarters. However, with these years excluded from our data, 
this will not be a problem for us.  
                                                        
64 This problem was discussed in 5.4.4. A shock will affect the actual values for several consecutive periods 
because the forecasts span a longer period than the sampling frequency, hence the forecast errors will be 
correlated. 
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 118 
 
Another paper that examines how the forecast performance has evolved is Mankiw et al. 
(2003). They look at how the disagreement between the forecasters has varied with the 
business cycle, and find that the disagreement between the economists in the SPF does not 
have a very strong obvious relationship with the state of the real economy. However, they do 
find that large changes in inflation, both positive and negative, are correlated with an increase 
in disagreement. Figure 6.1, presenting the mean forecasts of individuals and the actual 
inflation, suggests that this holds for our data as well The largest differences between the 
forecasted inflation and the actual inflation are in times when the inflation level was higher 
and more changing than it has the last years (in line with also other studies, like Su and Su 
(1975) and Croushore (2006)). Also when looking at the standard deviation of the inflation 
forecasts against the level of the actual inflation, in figure 6.5, this relationship seems to hold. 
The article by Mankiw et al. (2003) also investigates the effect of the mentioned Volcker 
disinflation on the forecasts. They find that the expectations adjusted slowly to the regime 
change that the disinflation period presented. Even though they examine the Michigan 
survey, we think that this period also affected the SPF forecasters (we examine this in section 
6.5). However, the effect may be smaller for the SPF forecasters, because they are economic 
professionals who should understand the impact of the disinflation to a larger extent than the 
consumers in the Michigan survey. Looking at figure 6.1-6.5 in section 6.1, it seems to be 
true that the Volcker disinflation affected the forecasts.65 It appears that the forecasters did 
not see the fall in inflation coming as quick as it did, with the forecasted inflation “lagging” 
the actual inflation with a substantial difference between the actual and the expected inflation 
in this period (a relationship also mentioned by Giordani and Söderlind (2002) and Croushore 
(2006)). The degree of disagreement between forecasters, measured by the standard deviation 
presented in figure 6.5, also seem to be higher in these periods than later on. 
Another paper that discusses the effect of specific events is a paper written by Lloyd (1999). 
Lloyd talks about unforeseeable “regime changes” and that failures of others, for example the 
central bank in keeping an inflation target, can cause fully rational agents to make systematic 
errors in certain periods. The mentioned effect of the Volcker disinflation period could be an 
example of such a regime change.                                                         
65 This is a pattern that Mehra (2002) also found in the SPF. Mehra (2002) did however not find that excluding 
the Volcker disinflation period improved the results from the Michigan survey. 
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Appendix 2: The data 
Appendix 2.1 Revised versus vintage data 
When comparing survey data and actual data it is important to choose between revised or 
vintage actual data.  The fully revised data is the newest value of the variable in question. If 
choosing vintage data, there are different sets to choose from, being the first one published or 
others published sometime after the first publications. For this to be possible it is necessary to 
have a real-time data set for the variables that one wants to look at.66 For the NIPA variables 
the publications of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) are used as vintage data. The 
NIPA values undergo a systematic process of revision.67 
Every fifth year there is a benchmark revision to the NIPA variables. In these revisions the 
base year level for the variables, thus the scale of the data, can change. This means that it is 
usually not appropriate to compare the level of an observation in one vintage with the level of 
the same observation in a different vintage if a benchmark revisions span the two.68 
Previous literature discusses whether to use revised or vintage data with different conclusions 
(Keane & Runkle, 1990; Croushore & Stark, 1999; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993). Two issues 
are important in this discussion (Keane & Runkle, 1990). The first one is whether the 
respondents are trying to predict the initial or the revised data. If the first is true, then vintage 
data should be used, if not, using the revised data is appropriate. Keane and Runkle (1990) 
find that predictions on average were closer to the initial announcements than the revisions. 
They therefore argue that the forecasters are trying to predict the initial announcement, and 
choose to use vintage data when comparing. However, in the forecasting literature it is more 
common to analyse based on the latest variables, thus revised, data (Croushore, 2006). The 
reasoning behind this is that it is the final actual data that the forecasters are trying to predict, 
not some preliminary data. Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) claim that while the preliminary data                                                         
66 A real- time dataset consists of the vintages; snapshots of the data at different times in the past, before the data 
were fully revised data. A vintage date is the date when the data were available for the public for the first time. 
This is discussed in (Stark, 2011) and in Stark and Croushore (1999) 
67 Near the end of the first month in each quarter the BEA releases the first estimate for the previous quarter. 
Revisions to this advance estimate, the preliminary and final estimates are released near the end of the following 
two months. After this, BEA releases annual revisions to estimates for the previous three years in its annual 
revision. Then, every few years, a benchmark revision is released, and these will usually affect all observations. 
In addition to incorporating new economic information, benchmark revisions often incorporate new statistical 
procedures and new definitions.  
68 This will be a problem if we want to compare our forecasts with the revised data, because the forecasts are not 
being revised with the base year changes (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). But, within a particular 
vintage, one can compare observations over time by for example computing growth rates. 
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are most closely related to what were available to the forecasters, they may themselves be 
partly predictions. They could therefore themself deviate from the “truth,” represented by the 
last revised data. On the other hand, the fully revised data may contain a lot of benchmark 
revisions. To demand the forecasters to be responsible for all measurement errors that are 
corrected for by these is questionable.  
The other issue Keane and Runkle (1990) states important is whether the data revisions are 
significant or predictable. If the data revisions are predictable, not systematic and not 
significant, the use of revised or vintage data should not be of big importance. Croushore and 
Stark (1999) find that the results for different vintages often are robust, meaning that this 
choice will not be of importance. 
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Appendix 2.2 The number of forecasts of the other pgdp levels for each individual 
In 5.2, figure 5.1 and 5.2 we presented the number of forecasted pgdp2 and pgdp6 levels for 
each individual. We stated that those were pretty similar as for the other pgdp levels. These 
are presented in this appendix, in figures A2.1-A2.4. 
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Figure A2.1: The number of forecasted pgdp1 
levels for each individual  
Figure A2.2: The number of forecasted 
pgdp3 levels for each individual  
 
Figure A2.3: The number of forecasted 
pgdp4 levels for each individual  
 
Figure A2.4: The number of forecasted pgdp5 
levels for each individual  
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Appendix 2.3 Altering the dataset to solve the problem of missing forecasts 
In section 5.4.2 we discuss the problem of missing forecasts, and choose to start analyzing 
after the third quarter of 1974. However, another alternative could be to fill inn an estimated 
value of pgdp6. In this appendix we present this alternative and give an example of how this 
can be done. 
Filling in an estimate of the missing values 
Finding values for some of the missing pgdp6 levels that can give us an estimate of what the 
response of the individual is an alternative solution to the problem with missing forecasts. 
This is especially desirable for individuals where only a few forecasted levels are missing 
over a longer period of time. Doing this can give us more inflation forecasts and also more 
consecutive inflation forecasts.  
Looking into previous studies, we have not found any other papers that have done something 
similar. To fill in for missing values is a task that needs consideration and carefulness, 
because we will be changing the original data. There are different approaches that could be 
thought of.69 Here I will present one solution that we found could be good, to make a linear 
projection of other pgdp levels to find the missing value.  
When examining the data we find that forecasters have often forecasted values of pgdp1-5, 
but not pgdp6. Hence, one alternative could be to use a simple linear projection to find a 
value for pgdp6 based on the earlier forecasts by the individual in that quarter. Two possible 
ways of doing this are:  
1) 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝6 = 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝5 ∗ �𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝2𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝1� + �𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝3𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝2� + �𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝4𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝3� + �𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝5𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝4�4   
2) 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝6 = 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝5 + (𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝2 − 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝1) + (𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝3 − 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝2) + (𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝4 − 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝3) + (𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝5 − 𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝4)4  
Where the first one uses the relationship between the earlier observations and then multiplies 
it with pgdp5 to get pgdp6, while the other uses the difference and then adds it to pgdp5. The 
two methods give almost the same result. 
                                                        
69 Examples are to make a liner projection if having the other pgdp levels necessary to do so, to fill in lead and 
lag values of pgdp2 and pgdp6, and to find out how the individual has performed compared to the mean before, 
and then fill in a value equivalent to those for the missing value. 
SNF Working Paper No 50/12
 123 
-.2
0
.2
O
ld
va
lu
e 
m
in
us
 "n
ew
" v
al
ue
1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Quarter
Difference in the median of pgdp6 Difference in median inflation forecast
This linear projection method entails filling in 339 new values of pgdp6 when we have 
removed respondents with less than 12 responses. By the basic statistic showed in table A2.1 
we see that this does not change the one-year-ahead forecast or the forecasted pgdp6 levels 
much, being 3.77% now and before (when comparing with the previous numbers when 
restricting the sample with those with 12 or more responses in table 5.1). Because we at the 
same time fill in values for pgdp6 in all the quarters that previously had no observation, thus 
increasing the number of forecasts per individual from 41.86 to 44.30, (presented in table 5.1) 
it seems as a reasonable method to use.  
The difference between the new median inflation forecast and the “old,” as well as how the 
pgdp6 levels have changed if we use this alternative, are presented in figure A2.5. 
  
 
 
 
 
Nmb forecasts per ind pgdp6 Inflation forecast
Mean 44.295 145.334 3.772
Std 25.119 36.141 2.158
Min 11 105.7 -4.569
Max 123 247 31.137
Statistics forecasted 
values and nmb of 
Values after made a linear projection
Table A2.1: Basic statistics of the forecasted values of the inflation after filling in a 
linear projection of pgdp6. 
Figure A2.5: The difference between the new median inflation 
forecasts and the old median inflation forecasts together with 
the difference made in the pgdp6 levels.  
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Appendix 2.4 Changing base year 
When working with data from the SPF database we should be aware of the mentioned base 
year changes for several variables. Every fifth year, when there are benchmark revisions to 
the NIPA variables, the base year may change in addition to the data being revised (explained 
in section three). There have been several base year changes since the SPF survey began. 
Because the forecasted levels in the dataset have not been rescaled with the base year 
changes, the levels in the data set use the base year that was in effect when the questionnaire 
was sent to the forecasters. For the pgdp there have been seven base year changes that we 
should be aware of. Those were in 1976q1, 1986q1, 1992q1, 1996q1, 1999q4 and 2004q1, 
and are listed in table A2.2, (source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008, p. 10)  and 
shown in figure A2.6. 
Whether the forecasters manage to keep track with the base year changes in their forecasting 
is interesting.70 In figure A2.6 we plot all individual forecasted levels of pgdp2 and pgdp6, 
showing that the individuals did keep track of the base year changes for pgdp2 and pgdp6. 
When working with percentage changes, the base year revisions do not have to be a problem, 
because the effect on the inflation rate is likely to be minor (Clements, 2004).71 Because the 
individuals seems to keep track of the base year changes, and we are working with 
percentage changes when calculating the inflation, we do not think of the base year changes 
as a big problem.  
 
 
 
                                                        70This can also be done by checking the quarters where the base year changed, listing the individuals’ responses 
these quarters and the previous quarter. 
71 However, if we want to compare the quarterly levels of pgdp with the actual levels, problems will occur. One 
problem is that the survey may ask for predictions further in the future than the next annual benchmark revision. 
A way of solving this is be to exclude all forecasts with horizons that extend beyond the date of systematic data 
revisions from the data (Keane & Runkle, 1990). One could also use vintage data when comparing (Clements, 
2006). Vintage data will always have the same base year as the forecasts, being the data that was available 
around the time the forecast was made.  
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Table A2.2: Base year changes for the NIPA variables, which includes the GDP deflator. Source: SPF 
documentation (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008). 
Base Years for NIPA Variables in the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters Range of Surveys  
Base Year  
1968:Q4 to 1975:Q4  1958  
1976:Q1 to 1985:Q4  1972  
1986:Q1 to 1991:Q4  1982  
1992:Q1 to 1995:Q42 1987  
1996:Q1 to 1999:Q33 1992  
1999:Q4 to 2003:Q4  1996  
2004:Q1 to present  2000  
Figure A2.6: Base year changes in forecasted pgdp levels. The forecasted levels of pgdp2 and pgdp6 are 
presented, making a downward “jump” each time the base year changes. 
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Appendix 2.5 Consistency of forecasts 
When analysing data, it is important that the data that we use are reliable and consistent. 
Errors made by forecasters, such as extreme outliers can lead to forecasted values that do not 
seem reasonable.  Extreme outliers can exist because of sloppy handwriting or other issues 
that makes the forecaster make mistakes (Giordani & Söderlind, 2002). To control for lacking 
consistency we can search the dataset for problems and eliminate them, and use robust 
methods when estimating, which will make the problems with outliers less severe (as for 
example the Newey-West method we are using discussed in 5.4.4). 
We begin discussing the dispersion in the data, presented by the highest and lowest inflation 
forecast each quarter and by the standard deviation of the forecasts in figure 5.6 and 5.7, 
section 5. Looking at the figures, there seem to be some periods that have more extreme 
values than others. Thus, we should inspect the data to see if they seem consistent and 
correct. Doing this involves inspecting if all the pgdp levels forecasted by the given 
individual are extreme in the given period. This enables us to detect if one of the forecasted 
levels seems unreasonable compared to the others.  
Extreme values can give biased results. Hence, it is important to locate them in order to 
assess their importance for our analysis. Figure A2.6 in appendix A2.4 present the forecasted 
pgdp2 and pgdp6 levels each quarter, and gives us a visual of potential outliers. As we 
expect, being a forecast of the current quarter pgdp, pgdp2 seem to be relatively consistent. 
However, pgdp6, seems to have some potential problematic outliers before the second base 
year change. The most serious one is located in the third quarter of 1978. In the same quarter 
one can find similar outliers in pgdp4 and pgdp5, which could imply that this is a forecaster 
who have made mistake or made a forecast which deviates from the consensus forecast. After 
some research, we find that the pgdp6 value reported here seems to be in line with the other 
pgdp levels that the given individual responded that quarter. Hence, it seems at though the 
respondent just made an optimistic forecast and can therefore not be seen as an outlier being 
in line with the forecaster’s beliefs. The forecasted levels of pgdp as well as the calculated 
inflation forecast of this individual, number 47, is presented in table A2.3. The forecasted 
values give that this individual expects the inflation the next year to be 31.14%, over 20% 
higher than the mean and median values this quarter (with the mean being higher than the 
median, probably affected by this individual’s high forecast). 
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Because this was the largest outlier found it seems reasonable to believe that the other 
potential outliers are just a individual making a slightly more optimistic forecast than the 
consensus, hence we will not delete any of those from the dataset.  
For the forecasted values to be claimed consistent we should to consider other things than 
potential outliers. One example is that if forecasts are consistent, the quarterly predicted pgdp 
levels should be relatively similar to the predicted annual levels. Testing this is possible in 
the quarters where we have annual forecasts available, from the third quarter of 1981 and 
onwards. In the first quarter of a year there should be consistency between pgdp6, which is 
the one-year-ahead forecasted pgdp level, and the annual average forecast the current year, 
pgdpa. Being forecasts of almost the same, these should be similar. Consistency should also 
exist between the level of pgdp6 and pgdpb, the annual-average forecast for the next year, 
when standing in the fourth quarter of a year.  To investigate this we can find the percentage 
difference between the pgdp6 and pgdpa and plot this relationship against time when standing 
in the first quarter to see how this relationship has evolved. The same is done for the pgdp6 
and pgdpb when standing in the fourth quarter of a year.  
Figure A2.7 and A2.8 show these percentage differences between the forecasted inflation 
level one year ahead and the forecasted annual-average inflation level. The differences should 
be close to zero if the forecaster is consistent. However, that does not seem to hold, especially 
in the early 80’s. In this period the differences between pgdp6 and pgdpa when standing in 
the first quarter varied from -3 % to +10 %. After Philadelphia Fed took over the survey, in 
early 1990, the problem became much less severe. This may imply that the forecasters were 
more aware of what they actually were forecasting. The pattern is quite similar for the pgdp6 
and pgdpb when standing in the fourth quarter of a year, but the range of the percentage 
difference is smaller. 
Outlier for id=47 in 1978q3
Variable pgdp1 pgdp2 pgdp3 pgdp4 pgdp5 pgdp6 Inflation forecast
Forecasted quarter 1978q2 1978q3 1978q4 1979q1 1979q2 1979q3 1979q3
id=47 150.7 160.9 172.5 185.0 197.7 211.0 31.137
Mean 150.673 153.681 156.908 160.131 163.181 165.908 7.910
Median 150.700 153.500 156.150 158.800 161.550 164.250 7.122
Table A2.3: The forecasted values of the forecasted pgdp levels made by individual number 47 in 1978q3. 
The mean and median inflation forecast in the same quarter is also presented.  
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A possible solution to this consistency problem is to exclude values that are too extreme from 
the sample. This would make the dataset more robust and less exposed to outliers. We can, 
however, perform this consistency check from the third quarter of 1981 only. We have no 
way of checking the consistency for the earlier years, but looking at the results in figures 
A2.7 and A2.8 it is reasonable to believe that they are not too good. Only removing values 
from the 80’s will not solve our problem, thus that is a bad solution. Another solution that 
seems more realistic is to only use data from 1990 and onwards, or use sub-samples that start 
after Philadelphia Fed took over the survey. Because of the huge amount of data that we will 
be missing by doing this, we will not do this when performing all tests, but we will however, 
also test the data only after the Philadelphia Fed took over the survey, thus using the more 
consistent period (this analysis is presented in 6.4.2). 
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Figure A2.7: Inconsistency between one-
year-ahead inflation forecast standing in first 
quarter (pgdp6) and the forecasted average 
inflation current year (pgdpa) 
 
Figure A.2.8: Inconsistency between one-year-
ahead inflation forecast (pgdp6) standing in 
the fourth quarter, and the forecasted average 
inflation for next year (pgdpb) 
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Appendix 3: Forecast accuracy 
Appendix 3.1 The rankings of the best and the worst ten forecasters in terms of 
different accuracy measures 
In 6.2 we rank the individual respondents in terms of having the lowest value of the different 
accuracy measures. The ones that were most accurate in terms of each measure are presented 
in table A3.1, while the ones who were least accurate, are presented in table A3.2. As 
mentioned in 6.2.2.3 we see that there is some overlapping in the best ones and in the worst 
ones. One example is individual number 472, who is ranked most accurate by ME, RMSE 
and MNSE. 
 
ID Value ID Value Id Value ID Value
1 472 -0.001 531 0.508 472 0.010 472 0.0114
2 446 0.004 405 0.511 446 0.035 446 0.0415
3 448 0.020 422 0.514 448 0.107 145 0.1145
4 524 0.026 510 0.558 524 0.136 448 0.1400
5 431 0.028 502 0.579 145 0.143 524 0.1449
6 424 -0.029 544 0.581 424 0.144 424 0.1748
7 145 0.034 507 0.585 431 0.218 31 0.2217
8 65 0.046 546 0.593 465 0.301 431 0.2677
9 31 -0.059 465 0.595 502 0.313 65 0.3158
10 411 0.059 500 0.600 549 0.320 158 0.3224
Best ten respondents
ME MAE RMSE MNSERank by 
best
ID Value ID Value Id Value ID Value
1 100 -2.251 148 2.4290 100 9.5484 100 12.975
2 23 -2.196 100 2.3654 60 9.1201 434 10.986
3 5 -1.865 23 2.2945 23 8.7834 440 10.114
4 47 -1.729 125 2.2709 47 8.2909 35 8.982
5 22 1.702 9 2.2147 35 8.2476 427 8.459
6 79 -1.630 47 2.2028 79 7.6445 23 8.361
7 13 -1.553 93 2.1874 66 7.2215 407 8.353
8 434 -1.538 31 2.1315 22 7.0188 66 7.920
9 69 -1.484 43 2.0680 5 6.7229 79 7.811
10 68 -1.484 5 1.8646 69 6.4697 60 7.689
Rank by 
worst
ME MAE RMSE MNSE
Worst ten respondents:
Table A3.1: The most accurate respondents in terms 
of each accuracy measure 
Table A3.2: The least accurate respondents in terms 
of each accuracy measure. 
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Appendix 3.2 Summarizing the values of the accuracy measures and the number of 
forecasts per individual for the ten worst and the ten best respondents in terms of the 
accuracy measures 
Table A3.3 summarizes the values of the accuracy measures. Values for mean and median 
consensus forecasts as well as the mean and median of the ten best and ten worst forecasters 
are presented for each accuracy measure. 
Table A3.4 summarizes the mean and median number of forecasts for the consensus and the 
ten best and the ten worst for each accuracy measures. We see that the ten best tends to have 
made more forecasts than the worst for each measure, but that the number is not very much 
higher than the consensus number (as discussed in 6.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview accuracy measures ME MAE RMSE MNSE
Consensus mean -0.275 0.865 3.311 2.216
Consensus median -0.280 0.884 3.378 2.260
Mean of the ten best 0.013 0.562 0.173 0.175
Mean of the ten worst -1.403 2.203 7.907 9.165
Median of the ten best 0.023 0.580 0.144 0.160
Median of the ten worst -1.591 2.209 7.946 8.410
Overview nmb of individual forecasts Consensus ME MAE RMSE MNSE
Mean number of forecasts: 41.80
   Ten best 47.90 25.30 33.90 43.40
   Ten worst 17.10 23.40 24.70 27.30
Median number of forecasts: 42
   Ten best 43 23.5 27 32
   Ten worst 17.5 21.5 20.5 20
Table A3.3: Overview of the accuracy measures 
Table A3.4: Overview of number of forecasts for the ten most accurate and the ten least 
accurate in terms of each accuracy measure 
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Appendix 4: Rationality tests 
Appendix 4.1 Ranking of the ten best individuals in each efficiency test in terms of the 
other efficiency tests 
In the end of 6.2.2 we mention that we rank the individuals who had the highest p-values of 
being efficient for the different efficiency tests in terms of their ranking in the other 
efficiency tests. This left us with relatively little overlapping, pictured in the tables A4.1-A4.5 
presented in this appendix.  
 
429 19 85 103 64
34 13 9 2 12
424 7 93 - 72
502 18 56 33 4
543 40 72 5 95
541 38 22 12 42
65 20 14 25 122
528 55 25 13 51
524 6 19 21 15
527 50 37 7 33
Rank 
efficiency 
test 4
Efficiency 
test 1: ten 
best 
respondents 
in terms of 
ranking in 
the other 
tests
Individual 
number
Rank test 
of bias
Rank 
efficiency 
test 2
Rank 
efficiency 
test 3
472 31 59 74 21
446 33 79 86 80
448 41 88 83 139
145 36 2 19 10
31 57 32 31 113
524 9 19 21 15
424 3 93 - 71
93 22 42 16 91
431 19 70 44 57
158 96 62 20 67
Rank 
efficiency 
test 4
Bias test: ten 
best 
respondents 
in terms of 
ranking in 
the other 
tests
Individual 
number
Rank 
efficiency 
test 1
Rank 
efficiency 
test 2
Rank 
efficiency 
test 3
Table A4.1: Bias test: the rankings in the other 
rationality tests of the individuals ranked 
highest in terms of the test of bias 
Table A4.2-A4.5: Efficiency tests: the ranking of the ten best individuals in terms of each of the 
other rationality tests 
98 12 11 24 55
145 4 36 19 10
124 33 62 37 82
78 29 14 - 14
546 22 25 14 73
535 39 37 27 46
549 17 28 6 52
507 35 52 40 18
34 13 2 2 60
510 43 120 37 60
Rank 
efficiency 
test 4
Efficiency test 
2: ten best 
respondents 
in terms of 
ranking in the 
other tests
Individual 
number
Rank test 
of bias
Rank 
efficiency 
test 1
Rank 
efficiency 
test 3
144 34 64 31 59
34 13 2 9 12
465 14 54 113 111
125 23 65 127 98
543 40 5 72 95
549 17 28 7 52
527 50 10 37 33
548 64 27 17 35
500 24 88 77 62
485 46 14 133 112
Efficiency test 
3: ten best 
respondents in 
terms of 
ranking in the 
other tests
Individual 
number
Rank test 
of bias
Rank 
efficiency 
test 1
Rank 
efficiency 
test 2
Rank 
efficiency 
test 4
488 108 80 81 57
462 101 68 104 -
432 98 103 111 -
502 18 4 56 33
60 138 130 100 114
39 85 60 24 -
42 41 56 47 -
498 134 118 95 85
520 53 40 28 60
145 4 36 2 19
Efficiency test 
4: ten best 
respondents in 
terms of 
ranking in the 
other tests
Individual 
number
Rank test 
of bias
Rank 
efficiency 
test 1
Rank 
efficiency 
test 2
Rank 
efficiency 
test 3
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Appendix 4.2: The strong-form rational individuals are late forecasters, and have few 
responses 
In section 6.3.2.2 we perform the efficiency tests on the individual respondents. We find that 
only four are strong-form efficient on a 5% significance level. These four are presented in 
this appendix. 
There are, as mentioned, only four respondents who are strong-form rational at a 5% 
significance level. These are the four ones with the highest p-values in terms of the joint null 
hypothesis for efficiency test four holding, individual number 488, 462, 432 and 502. Table 
6.26 in section 6.3.2.2 shows that all these responded quite late in the survey, all after the 
Philadelphia Fed took over the survey in the second quarter of 1990. The standard deviation 
of the actual inflation in their forecasting period is thus quite small, indicating that strong-
form rationality is easier achieved if the actual inflation level is stable. This finding, 
indicating an improved forecast performance, is in line with the result in 6.2.2.2 as well as of 
other literature (Gerberding, 2006; Croushore, 2006). Other patterns are that three out of four 
seem to be underestimating the inflation, and that they all have made few forecasts. With the 
highest of these four’s number of forecasts being 16, it again looks as if it is an advantage to 
not respond to the survey a lot of times. This is a rather strange conclusion, indicating no 
learning among the individual forecasters (again in line with the results found by Lamont 
(2002)). 
Looking at table 6.22 in section 6.3.2.2 we see that these four do not seem to have 
particularly low accuracy levels and rankings. Only the fourth best, number 502 have 
relatively low accurate values for each accuracy measure. This is at the same time the only of 
the four who are overestimating the inflation on average.  
Also when investigating their ranks in terms of the other rationality tests, as listed in table 
A4.1-A4.5 in appendix 4, we do not find any clear pattern of these four having low rankings. 
For efficiency test three, two of these do not have enough observations for us to be able to 
rank them in terms of this test. Hence, it does not seem that these strong-form rational 
forecasters have made especially good forecasts in terms of both accuracy as well as in the 
other efficiency tests.  
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Appendix 4.3 An overview of the number of individuals rational and efficient in each 
industry 
In 6.4.6 we sum up our results regarding the industry variables. Table A4.6 summarizes the 
results of the individual respondents in the different categories as well as for the whole 
sample this period, showing the total number of individuals and the part of them that pass the 
different tests. 
 
Test of bias 81 0.622 40 0.525
Efficiency test 1 72 0.583 36 0.528
Efficiency test 2 82 0.195 40 0.175
Efficiency test 3 67 0.388 33 0.424
Efficiency test 4 72 0.056 35 0.057
Test of bias 42 0.667 7 0.714
Efficiency test 1 38 0.525 5 0.800
Efficiency test 2 42 0.262 7 0.143
Efficiency test 3 37 0.270 7 0.800
Efficiency test 4 38 0.053 5 0.000
Total number 
of individuals
Part not rejecting 
the null on a 5% 
Total number 
of individuals
Part not rejecting 
the null on a 5% 
Industry 3Industry 2
Overview total 
sample and all 
industries
Industry1All sample this period
Part not rejecting the 
null on a 5% level
Total number 
of individuals
Part not rejecting the 
null on a 5% level
Total number 
of individuals
Table A4.6: An overview of the rationality results of the individual respondents in each industry. 
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How is the forecast behaviour of professional individuals? Are they accurate 
and efficient, and how are their performances compared to the consensus’ 
performance? Do their forecasts differ in the special episodes of the Volcker 
disinflation and in the recent financial crisis? And are individuals employed in 
certain industries outperforming individuals employed in other industries? This 
thesis examines these issues, using survey data of the one-year ahead inflation 
rate in the United States, derived from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
Several aspects of the forecasting behaviour of individuals are highlighted. The 
consensus mean and median forecasts and most individuals are unbiased. They 
also pass some efficiency tests, even though they are not strong-form rational. The 
performance of consensus forecasts is better than the performance of the major-
ity of individuals, though several individuals make accurate forecasts. Even though 
individual differences exist, there are few differences between the forecasters 
employed in different industry categories. The forecasters performed were worse 
during the Volcker disinflation, though not as bad as we might expect. And during 
the recent financial crisis, the performances of forecasters have not worsened. 
Additionally, the forecasts seem to have improved over time. 
